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“Just as ancient peoples needed, above all, a common faith to live by, so 
we need justice”.  
Durkheim (1930/1998, p. 382) 
 
 
“‘Justice’, as we shall use the term, means the active process of 
remedying or preventing that which would arouse the sense of injustice” 
Cahn (1949, p. 13) 
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The three studies that are presented in chapters 1, 2 and 4 and the conceptual model 
that is proposed in chapter 3 of this dissertation are the main pieces of a global research 
program that tries to give answers to the question “how and why do managers correct 
injustice in the workplace?” As such, they have already been presented at international 
conferences, and been published or about to be published in French- and English- speaking 
international journals (see Appendix B). 
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GENERAL ABSTRACT 
 
 
Traditional organizational justice research has documented the impact (in)justice 
perceptions have on a host of employees’ attitudes and behaviors. This perspective has been 
named the reactive perspective of organizational justice. Other works show what an 
organization has to do to be considered as behaving in a just way. This orientation has been 
called the proactive orientation of organizational justice. Proactive justice studies are scarcer 
especially concerning the way supervisors manage their subordinates’ justice perceptions. 
Given the impact managers have on their subordinates at work, in this dissertation I attempt to 
better understand the dynamics of their just and unjust behaviors.  
Reactive justice studies have well documented the influence managers have in the 
shaping of their subordinates’ perceptions. Managers have the power to correct organizational 
injustices at work. In particular, a robust finding is that a manager behaving interactionally 
fairly can compensate for unjust formal procedures and unfair reward allocations. However, 
to the best of my knowledge, no study has specifically investigated these corrective justice 
behaviors of the managers from a proactive point of view. Thus, I aim to understand “How 
and why do managers correct injustice at work?” I address this global question in four 
complementary ways.  
In a first study, I investigated the antecedents of managers’ tendency not to use 
interactional corrective justice behaviors. Interactional justice perceptions concern the extent 
to which employees feel they have been treated with politeness, respect, and compassion 
(interpersonal justice) and whether they believe they have received adequate, timely, and 
personalized explanations (informational justice). Given the positive effects of both 
interpersonal and informational facets of interactional justice, it is puzzling that managers 
often, when they have to announce a decision that they know will have a negative and / or 
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unfair impact on their subordinates, distance themselves and act in interactionally unjust ways 
– a phenomenon referred to as the “Churchill effect”. My first study tested this Churchill 
effect and distinguished its interpersonal and informational dynamics. I conducted an 
experiment (n=118) that showed that on the one hand the informational injustice component 
was linked to situational factors (managers avoided giving explanations when they view the 
situation itself as being unjust). On the other hand, the interpersonal component was predicted 
by interindividual factors (managers behaved unjustly by avoiding showing politeness, 
respect, and compassion when they lacked adequate social competencies).  
Thus, the results confirmed the existence of the Churchill effect, showing that the 
more unjust the managers found a situation, the less likely were they to correct it, using 
informational justice. Moreover, the less assertive the managers, the less likely were they to 
correct the injustice using interpersonal justice. Besides, manager’s identification with their 
firm had a negative impact on their interpersonal and informational justice behaviors. 
Identification also had a moderating effect on the relationship between managers’ procedural 
justice judgments and their informational justice behaviors so that this relationship was 
stronger for high identifiers. However, the experiment also showed that managers might use 
other kinds of corrective justice strategies than interactional justice behaviors. 
I conducted a second exploratory study (n=35) to identify managers’ other corrective 
justice strategies. This study helped reveal a heretofore unstudied strategy to correct injustice 
at work. This strategy consisted of allocating something extra, belonging to the company, not 
for its formal or intended use, to restore justice (for example, managers might distribute 
benefits such as free time, personal use of equipment, extra training or bonuses to victims of 
injustice). It occurred “under the radar” (without more senior managers’ or other employees’ 
knowledge). Thus, I labelled this strategy an invisible remedies strategy.  
The fair hand of managers 
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In this second study I compared this strategy to the other managerial corrective justice 
strategies that emerged from the data. Managers were more likely to use invisible remedies to 
compensate for organizational distributive injustices that resulted from the deficiencies in the 
formal reward system (i.e. lack of bonuses and pay increases, low salaries, promotions that 
were refused…) rather than to correct other types of injustices. They were more likely to react 
in this way when injustices violated their sense of equity rather than their sense of equality or 
need. Finally, their primary motivation appeared to be to restore justice in the workplace even 
if they knew that these attempts mainly mitigated negative reactions in the short run without 
fundamentally solving any real source of injustice in the long run. 
 In order to better understand this invisible corrective justice strategy, I built a 
conceptual model linking the organizational justice literature and sociological studies about 
organizational theft. This work allowed me to make research propositions concerning the 
forms invisible remedies might take in the workplace and the conditions under which 
managers are most likely to use them. In particular, I proposed that the more important 
morality is for a manager, the more likely he or she is to use invisible remedies to correct a 
work injustice.  
I labeled Robin Hoodism the use of this strategy by the managers and the Robin Hood 
effect the impact invisible remedies can have on employees’ subsequent behaviors. This 
impact was proposed to be favorable for the manager and unfavorable for the firm. Further, I 
proposed that invisible remedies can reduce the negative reactions resulting from distributive, 
procedural and interactional injustices due to their ability to address employees’ instrumental, 
relational and moral motives.  
Finally, in a scenario study (n=187) preliminary quantitative support was found for  
aspects of the proposed model, namely the importance of distributive and interpersonal 
injustices and of managers’ moral identity in predicting the managers’ allocation of invisible 
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remedies. The research showed that an interaction between distributive and interpersonal 
injustice experienced by a subordinate predicted managers’ Robin Hoodism, and that the 
moral identity of managers moderated this interaction. Managers who were low moral 
identifiers did behave as modern organizational Robin Hoods to correct either distributive or 
interpersonal injustices experienced by their subordinates. However, only managers who were 
high moral identifiers corrected interpersonal injustices in this way even at a high level of 
distributive justice.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
G.I.1. ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE RESEARCH 
 
The favorability of a promotion decision is a significant predictor of the recipient’s 
organizational commitment and intention to quit right after the allocation. But the justice1 
judgment about this outcome, or about the procedure that was followed to attain it, 
significantly predicts organizational commitment, turnover and job satisfaction not only 
during this short-term post-allocation phase but also before the decision and one year later 
(Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003). “The traditional emphasis in organizational justice work has 
been on [such] demonstrations of the basic justice phenomena” (Blader & Tyler, 2005, p 
331).  
As an introductory definition, I propose that when individuals assess the fairness of an 
event at work, they are evaluating whether or not this event is morally appropriate or ethically 
proper (Cropanzano, Stein & Nadisic, 2008). Since Adams’ seminal article (Adams, 1965) 
organizational justice research shows that fairness matters for many people in many 
situations. His equity theory proposed that, to be sure that they’re treated fairly, people 
sometimes even accept to have their own outcomes lowered (Adams, 1963). With regard to 
the fairness of the procedures and social interactions, research has also shown a “fair process 
effect” (Folger, Rosenfield, Grove & Corkran, 1979). It focuses on the “positive effect that 
people’s procedural fairness perceptions have on their subsequent reactions” (Van den Bos, 
2005, p. 274). This fair process effect is arguably the most replicated and robust finding in the 
literature on organizational justice and one of the most frequently observed phenomena and 
                                                 
1
 As is usual in the organizational justice literature, I use the two terms justice and fairness interchangeably. 
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among the basic principles in the organizational behavior and management literature 
(Greenberg, 2000).  
As for managers who are in a proactive position, which means that they allocate 
working means and rewards to their subordinates, justice matters too. In a case vignette study 
on managers who had to make bonus allocations, it was proved that justice motives per se 
figure prominently in the way managers resolve allocation problems (Meindl, 1989). Finally, 
third-party observers can also react to violations of justice: numerous customers who were 
made aware of a report on Nike’s employment practices in Third World countries, which 
showed that employees had quite often been physically and sexually abused, withdrew their 
support from the company. As a result, Nike’s sales decreased and its stock prices went down 
significantly (Ellard & Skarlicki, 2002).   
Employees’ justice judgments have been traditionally studied in organizational justice 
research in situations in which an authority figure makes some sort of decision that impacts 
one or more members of a collective. This is why justice is “almost always examined in a 
hierarchical decision-making context” (Colquitt, Greenberg, & Scott, 2005, p. 595). The 
underlying model that researchers have in mind is as follows: a supervisor allocates resources 
to subordinates. This allocation conforms with some distributive rule, generally the equity 
rule, and is a result of a formal procedure, that people assess in order to assure that this 
procedure is fair. When the allocation is concretely made and communicated, a social 
interaction occurs between the supervisors and their employees. It is then that the 
interpersonal and informational characteristics of this social process make the employees feel 
interpersonally and informationally more or less fairly treated. 
Four types of justice judgments exist. First, employee make distributive justice 
judgments when receiving rewards in exchange for the work they have done. These rewards, 
whether they are constituted by pay, bonus, benefits or other, can be considered as 
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“distributive justice antecedents” that affect perceptions of distributive justice (Ambrose & 
Arnaud, 2005, p. 66). The judgment itself follows a mechanism based on the contribution (or 
equity) rule (Adams, 1965). That is the employees calculate a ratio of the amount they receive 
and the inputs they make and then compare their personal ratio to a referent other. The 
employees feel that they are treated with fairness if they find that the two ratios are equal. 
Employees can react positively even if their outcome is unfavorable, provided that their inputs 
have been correspondingly reduced, or, if their inputs have remained stable, provided that the 
referent person’s ratio remains similar.  
People also make procedural justice judgments. It is generally assumed that there are 
seven antecedents to procedural justice (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005, p. 66; Thibaut & Walker 
1975, 1978; Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza & Fry, 1980; Colquitt, 2001): the 
opportunity to express one’s views, the opportunity to have some influence on the outcomes, 
the consistency with which the procedure is applied, the suppression of bias in the decision 
making process, the accuracy of the information used for the decision, the right to appeal the 
outcome and lastly the ethicality of the procedure. These antecedents are deemed second 
order antecedents: it is when they receive outcomes, such as pay or bonuses… (which are first 
order antecedents) that the employees make their procedural judgment. When these seven 
antecedents are present, employees feel that the procedure is fairer than when these 
antecedents are absent. However, there could be some variation in the number of procedural 
justice antecedents. In this respect, there has been a warning that procedural justice must not 
be assimilated to its antecedents (Mikula, 2005). Still, a lot of studies have proved that these 
seven antecedents are relevant to many allocations and situations (Colquitt, 2001, Jouglard-
Trischler & Steiner, 2005).  
A last aspect of justice concerns interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986) – the 
perceived fairness of a supervisor’s treatment, which consists of two dimensions:  
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interpersonal and informational justice judgments (Greenberg, 1993a; Colquitt, 2001). 
Employees who experience an interaction with an authority try to determine its informational 
fairness, by seeing if the following five antecedents are present: candid communication, 
thorough explanations, reasonable explanations, timely communication and personalized 
communication. They make their interpersonal justice judgment by seeing if four further 
antecedents are present: politeness, dignified treatment, respect, and absence of improper 
remarks and comments. 
Note that some conceptualizations of justice (for example the group-oriented 
conceptualizations2 of justice) consider only two global justice judgments: the justice 
judgment about the allocation and the justice judgment about the process, which is often 
simply called procedure, in a broad sense (i.e., encompassing both the judgment regarding 
formal procedures and the judgment regarding informal interpersonal and informational 
justice). This view acknowledges that the procedural, interpersonal and informational justice 
judgments are closer to each other than to the distributive justice judgment (see table 1).   
 
TABLE 1:  
Correlations between the Different Types of Justice 
 
Corrected 
population 
correlations 
Distributive 
justice 
Procedural justice 
(in a strict sense) 
Interpersonal 
justice 
Informational 
justice 
Distributive justice 
 
 
 .57 .42 .46 
Procedural justice 
(in a strict sense) 
 
 .63 
 
.58 
Interpersonal 
justice 
 .66 
 
 
 
  
Adapted from Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter & Ng, (2001) 
 
                                                 
2
 The group-value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988), the relational model (Tyler & Lind, 1992) and the group 
engagement model (Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). 
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GI.2. THE IMPACT OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE AT WORK 
 
Why is it important to study justice judgments? For organizational justice researchers 
the answer is usually: because of their strong effects at work. A large body of research has 
shown that more favorable effects result when employees feel justly treated versus when they 
feel unjustly treated (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter & Ng, 2001). Two positive effects of 
justice can be distinguished, according to the main type of justice considered: the fair process 
effect and the fair distributive effect.  
The fair process effect, or the positive effect that a fair process3 has on recipient’s 
subsequent attitudes and behaviors, is now a well-documented phenomenon (Folger et al., 
1979; Greenberg 2000, Van den Bos, 2005). It has almost become the standard on which one 
evaluates the interest of organizational justice research. Along the same lines, before the 
introduction of procedural justice (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978; Leventhal, 1980; 
Leventhal et al., 1980; Greenberg & Folger, 1983), another important effect had been proved: 
the positive effect that distributive justice has on subsequent attitudes and behaviors (Adams, 
1965) labelled the fair distribution effect. This effect has been pointed out only recently (Lind 
& van den Bos, 2002; Skitka, Winquist, & Hutchinson 2003, van den Bos, Vermunt, & 
Wilke, 1997). Notice that the fair process effect and the fair distributive effect pertain to 
recipients’ (or observers’) positive reactions vis-à-vis the allocator, who is in an 
organizational context, a manager or the firm. 
However, whatever the interactional, procedural or distributive nature of the justice 
effect, its importance is not fully accounted for as long as one considers it without reference 
to its context. It has been stated that the effect by itself is “obvious – indeed, mundane” 
(Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 2005, p. 527). There is an other important and robust finding in the 
                                                 
3
 Which may correspond to the fairness of a formal procedure or the fairness of an informal interaction (and its 
interpersonal and informational components). 
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organizational justice literature: the interactive effect, which refers to the tendency for 
outcome favorability to interact with procedural fairness or interactional fairness to influence 
employees’ work attitudes and behaviors. Mainly, it takes the following form: “High 
procedural fairness reduce[s] the effect of outcome favorability on employees’ support for 
decisions, decision makers, and organizations, relative to when procedural fairness [is] low.” 
(Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 2005, p. 526). When employees experience a negative outcome, if 
the procedure or the interaction is fair, then, this will mitigate their negative attitudes and 
behaviors. A similar interactive effect with respect to outcome favorability and distributive 
justice, was found in experiments (van den Bos et al., 1997; Lind & Van den Bos, 2002). 
Whatever the kind of justice considered, the well-documented interactive effect shows that 
fairness can mitigate negative reactions that could follow a negative outcome.  
Three integrative theories of organizational justice have tried to explain the 
mechanisms by which justice judgments impact attitudes and behaviors, i.e. the fair process 
and fair distribution effects (Colquitt, Greenberg & Zapata-Phelan, 2005). Each explanation 
gives a different account for why people react so strongly to justice and injustice in the 
workplace. The group-oriented conceptualizations of justice suggest that justice is valued 
because it indicates a full membership in the work group and hence helps employees to foster 
self-esteem (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Lind, 1992; Tyler & Blader, 2000, 2003). Fairness 
Theory relates the unfavorable event to an identifiable source of responsibility (for example 
the supervisor or the organization as a whole). Thus, when people process their “would” 
(would I have been better off if the event that currently impacts me had not happened?), 
“could” (could the managers responsible of this state of fact have acted differently?) and 
“should” (should they have behaved differently?) judgments, their justice judgment is 
critically useful. It gives employees clear information about whom to blame for their negative 
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outcomes (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). Finally, for the heuristic conceptualizations4, 
procedural or interactional justice may be the base of the whole justice judgment for people 
who do not have enough information to process their distributive justice judgment about an 
outcome they receive (Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & de Vera Park, 1993; van den Bos, Vermunt, 
& Wilke, 1997; Lind, 2001), the reverse also holds: people use their distributive justice 
judgments as a cue to assess their global justice judgment when they lack information about 
the process. More generally, employees’ justice judgment’s role is important as it reassures 
them and allows them to cope with stressful uncertain situations (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; 
Van den Bos & Lind, 2002).  
All three theories help explain the interaction effect between the favorability of the 
outcome and justice. For the group-oriented conceptualizations, justice reduces the effect of 
short-term outcome valence because employees give more importance to long-term 
relationships. For Fairness Theory, the interactive relationship is due to the fact that high 
justice means that there is no one to blame and therefore no injustice, thus no antagonistic 
reactions, even in presence of an unfavorable event. For heuristic conceptualizations, when 
receiving a negative outcome, people may feel uncertain and they may fear being in a out-of-
control condition. Depending on which information is available, individuals process their 
distributive, procedural or interactional justice judgment. If the outcome, procedure or 
interaction is seen as fair, this makes people think the situation is stable and under control. 
This reassures them and helps them to accept the negative outcome. 
 Thus, justice is important because it has favorable effects on employees’ behaviors at 
work through the fair process effect and the fair distribution effect. Justice is especially 
important when outcomes are negative, a phenomenon known as the interactive effect 
between outcome favorability and fairness. Justice is also important because its absence can 
                                                 
4
 Fairness Heuristic Theory (Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & de Vera Park, 1993; Van den Bos, Vermunt, & Wilke, 
1997; Lind, 2001) and Uncertainty Management Theory (Lind & Van den Bos, 2002; Van den Bos & Lind, 
2002). 
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have deleterious effects at work. According to Conlon, Meyer, and Nowakowski (2005), 
people can react to injustice at work in three different ways. They can decrease their “good” 
behaviors (like organizational citizenship behaviors, compliance, or performance), increase 
their “bad” reactions (absenteeism, turnover, or neglect), or even start to behave in “ugly” 
ways (by sabotaging or implementing organizational retaliatory behaviors).  
 Finally, one robust and intriguing result of justice research is that the different types of 
justice not only interact with outcome favorability but also the one with the other. Scholars 
have found that the justice judgment regarding the process (the formal procedure as well as 
the informal interaction) interacts with distributive justice (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). 
Specifically, unfavorable reactions are strongest when both forms of fairness are low, 
Negative responses are greatly reduced when one or both of procedures or outcome is judged 
as fair. Thus, by being interactionally just a manager can mitigate unfavorable reactions that 
could arise due to unfair outcomes. However, as I will show in chapter 1, managers are 
unlikely to behave interpersonally fairly when they have to implement and announce an unfair 
decision.  
The three integrative theories of justice have proposed an explanation to account for 
this interactive effect between the fairness of a distribution and the fairness of a process 
(Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 2005). First, for the relational models of justice when authorities are 
procedurally just, employees give less importance to the fairness of their short term outcomes 
and remain confident that in the long run, their interests will be fairly taken into account by 
their managers. Second, according to Fairness Theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001), the 
effect of outcome fairness on employees’ reactions depends on the degree to which they hold 
the decision maker accountable for the decision. A fair process means that the manager is not 
responsible for the unjust outcomes. For example, an external factor, such as loss of 
customers, can mean employees earn less through no fault of their own (Greenberg, 1990a). 
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Employees view their manager as more responsible for a distributively unjust outcomes when 
the manager exhibits lower procedural or interactional fairness. Third, according to 
Uncertainty Management Theory (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 2005), employees use procedural 
fairness judgments to make sense of the events in situations that have a high degree of 
uncertainty (Lind & van den Bos, 2002).  A high level of procedural fairness can either make 
an outcome seem more distributively fair, or can give employees a sense of global control and 
reassurance concerning the general rules and functioning of their firm.  
From a moral perspective of justice (Folger, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001), 
procedural injustice (and interpersonal injustice in particular) raises moral concerns more 
strongly than other aspects of justice because it constitutes a lack of dignified treatment from 
a clearly identified source. Although unfair outcomes are an inevitable part of organizational 
life, employees feel they deserve to be treated with dignity and respect. Therefore, when 
procedural (and in particular interpersonal) and distributive injustices coincide, employees are 
more willing to retaliate against their managers (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). 
 The moral perspective shows that justice is important as an end in itself. Thus, one 
might treat people fairly simply because it is the right thing to do. As I will show in chapter 4, 
the interactive effect between the justice of the outcome and the justice of the process can also 
occur with respect to managers’ justice corrective behaviors. The moral view of justice will be 
used to predict the shape of this effect. 
 
G.I.3. THE CORRECTIVE JUSTICE ROLE OF THE MANAGER 
 
Traditional organizational justice research has investigated the impact of justice on a 
host of employees’ attitudes and behaviors and explored the reasons why they react so 
strongly to fairness and unfairness. This perspective, consisting of studying what effects the 
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fairness of outcomes, procedures or interactional treatment has on employees’ reactions and 
the motives that explain these reactions, has been termed the reactive perspective of 
organizational justice (Greenberg & Wiethoff, 2001). Related work shows what a manager 
has to do to be considered as behaving in a just way (Bobocel & Zdaniuk, 2005; Chen, 1995; 
Deutsch, 1985; Martin & Harder, 1994). Studies of the organizational features and managerial 
behaviors that are likely to be considered just, has been termed the proactive orientation of 
organizational justice (Greenberg & Wiethoff, 2001). The proactive justice perspective, 
especially regarding procedural and interactional justice, has received less research attention 
than the reactive justice perspective. Surprisingly, very few proactive studies have focused on 
the way supervisors manage their subordinates’ justice judgments (for exceptions see 
Greenberg, 1988, 1990b). Given the impact managers have on their subordinates (Yukl, 
2006), it would be worthwhile to try to better understand the dynamics of their just and unjust 
behaviors, in order to be able to help managers to behave in ways that are likely to be 
regarded by their subordinates as fair. 
Reactive justice studies have well documented the influence managers have in the 
shaping of their subordinates’ judgments. For example, Skarlicki and Folger (1997) showed 
that managers have the power to correct organizational injustices at work. They hypothesized 
and found that employees reacted the most negatively when the justice of the outcome and the 
justice of the process were at a low level. They also proposed that interactional justice 
demonstrated by the manager could be a substitute for organizational procedural justice. 
Indeed, the results showed that a manager behaving interactionally fairly could compensate 
for unjust formal procedural rules. More precisely, when experiencing low levels of 
distributive and procedural justice, employees engaged in retaliatory behaviors at work only 
when interactional justice was also at a low level. In other words, the results showed that 
managers could correct distributive and procedural injustices by being interactionally fair and 
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thus prevent retaliation and revenge by their subordinates. Other studies provide consistent 
evidence that managers’ interactional justice behaviors can compensate for low distributive 
and procedural injustice (Cropanzano, Slaughter & Bachiochi, 2005; Goldman, 2003). 
Research has even shown that managers trained to be interactionally fair helped their 
subordinates to better react to a distributive injustice and to experience less insomnia 
(Greenberg, 2006). Managers are also likely to use means other  than interactional injustice to 
provide justice to their subordinates. They might mitigate a negative outcome using 
discretionary and informal decision making power, especially in the numerous cases when 
there are no formal rules to guide them (Blader & Tyler, 2003). 
Little research has empirically investigated the actions taken to correct and mitigate 
perceived injustice at work. These behaviors have been discussed in various ways. Reb, 
Goldman and Cropanzano (2006) referred to remedial actions. When these actions are 
implemented at the organizational level to correct injustices provoked by the manager, they 
are called organizational remedies. Correcting injustices by compensating the victim is 
referred to as compensatory justice and correcting injustices by punishing the perpetrator is 
known as retributive justice (Darley & Pittman, 2003). Restorative justice has been widely 
used to refer to an action aimed at restoring a sense of justice through renewed value 
consensus between the victim, the perpetrator and the whole community (Umbreit & Coates, 
2006; Wenzel, Okimoto & Feather, 2006; Zehr, 2002). In this sense, restorative justice can be 
distinguished from retributive justice, which involves imposing a punishment, in the form of 
adjudication or revenge.  
From a more general social psychological point of view, a recent work has attempted 
to conceptualize the dynamic process and the mechanisms that underlie the repair of a 
relationship between two parties in which a transgression has occurred (Dirks, Lewicki & 
Zaheer, in press). The model proposed by these authors identified different factors that can 
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damage a relationship after a transgression has occurred: trust, negative affect and negative 
exchange. Propositions were made concerning the power of symbolic actions like apologies 
or substantive actions like incentives to repair each of these factors. This work shows the 
importance to attempt to correct a transgression in order to prevent its negative consequences.  
The corrective justice behaviors of the managers is a promising area in which to run 
proactive studies about organizational justice. In the present dissertation, I refer to the range 
of actions aimed at correcting injustices in the workplace as corrective justice, a label first 
introduced by French (1964) to describe a way of seeking “to remedy mistakes in the 
allocation of rewards and penalties” (French, 1964, p. 412).  
More precisely, I studied in the present dissertation managerial corrective justice. 
Correcting an injustice can involve correcting the transgression that was the source of the 
injustice. This would be the case if a manager allocated different tasks to a subordinate 
because the current tasks they are handling have been unjustly allocated to them (see chapter 
2). Alternatively, correcting an injustice can also involve correcting its consequences. For 
example, a manager that shows interpersonal justice to subordinates can help better react to 
negative outcomes and experience less insomnia (Greenberg, 2006). In addition, correcting an 
injustice can involve the use of material means, such as financial compensation, or symbolic 
means, such as the justification provided for an unjust decision. 
Therefore, I define managerial corrective justice behaviors as the material and 
symbolic strategies used by managers to correct either the sources or the consequences of 
injustices experienced by their subordinates at work. Injustice is pervasive at work and often 
independent of direct managers’ behaviors (Frost, 2006). The organization doesn’t often try to 
correct these systemic injustices that remain and produce negative effects (Beugré & Baron, 
2001; Sheppard, Lewicki & Minton, 1992). Therefore it is of particular interest to study 
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managerial corrective justice behaviors regarding injustices experienced by their subordinates 
and produced by the organization itself. 
 
G.I.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Given the importance of employees’ (in)justice judgments, the important role that  
managers can play in shaping their subordinates’ justice judgments, and the current gap in the 
literature regarding managers’ proactive, corrective justice behaviors, I posed the following 
question: 
 
How and why do managers correct injustice at work? 
 
This global question can be expressed in three more focused research sub-questions 
(Q1, Q2 and Q3): 
 
Recent calls have been made to identify and empirically test the antecedents of just 
and unjust managers’ behaviors (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003). The few studies to date in this 
area mainly concerned the determinants of interactional justice behaviors (Folger & Skarlicki, 
1998; Korsgaard, Robertson & Rymph, 1998; Gilliland & Schepers, 2003). One paradoxical 
result shown by these studies is that, in spite of the efficiency of interactional justice in 
correcting other forms of injustice, managers were unlikely to use it. In chapter 1, I sought to 
add to this body of work investigating interactional “fairness as a dependent variable5” 
(Folger & Skarlicki, 2001) by identifying and testing antecedents of managers’ unfair 
                                                 
5
 This expression puts the emphasis on the fact that what is under study is the justice behaviors. In fact, in the 
organizational justice field, the real dependent variables are always fairness judgments about these behaviors 
(usually employees’ judgments) and thus cannot be fairness behaviors by themselves. 
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interactional behaviors, that make bad times worse instead of correcting the injustices 
experienced by their subordinates.  
Four factors were tested: the distributive and procedural unfairness of the situation to 
which the managers had to react, their level of empathy and assertiveness and the extent to 
which they identified with their organization. In addition, this research tested whether both 
aspects of interactional justice (interpersonal justice, and informational justice) had distinct 
antecedents. In sum, this first study attempted to answer my first research question:  
 
Q1: What factors prevent managers from using interpersonal and informational 
justice to correct injustices at work? 
  
However, managers’ behaviors toward their subordinates at work go far beyond their 
mere use of interpersonal and informational treatment. For instance, managers might use their 
discretionary and informal decision making power (Blader & Tyler, 2003) to correct 
injustices in other, more concrete, ways - a possibility that to date has not been included in the 
concept of interactional justice. It is of great interest to identify these other corrective 
behaviors and their antecedents. Hence, my second research question:  
 
Q2: In what other ways do managers correct unfairness at work? 
 
In chapter 2, I answered this second research question by identifying a strategy 
whereby managers actions consist of allocating something extra, belonging to the company, 
not for its formal or intended use, to restore justice (for example, managers may distribute 
benefits such as free time, personal use of equipment, extra training or bonuses to victims of 
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injustice). Because this often occurs “under the radar” (without more senior managers’ or 
other employees’ knowledge), this strategy was referred to as an invisible remedies strategy.  
 
My third and last research question was specifically focused on a better understanding 
of this strategy:  
 
Q3: Given managers’ use of invisible remedies, what are the antecedents of this 
strategy?  
 
 I answered this last question in two different ways. First, in chapter 3, I developed a 
conceptual model in order to better understand this specific managerial corrective strategy. 
This work allowed me to make research propositions concerning the forms invisible remedies 
might take in the workplace, the conditions under which managers are most likely to use 
them, and the impact invisible remedies can have on employees’ subsequent behaviors. 
 Second, in chapter 4, I tested, firstly, whether the robust phenomenon of the 
interactive effect between the justice of the process and the justice of the outcome predicted 
managers’ use of invisible remedies, and, secondly, whether the moral identity of managers 
moderated the effects of the justice of the process and the justice of the distribution. 
 
G.I.5. A NOTE ON METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY 
 
G.I.5.1. THE “METHODOLOGICAL FIT” 
 
Research methods used in this dissertation need to be consistent with the 
characteristics of each specific research question. For Edmondson and McManus (2004), this 
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methodological fit is an “implicitly valued attribute of high-quality field research in 
organizations” (Edmonson & McManus, 2004, p. 1). Because too often “the use of 
quantitative data and statistical inference constitutes an assumed default approach” (p. 4.), 
these authors propose a contingency framework consisting in three distinct research patterns. 
In each pattern, the current state of theory and research has to be congruent with 
methodological choices in order to ensure these two components being mutually reinforcing. 
In their typology the state of prior theory and research can be seen as an independent variable 
as it is a fixed context “over which the researcher has no control” (p. 5).  
In mature theories, researchers have accumulated knowledge over a significant period 
of time, such that there is general agreement regarding some well-developed constructs, 
relationships between them, and theoretical mechanisms that explain these relationships. 
Well-tested measurement scales are widely used across projects. Research in such an area is 
focused on refining existing theories using highly focused questions. Often, quantitative data 
coming from surveys or experiments is useful to test formal hypotheses logically derived 
from theory and prior research. Methods of analysis are usually based on statistical inference. 
In contrast, nascent theory is characterized by the study of phenomena about which 
little is known. In some cases, no previous theory exists, so working in this area consists in 
part of presenting possible new relationships and explanations. Research questions in such 
areas are often open-ended. The research process is often inductive and involves qualitative 
data collected by ethnographic immersion or exploratory interviews. Methods of analysis are 
often based on thematic content analysis, with connections proposed to try to make sense of 
the data. Tentative answers address how and why questions and thus need not always be 
formally demonstrated.  
Intermediate theory lies between the above two extremes. It concerns tentative 
constructs that lack conceptual development and measures or involves different models 
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coming from separate bodies of work that have never been integrated. Research in this area 
usually explores alternative explanations of the data and propose new relationships between 
new and established constructs. Open-ended inquiry in a narrow domain is usually combined 
with testable hypotheses. New measures of constructs are often tested and qualitative and 
quantitative data are often analysed with, respectively, content analysis or exploratory 
statistics. Although research at the intermediate theory level aims to provide provisional 
theories that are able to integrate separate areas of knowledge, “the blend can be difficult to 
integrate” (p. 21).  
For Edmonson and McManus (2004), in every area of interest one can find theories 
that are “anywhere on the continuum”, from nascent to mature. (p. 8), depending on the kind 
of specific questions one is concerned with. It is this congruence between the state of past 
work and the methodological choices (the research question and the research design) that help 
a study make “a compelling new contribution to the literature” (p. 25). 
The Edmonson and Mc Manus (2004) contingency framework was used to build my 
methodological strategy.  
 
GI.5.2. THREE CONTINGENT METHODOLOGICAL CHOICES 
 
Following Edmonson and McManus’ (2004) advice, I have tried to make my research 
methods congruent with the current state of the field regarding each of my research questions.  
 
G.I.5.2.1. Chapter 1: An experiment to investigate  the antecedents of managers’ 
tendency not to use interactional corrective justice behaviors 
My first research question regards the antecedents of managers’ unlikeliness to use 
interactional corrective justice behaviors. Interactional justice is now a mature concept. 
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Researchers have accumulated knowledge about this construct, since Bies and Moag (1986) 
formally introduced it. The splitting of interactional justice in two components, interpersonal 
and informational justice, is more recent. However, it has already received empirical support 
showing that both constructs have independent and additive effects on employees’ reactions 
(Greenberg, 1993b, 1994, Colquitt, 2001). A now widely accepted scale has been developed 
to measure interpersonal and informational justice (Colquitt, 2001). The importance of 
interactional justice behaviors in correcting distributive and procedural injustice is also well 
accepted (Cropanzano, Slaughter & Bachiochi, 2005; Goldman, 2003; Greenberg, 2006; 
Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Regarding the proactive view of interactional justice, only a few 
empirical studies have so far tested situational antecedents of managers’ interactional justice 
behaviors (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; Gilliland & Schepers, 2003; Korsgaard, et al., 1998, 
Patient & Skarlicki, in press) though there has been conceptual work in this area (Masterson, 
Byrne, & Mao, 2005; Patient & Skarlicki, in press). In addition, the “Churchill effect” 
explaining why managers may be motivated to distance themselves from their subordinates 
when communicating them bad news, has been proposed (Folger, 1993) and tested  (Folger & 
Skarlicki, 1998). A conceptual paper has linked the Churchill effect with interactional justice 
(Folger & Skarlicki, 2001).  
Thus, it appears that the field is now ripe for research regarding the antecedents of 
managers’ interactional (in)justice behaviors: What factors are likely to be the main 
determinants of managers’ interactional (in)justice behaviors? Do interpersonal and 
informational justice behaviors have different kinds of antecedents? Do situational and 
interindividual antecedents have a distinct impact on interpersonal and informational justice 
behaviors? These questions are important. Indeed, they allow predictors of managers’ 
interactional justice behaviors to be identified. To date, interactional justice behaviors 
represent the only managerial corrective strategy studied in the justice literature. Thus, it is a 
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good starting point in my study of the forms and antecedents of managers’ corrective justice 
behaviors. 
Due to the maturity of the extant theory, hypothetical and deductive approach seem 
well suited to the investigation of these questions. According to Edmonson and McManus 
(2004, p. 10) “the most compelling test of a theory may be experimental”. Specifically, I used 
an experimental methodology to test formal hypotheses concerning the antecedents of 
managerial interactional (in)justice behaviors.  
The contribution of this work was twofold: (1) new conceptual refinements were 
proposed that differentiated situational from interindividual antecedents and that predicted 
distinct effects on interpersonal and informational justice behaviors, and (2) these predictions 
were tested using an experimental methodology and practicing managers.    
 
G.I.5.2.2. Chapter 2: An exploratory study to investigate additional ways managers 
correct injustice at work, including their antecedents  
I have found some support (see chapter 1), for the hypotheses proposed regarding the 
antecedents of interactional corrective justice behaviors, which may practically help to make 
managers behave more fairly at work. However, the results also showed that managers were 
likely to be interactionally unfair when applying an unjust decision on their subordinates. 
Why? Because they tried to protect their social self. Thus, interactional justice might not be a 
widely used managerial corrective strategy.  
An important follow-up question becomes: Do managers use other corrective justice 
strategies? To date, organizational justice researchers have studied corrective justice at the 
organizational level. Reb, Goldman and Cropanzano (2006) for instance defined an 
organizational remedy as “an action carried out by an organization with the intention of 
creating in the mind of an aggrieved worker the judgment that the perceived injustice has 
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been atoned for.” (p. 34). They studied which actions were implemented at the organizational 
level to correct injustices provoked by the manager. In contrast, to the best of my knowledge, 
corrective justice strategies (other than interactional justice strategy) have not been studied at 
the managers’ level.  
This state of prior work is characteristic of a nascent theory. No previous theory exists 
about the phenomenon I was studying. Thus, this research question could not lead to formal 
theory-driven hypotheses. It had to be open-ended and the method had to be inductive and 
based on qualitative data. I used an explorative methodology involving qualitative interviews 
of 35 managers in one firm. They were asked to describe the kind of behaviors they 
implemented after one of their subordinates had experienced injustice at work. They were also 
asked to describe their motives and the consequences they thought their reactions brought. 
The interviews were content coded and analysed using N’Vivo 7® software. Based on this 
analysis, I presented a tentative typology of managers’ corrective justice strategies at work 
and identified an under-researched corrective strategy that I named Robin Hoodism. I 
proposed tentative connections between this strategy and some antecedents linked to the 
situation or to managers’ characteristics (see chapter 2).  
   
G.I.5.2.3. Chapter 3 and 4: The conceptual model of Robin Hoodism and a scenario 
study investigating its antecedents 
One of the more interesting findings of the explorative study was the identification of the 
managerial corrective justice strategy of Robin Hoodism: allocating something extra to their 
subordinates in order to restore justice (for example, benefits such as free time, personal use 
of equipment, extra training, or bonuses). Because this strategy occurred “under the radar” 
(without the knowledge of more senior managers or other employees), I referred to this 
approach as an invisible remedies strategy. My final research question was addressed at 
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understanding this strategy and its antecedents. Because the concept of invisible remedies was 
relatively new, conceptual development was required. Accordingly, I integrated different 
areas of knowledge (including previous work relating to organizational theft, organizational 
justice, and moral identity). In chapter 3, I proposed  relationships between this new construct 
and other well established concepts (such as distributive justice, interpersonal justice and 
moral identity). Prior work corresponded to what Edmonson and McManus term 
“intermediate theory”. Thus, using a “mixed methodology” seemed appropriate. In chapter 4, 
I used a scenario study involving a new Robin Hoodism scale to test the relationship between 
managers’ invisible corrective justice strategy, their moral identity and the types of injustice 
that the managers tried to correct. 
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CHAPTER 1: UNDERSTANDING THE CHURCHILL EFFECT: WHAT FACTORS 
PREVENT MANAGERS FROM USING INTERPERSONAL AND 
INFORMATIONAL JUSTICE TO CORRECT INJUSTICES AT WORK? 
 
 
 
1.0. ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
In the present study, I investigated the antecedents of managers’ unlikeliness to use 
interactional justice as a corrective strategy. Interactional justice perceptions concern the 
extent to which employees feel they have been treated with politeness, respect, and 
compassion (interpersonal justice) and whether they believe they have received adequate, 
timely, and personalized explanations (informational justice). Given the positive effects of 
both interpersonal and informational facets of interactional justice, it is puzzling that 
managers often, when they have to announce a decision that they know will have a negative 
and / or unfair impact on their subordinates, distance themselves and act in interactionally 
unjust ways – a phenomenon referred to as the “Churchill effect”. I tested this Churchill effect 
and distinguished its interpersonal and informational dynamics.  
I conducted an experiment (n=118) that showed that on the one hand the informational 
injustice component was linked to situational factors (managers avoided giving explanations 
when they viewed the situation itself as being unjust). On the other hand, the interpersonal 
component was predicted by interindividual factors (managers behaved unjustly by avoiding 
showing politeness, respect, and compassion when they lacked the social competency of 
assertiveness).  
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Besides, manager’s identification with their firm had a direct negative effect on their 
interpersonal and informational justice behaviors. Identification also had a moderating effect 
on the relationship between managers’ procedural justice judgments and their informational 
justice behaviors so that this relationship was stronger for high identifiers. The results also 
showed that managers might use other kinds of corrective justice strategies than mere 
interactional justice behaviors. 
 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
When employees have their salaries reduced by 15%, they may feel unjustly treated 
and react in an antagonistic way by quitting or stealing from the firm. But if they receive a 
sincere justification in a sensitive and respectful way, these reactions can be very significantly 
mitigated (Greenberg, 1990a). Feeling that one has received adequate information and has 
been shown interpersonal sensitivity and respect – when a procedure is implemented that can 
have an effect on one’s outcomes, especially when this impact is unfavorable – is named 
interactional justice (Bies & Moag, 1986).  
More precisely, the concept of interactional justice has been shown to include two 
different constructs: interpersonal justice and informational justice (Bies & Moag, 1986; 
Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993a; Shapiro, Buttner & Barry, 1994;). Interpersonal justice 
pertains to the form of the social interactions (the way things are said) and relates to 
politeness, respect, dignity, and the absence of derogating comments, e.g., sexist or racist 
remarks (Colquitt, 2001). Some researchers also add emotional support and the absence of 
intimidation or manipulation (Greenberg, 2006). Informational justice pertains to the content 
of social interactions (what is said to the employees) i.e. the information given about the 
procedures used to take decisions. It relates to candid communication, thorough and 
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reasonable explanations about procedures, detailed and timely communication, efforts to 
tailor communication to the employees’ specific needs, and efforts to take the necessary time 
to give the explanations and to remain accessible (Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 2006). It has 
been shown that both constructs have independent and additive effects on employees’ 
reactions (Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter & Ng, 2001; Greenberg, 1993b, 1994). 
Regarding the source of interactional justice, Byrne (1999) proposed a model of 
multifoci justice in which interactional justice was hypothesized to exist at both supervisory 
and organizational levels. Rupp and Cropanzano (2002) confirmed that separate foci existed 
for interactional justice. In particular, they showed that supervisory interactional justice is a 
much more important predictor of criteria relevant to both supervisors and organizations than 
organizational interactional justice. 
Organizational justice research (Bies, 2001) has documented effects of interactional 
justice (mainly supervisory interactional justice) on a host of employees’ attitudes and 
behaviors beyond the impact of distributive justice (the fairness of the outcomes received, 
Adams, 1965) and procedural justice (in its restrictive current usual meaning: the fairness of 
the formal procedures used to determine an outcome, Leventhal, 1980; Thibaut & Walker, 
1975). A meta-analysis has distinguished between the effects of interpersonal and 
informational justice. Interpersonal justice strongly relates to agent-referenced evaluation of 
authority and relates moderately to job satisfaction, system-referenced evaluation of authority, 
individual organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBIs) and negative reactions. On the other 
hand, informational justice strongly relates to trust, agent-referenced evaluation of authority, 
system-referenced evaluation of authority and is moderately related to outcome satisfaction, 
job satisfaction, organizational commitment, OCBIs, withdrawal, and negative reactions 
(Colquitt et al., 2001).  
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In spite of the benefits of interpersonal and informational justice, one study found that 
managers can schedule an unexpectedly short amount of time to announce and explain to their 
subordinates a dismissal (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998). A survey of 543 human resource 
managers6, showed that interactionally unjust behaviors during layoffs were usual (Gilliland 
& Schepers, 2003). 25% of the respondents recognized that they had already escorted laid-off 
employees from the premises immediately after informing them of the layoff. Moreover, 33% 
indicated they had a different employee clear up the terminated employee’s work area to 
prevent sabotage.  
These behaviors are not limited to dismissals. They happen in organizations’ everyday 
life (Dejours, 1998; Dubet, 2006). Managers in charge of their firm’s recruitment process 
sometimes do not even inform candidates that they are not selected and thus leave them to 
wait in vain for a second interview, without ever giving information or an apology (Bies & 
Moag, 1986). Managers have also been found to distance themselves from subordinates while 
communicating to them their annual performance reviews (Korsgaard, et al. 1998; Taylor, 
Tracy, Renard, Harrison & Caroll, 1995). Others are interactionally unjust in conditions of 
budget request rejections (Bies & Shapiro, 1987).  
The above examples show that managers’ interactionally unjust behaviors are 
especially likely to happen when the decisions to announce are unfavorable. The paradox is 
that it is in difficult or uncertain situations that interactional justice most strongly shapes 
employees’ work attitudes and behaviors (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Lind & van den 
Bos, 2002; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997; van den Bos & Lind, 2002). So why do managers add 
interactional injustice to situations that are already difficult?  Or more colloquially: why do 
“tough times make tough bosses”? (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998). 
                                                 
6
 The low response rate characterizing this survey (22%) may be due to the fact that respondents who behaved 
fairly could be more prone to answer and thus might have been overrepresented in the sample. Besides, the 
highly sensitive subject under inquiry in this study may have led even participants who did not behave fairly to 
distort their responses in a socially desirable direction.  
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Organizational justice research has largely consisted of studying the effects a certain 
kind of outcome, procedure or treatment has on employees’ justice judgments, attitudes and 
behaviors - the reactive perspective of organizational justice (Greenberg & Wiethoff, 2001). 
Other research investigates what a manager has to do to be considered as behaving in a just 
way (Bobocel & Zdaniuk, 2005; Chen, 1995; Deutsch, 1985; Martin & Harder, 1994), by 
studying the organizational features and managerial behaviors likely to be considered just - 
the proactive orientation of organizational justice (Greenberg & Wiethoff, 2001). Calls have 
recently been made to also study the antecedents of these organizational features and 
managers’ behaviors that promote justice perceptions (Colquitt & Greenberg, 2003). So far, 
relatively few attempts have been made to identify and empirically test these antecedents. 
This approach could better allow one to understand how to create fairer organizations. Indeed, 
this line of research is not focused on the reactions to “what” does a manager nor on “how” a 
manager can behave justly, but on “why” he may be just.  
Interestingly, the research conducted in this area mainly concerns the determinants of 
interactional justice: Folger and Skarlicki (1998) showed the impact that expected blame by 
managers for a negative decision had on their subsequent behavior. Korsgaard, Robertson and 
Rymph (1998) tested the effect of subordinates’ behavior on managers’ interactional justice. 
Gilliland and Schepers (2003) showed that organizational features also had an impact on just 
behaviors. Finally, Patient and Skarlicki (in press) studied individual difference variables and 
showed that the level of moral development and empathy also affected interactional justice.  
The aim of the current study is to add knowledge to the recent body of empirical work 
that considers interactional fairness behavior as a “dependent variable” (Folger & Skarlicki, 
2001). It consists of identifying the impact of situational as well as interindividual variables 
on the interpersonal and informational components of managers’ interactional (in)justice 
behaviors. 
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Specifically, I am going to study in this chapter a recruitment situation. First, 
recruitment processes are important management processes to master for a firm (Igalens & 
Roger, 2007). Second, job applicants are strongly affected by justice, interactional justice in 
particular (Gilliland, 1993; Gilliland & Hale, 2005; Steiner & Gilliland, 1996). Third and last, 
recruitment situations are representative of more general management situations and 
understanding the social-psychological processes linked to justice behaviors in this particular 
setting can then be used to understand other management situations (Folger & Skarlicki, 
2001). The situation I am going to study is a common management situation in which a 
manager has to announce a negative or unjust decision that has already been made at the 
organization’s level. 
 
1.2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
My hypotheses are based on three main bodies of research. The first concerns the 
“Churchill effect”: the most used paradigm to identify situational factors predicting 
interactionally fair and unfair behaviors (Folger & Pugh, 2002; Folger & Skarlicki, 1998; 
Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). I compare this paradigm to “moral outrage repair” (Bies, 1987), 
which makes opposing predictions, and try to reconcile both views. The second body of 
research I rely on concerns the effect of interindividual differences on interactional justice 
behaviors. Most research in this area is conceptual (Folger & Pugh, 2002; Masterson Byrne & 
Mao 2005; Patient & Skarlicki, 2005; c.f., Patient & Skarlicki, in press). Third, I apply 
research on employee identification with the organization to better understand the 
mechanisms underlying interactional (in)justice behaviors. Organizational identification has 
been shown to have an important impact at work, including on justice perceptions (Hogg & 
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Abrams, 1988; Hogg & Terry, 2001; Okimoto, in press, a; Olkkonen & Liponen, 2005). To 
my knowledge, it is the first time this kind of research is used in a proactive study.  
 
1.2.1. THE IMPACT OF THE SITUATION: CHURCHILL EFFECT AND MORAL OUTRAGE REPAIR 
 
 
The term “Churchill effect” comes from the telegram Winston Churchill sent to the 
Japanese ambassador in London to declare war on Japan in 1941. The letter, which was polite 
and respectful in tone, caused great protest among the British population. Churchill justified 
himself by saying: “When you have to kill a man it costs nothing to be polite” (Churchill, 
1950, p. 611). In fact, the reaction of the British shows that there is, at the very least, an 
emotional cost to being interactionally just with someone to whom you are communicating a 
negative outcome or action. The Churchill effect refers to the British public’s preference for 
distancing themselves, and having their leader distance himself from, a party that they are 
communicating a negative and severe outcome to (Folger, 1993).  
When managers implement a decision procedure that has negative consequences for 
an employee, they know that they are inflicting suffering on the employees. A challenging 
situation is created in which the social identities of both the supervisor and the victims are 
threatened, and in which each side will want to “save face” (Goffman, 1971). The employees’ 
self-esteem is threatened by the unfavorable event. The managers self-impressions and 
reputation are threatened by the manager’s association with the negative outcome they have to 
communicate. Managers can choose to implement one of two strategies: an approach strategy 
or an avoidance strategy (Folger & Pugh, 2002). 
The approach strategy consists of behaving interactionally fairly by trying to sincerely 
justify the decision and at the same time show respect and compassion. Bies (1987) refers to 
this as a moral outrage repair strategy, whereby managers are motivated to demonstrate 
respect and concern and to provide social accounts (i.e., explanations or apologies) in order to 
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reduce the “moral outrage” of the harmed employee. This is the approach strategy chosen by 
Churchill when he declared war on Japan. In contrast, an avoidance  strategy consists of 
psychologically and physically distancing oneself from the victim, by giving minimizing 
explanations and by showing no sensitivity or respect, i.e. by being interactionally unjust. 
This is the alternative strongly favored by the British public when they criticized their leader’s 
letter. The Churchill effect refers to this avoidance strategy. 
Using interactional justice, although likely to lead to more favorable employee 
behaviors, can expose managers to employee negative reactions. In addition, managers may 
worry that providing explanations will make them more vulnerable, and that showing 
compassion can be taken by employees as accepting responsibility and moral blame. For these 
reasons, managers might think that helping victims save face can, in fact, endanger their own. 
In these conditions, the Churchill effect is fostered by managers’ desire to protect one’s social 
self (Folger  & Skarlicki, 2001). This avoidance strategy can also lead to a denial of the 
situation and the derogating of the victims. The paradox is that by trying to protect 
themselves, managers produce even stronger negative reactions from employees than if they 
had chosen an approach strategy (Bies, 2001; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997), thereby making bad 
times even worse. For instance, it is in the interest of the firm to avoid legal wrongful-
termination claims. And what research has shown is that the very strongest reason why people 
choose to file such claims is when they feel they have been treated in an insensitive way at the 
time of termination whatever happened during the whole job relationship (Lind, Greenberg, 
Scott & Welchans, 2000).  
Folger and Pugh (2002) describe the Churchill effect as a non-rational ego defense 
strategy. However, in at least some cases, managers use the approach strategy of moral 
outrage repair and behave interactionally fairly. This leads to an important question: Which 
situational factors make the Churchill effect versus the moral outrage repair more likely? I 
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believe that a clear and important characteristic of the situation can help answer the question: 
is the situation unjust or unfavorable? Indeed, unfavorability and injustice have been shown to 
be two different constructs, conceptually as well as empirically (Skitka, Winquist & 
Hutchinson, 2003). 
For Folger and Pugh (2002), the Churchill effect is a special case of the just world 
theory (Lerner, 1980). According to this perspective, third-party observers often distance 
themselves from victims who unjustly suffer in order to avoid distress prompted by a situation 
threatening a belief in a just world. To maintain this belief, people often deny the injustice 
itself, and find a way to believe that victims deserve their fate and as a consequence they do 
not merit an approach strategy. The Churchill effect can be viewed as a just world effect that 
concerns people who are not only observers but also can be responsible for the unjust 
outcome that affects the victims, creating a “threat to the belief in a just self” (Folger & Pugh, 
2002, p 171).   
Other researchers have proposed similar analyses. Milgram (1974) identified the same 
self-protection strategy as the Churchill effect among participants in an experiment in which 
they had to unjustly treat an innocent victim. Dejours (1998) showed that managers adopt ego 
defensive strategies of believing that the harm experienced by their subordinates is the 
employees’ fault or simply due to misfortune, rather than to their own responsibility.  
Only when managers are faced with unjust situations should they be motivated to 
protect their “just social self” by distancing themselves from a victim. In unfavorable (but not 
unjust) situations, managers will not feel such a danger to their fair ego and therefore should 
be more likely to follow the moral outrage repair strategy. Thus, I propose that the Churchill 
effect and the moral outrage repair are not contradictory phenomena, and instead have 
different boundary conditions. This means that I think the incidents I quoted in the 
introduction involved events considered as unjust and not only as unfavorable. 
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Notice that in the organizational justice field, fairness is defined as a subjective justice 
judgment based on some objective antecedents (Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005). Thus, when I talk 
about the (in)justice of the situation, I mean in fact two different things. First, this term relates 
to the objective characteristics of the situation that usually make one judge it unjust, that can 
be called the justice antecedents (Colquitt, 2001). Regarding the outcome, this means that it is 
not in line with the contribution of the recipient in comparison with a referent standard. 
Researchers refer to this rule as the equity rule (Adams, 1965). Regarding the process, 
researchers refer to the procedural rules identified by Thibaut and Walker (1975) and 
Leventhal (1980): voice, consistency, no bias, accurate information, possibility to appeal and 
respect of ethical norms. In this chapter, I will use the generic term of “proper procedure” to 
refer to a process that respects these rules and I will use “improper procedure” to refer to a 
process that doesn’t respect these rules. Second, when talking about the (in)justice of the 
situation, I take the perspective of the manager who judges it. This judgment might be 
different from the objective presence or absence of the distributive and procedural antecedent 
rules that I have mentioned. Rather, it is the subjective way managers frame the situation as 
unjust or simply unfavorable that should influence their interactional justice behaviors. 
Besides, it is worth asking what kind of injustice (distributive or procedural) managers will be 
likely to more be sensitive to and would as a consequence predict their interactionally unfair 
behaviors.  
According to the deontic model of justice (Folger, 1998, 2001), procedural justice 
more strongly raises moral concerns than distributive justice, thereby provoking stronger 
reactions to injustice. According to fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998), a fairness 
judgment involves three counterfactuals: “Would” the situation have been more favorable if 
the current event “wouldn’t” have happened? “Could” the person responsible for this event 
have acted differently? And, finally, “should” the perpetrator have behaved differently? 
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Because procedural fairness gives information about the perpetrator’s behavior, it is more 
likely to lead to “could” and “should” counterfactuals. Thus, I propose that when managers 
frame the situation as procedurally versus distributively unjust (for example, because the 
procedure is biased or based on inaccurate information) they will be more likely to 
demonstrate interactionally unjust behaviors.  
The situational factors that have to date been shown to impact interactional justice 
(subordinate behavior (Korsgaard, et al. 1998), organizational context (Gilliland & Schepers, 
2003), and managerial blameworthiness (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998)) related only to the 
informational component of interactional justice. Because an unjust decision is not easy to 
explain and justify, managers may use fewer social accounts such justifications, when the 
decision is likely to be regarded as unjust. Likewise, Masterson, Byrne and Mao (2005) 
proposed that informational justice behaviors are linked to the content of a message and 
should therefore be predicted by situational rather than interindividual antecedents. Therefore, 
I expect that a managers’ procedural justice judgment of the situation will impact the 
informational component of their interactional justice behaviors. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Situations consisting for managers in implementing and communicating 
inequitable decisions made by improper procedures will lead to lower managers’ 
informationally justice behaviors. 
Hypothesis 1b: The impact of situations consisting for managers in implementing and 
communicating inequitable decisions made by improper procedures on these managers’ 
informational justice behaviors is mediated by managers’ perceptions of procedural justice.  
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1.2.2. THE IMPACT OF MANAGERIAL INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES: EMPATHY AND 
ASSERTIVENESS  
 
Regardless of the situation, several individual differences have been proposed for why 
some managers may be more prone than other managers to distance themselves from their 
subordinates. First, a manager’s level of moral development (Kohlberg, 1981) has been 
suggested, in accordance with the deontic model of justice (Cropanzano, Goldman & Folger 
2003; Folger, 1998, 2001; Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005) by Patient and Skarlicki 
(2005) to have an impact. However, the importance of this variable is questionable since, 
according to one study, 86 % of managers operate at the conventional level of moral 
development (Weber, 1990).  
Four other variables have been suggested as predicting managers’ interactional 
behaviors: empathy (Patient & Skarlicki, 2005; Masterson et al., 2005), agreeableness7 
(Masterson et al., 2005), self-esteem (Patient & Skarlicki, 2005), and the managers’ ability to 
repair the relationship (Folger & Pugh, 2002). These variables do not concern the intrinsic 
moral motivation to be fair, but rather the social skills, which make the just behavior possible. 
In a medical setting for example, it has been shown that it is not sufficient for physicians to be 
motivated to show empathy, compassion, and respect to their patients when announcing them 
unfavorable outcomes to succeed. They  also need to be socially competent (Stuart & 
Lieberman, 2002). 
In the same way, managers may not have the ability to be interactionally fair in terms 
of social skills. Social skills or social competence can be defined as the availability and 
competent use of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral skills that lead to successful social 
interactions. They include such abilities as empathy, collaboration, conflict management, 
assertiveness, and leadership (Pohl, Bender, & Lachmann, 2005). Empathy and assertiveness, 
                                                 
7
 which belongs to the “Big Five” personality taxonomy (McCrae & John, 1992). 
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in particular, are two important components of social competence (Pohl et al., 2005; Sanz de 
Acedo Lizarraga, Ugarte, Cardelle-Elawar, Iriate, & Sanz de Acedo Baquedano, 2003) 
because they are at the root of emotional and social understanding (Broome, 1991; 
Thompson, 1998).  
Empathy refers to congruent emotional responses to another person’s emotional state 
(Davis, 1983; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987). An important affective component of empathy is 
empathic concern: feelings of warmth and concern for a victim (Davis, 1980). Empathic 
concern is linked to prosocial behavior (McNeely & Meglino, 1994) and interactional justice 
behavior (Patient & Skarlicki, in press). I refer to empathic concern as empathy in the present 
chapter. 
Wolpe (1958) defined assertiveness as “the proper expression of any emotion other 
than anxiety toward another person” (Wolpe, 1973, p. 81). Assertiveness was also defined in 
reference to one’s standing up for legitimate rights (Alberti & Emmons, 1970) and has often 
been used interchangeably with aggressiveness (Galassi & Galassi, 1978). For example, 
thirteen of the thirty items of the largely used Rathus assertiveness schedule significantly 
correlate with semantic differential ratings of aggressiveness (Rathus, 1973). Later, Bellack 
and Hersen (1977) emphasized that assertiveness also refers to the respect of others’ rights 
and proposed positioning it at the midpoint of a continuum whose poles are submission and 
aggressiveness. In this sense, assertiveness is the ability to respond in interpersonal relations 
without anxiety and without expressing aggression or anger with undue force (Arrindell, van 
der Ende, Sanderman, Oosterhof, Stewart, & Lingsma, 1999). More recent scales are 
consistent with this view, for example the scale for interpersonal behavior (Arrindell & Van 
der Ende, 1985). Assertiveness relates positively to self-esteem and self-confidence (Rabin & 
Zelner, 1992), the courage of one’s convictions, the ability to defend one’s rights and interests 
and to express positive feelings (Arrindell, et al., 1999). It also predicts others’ acceptance 
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and support and reciprocal and satisfactory relationships generally (Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga 
et al., 2003). 
In sum, empathy helps a person better understand others while assertiveness allows a 
person to better express oneself to the others (Pohl et al., 2005). In consequence, when 
managers have to communicate a negative outcome to their subordinates, empathy allows 
them to understand what the subordinates feels and thus to better appreciate the demands of 
the situation, while assertiveness makes possible for them a direct, open and honest 
expression of this understanding. Empathy and assertiveness are both necessary for many 
social tasks, for example mediation and negotiation (Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al., 2003).  
Because Gilliland & Schepers (2003) were not very successful at predicting 
interpersonal justice behaviors in their survey of human resource managers, they suggested 
that “psychological explanations” could be more useful for the task than the organizational 
variables they studied. In a similar way, when they hypothesized interindividual variables 
(concern for others, empathy and agreeableness) as antecedents of interactional justice 
behaviors, Masterson et al. (2005) proposed their main effect would be on the interpersonal 
component of interactional justice behaviors rather than on the informational justice 
component because interpersonal justice pertains to the way things are said and not to the 
content of the message.  
In the same line of thinking, as empathy and assertiveness pertain to the capability of 
taking the other’s emotions into account and expressing one’s position, I expect a high level 
of these social skills to have an impact on interpersonal justice behaviors. Indeed, it is 
plausible that showing personal sensitivity to the experience of subordinates relies on personal 
competencies while giving a justification doesn’t. Thus both empathy and assertiveness 
should be independently linked to interpersonal justice behaviors. 
Hence my second hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2a: Managers’ social skills (empathy) are directly related to their interpersonal 
justice behaviors so that the lower the managers’ level of social skills (empathy), the less 
interpersonally fair their behavior. 
Hypothesis 2b: Managers’ social skills (assertiveness) are directly related to their 
interpersonal justice behaviors so that the lower the managers’ level of social skills 
(assertiveness), the less interpersonally fair their behavior. 
            
1.2.3. THE MANAGERS’ IDENTIFICATION WITH THE ORGANIZATION: POSITIVE AND 
NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES. 
 
I argue that an additional antecedent to managers’ interactional justice behaviors that 
merits investigating is the managers’ identification with their organization. First, relational 
models of justice have shown the importance of social identity processes in explaining 
reactions to (in)justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992). 
Identification with the group moderates reactions to injustice, even for third parties (Okimoto, 
in press, a). Second, research shows the positive impact of employees’ organizational 
identification on their behaviors at work (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Hogg & Terry, 2001), 
especially on organization focused behaviors such as extra-role behaviors toward the 
organization (Olkkonen & Liponen, 2005). Interactional justice behaviors are positive 
behaviors at work aimed in part at fostering cooperation and as such should be positively 
impacted by organizational identification with the firm. On the other hand, managers who 
identify strongly with their firm might be willing to behave consistently with it when the firm 
is treating their subordinates unfairly or unfavorably . In this case, interactional justice might 
be negatively impacted by organizational identification with the firm. Thus, it is worth 
examining, on the one hand, the direct impact on managers’ interpersonal and informational 
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justice behaviors of their organizational identification. On the other hand, identification 
should also be examined as a possible moderator of  the relationship between the justice of a 
situation and informational justice behaviors, and on the relationship between interindividual 
differences and interpersonal justice behaviors. 
Identification with the organization is defined as the perception of belongingness to 
the organization (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), and is regarded as a relatively enduring state 
(Haslam, 2001). Identification forms an individual social-identity, viewed as “that part of an 
individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social 
group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63).  Organizational identification has been shown to 
negatively relate to employees’ turnover intentions, and positively to extra-role behavior and 
job satisfaction (Riketta, 2005).   
Group identification has also been shown to moderate the relationship between justice 
judgments and subsequent favorable attitudes and behaviors like cooperation at work (Tyler 
& Blader, 2000; Tyler & Smith, 1999). Moreover, Okimoto (in press, a) showed that not only 
victims react more strongly to (in)justice when they strongly identify with the group, but also 
third-party observers. Note that in a situation in which subordinates are unjustly treated, 
managers may be viewed as third parties belonging to the same group. This means that the 
more managers identify with the organization, the more strongly they should react when they 
think their employees experience an injustice. 
Still, the direction of their reaction is not straightforward concerning their interactional 
justice behaviors. As this kind of behaviors is usually seen as positive toward the employees 
and the organization (Bies, 2001), a strong identification should lead to highly fair 
interactional justice behaviors. However, if managers mainly identify with the organization, 
they are likely to react favorably toward the organization but not necessarily toward their 
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subordinates. Indeed, according to Olkkonen and Liponen (2005), organizational 
identification is a multi-foci construct. These authors have shown that identification with the 
organization as a whole predicted extra-role behavior toward the organization whereas 
identification with the work-unit predicted extra-role behavior toward the work unit. In case 
their subordinates experience a procedural or distributive injustice or an unfavorable outcome 
stemming from the organization, the managers might be likely to react unfavorably toward the 
employees. Indeed, they might categorize them as an out-group. According to Tajfel (1972), 
observing poor treatment of outgroups elicits weaker favorable reactions toward the victims 
and stronger favorable reactions toward the in-group, for example even stronger 
identification.  
Thus, managers who strongly identify with their organization, when having to 
announce to a subordinate an unjust or unfavorable decision for which the organization is 
responsible (or likely to be held responsible), might prefer to defend their organization by 
being interactionally unjust toward the employee. Thus, I propose that in such a situation 
managers’ identification with the organization will negatively relate to their interpersonal and 
informational justice behaviors. 
  
Hypothesis 3a: Managers with higher (versus lower) identification with the organization will 
show less informationally fair behaviors when having to announce unfavorable and/or unfair 
organizational decisions. 
Hypothesis 3b: Managers with higher (versus lower) identification with the organization will 
show less interpersonally fair behaviors when having to announce unfavorable and/or unfair 
organizational decisions. 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that because of the Churchill effect, managers will be more prone 
to behave informationally unfairly when they think that their subordinates have been treated 
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procedurally unfairly. The psychological mechanism involved relates to the motivation to 
protect one’s social just self. Because managers who highly identify with their organization 
are likely to view the organization as an extended self, they can be motivated to protect their 
organization’s image as well as their own. Therefore, the Churchill effect should be stronger 
for managers who identify more strongly with their organization.   
 
Hypothesis 4a: The negative relationship between managers’ procedural justice judgments 
regarding a situation and their informational justice behaviors is moderated by their 
identification with their organization. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 states that managers’ level of social skills (empathy and assertiveness) is 
negatively related to their interpersonal justice behaviors. Indeed, whatever the unfavorability 
or unfairness of the situation for their subordinates, managers with a low level of social skills 
are less able to take their employees’ perspective with compassion nor to communicate them 
clear respect. In case they strongly identify with their organization, they will be prone to take 
their organization’s perspective. This will make even more difficult for them to take their 
employees’ perspective or willing to express favorable emotions toward them. Thus, they will 
not be likely to treat their subordinates with compassion, nor to communicate respect to them. 
This means that a strong identification with the firm should strengthen the negative impact of 
their low level of social skills (empathy as well as assertiveness) on their interpersonal justice 
behaviors.  
 
Hypothesis 4b: The positive relationship between managers’ empathy and their interpersonal 
justice behaviors is moderated by managers’ identification with their organization. 
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Hypothesis 4c: The positive relationship between managers’ assertiveness and their 
interpersonal justice behaviors is moderated by managers’ identification with their 
organization. 
 
 
1.3. METHODS 
 
 
1.3.1. PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
The sample was 118 MBA students of a business school in Paris, France, who 
voluntarily chose to participate in the experiment for extra-credit. On average, participants 
were thirty years old, and thirty percent were female. All participants had previous 
professional experience (on average 5.2 years), sixty-six percent had experience leading teams 
within organizations (on average, 2.3 years, 8.4 subordinates).  
 
1.3.2.  PROCEDURES 
 
Participants made an appointment for a one-hour session. Upon first arriving at the 
session (where multiple students completed the same measures in a classroom), participants 
read several letters from managers of the business school informing them of their task. 
Specifically, participants were told to enact the role of assistant recruitment managers for a 
new internship program at the business school, and were told the following:  characteristics 
and aims of the internship program, requirements of the post to be filled, CV and cover letter 
for two (fictitious) applicants who had ostensibly applied for the internship position, and, in 
all cases, the decision already made by the business permanent recruiting manager regarding 
which of the two applicants had been selected, and which had been rejected (see appendix 
C.3.). Participants were told that their task consisted of writing one rejection letter (for the 
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rejected candidate), and one acceptance letter (for the selected candidate). Participants were 
thus put in a position where they had to implement, and communicate, a decision taken by a 
higher-level manager within the organization – a common situation within firms and a 
common situation in which interactional justice is studied (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 
Greenberg & Scott, 2005).  
Several steps were taken to include the plausibility of the task, including asking 
participants to sign a confidentiality agreement, telling them that their letters could really be 
sent to the candidates, and making sure candidates did not realize that multiple people were 
working on the same situations, for instance by using two different scenarios, each involving 
a different pair of candidates (see appendix C.3.6.). The gender of the person who was 
rejected was reversed across the two scenarios. I also randomly ordered the candidacies in the 
files to address possible order effects. 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of three conditions (see appendix C.2.): 
Condition 1. Equitable outcome and proper procedure (control): the profile of the chosen 
candidate clearly matched the characteristics of the position to be filled while the profile of 
the rejected candidate did not. Thus, the subjects had to write a rejection letter to the weaker 
candidate and an acceptance letter to the selected candidate; Condition 2. Inequitable outcome 
and improper procedure by mistake (because of an administrative error): the profile of the 
chosen candidate clearly did not match the characteristics of the position to be filled, the 
participant thus had to write a rejection letter to the candidate who was clearly best suited for 
the job and an acceptance letter to the candidate who was clearly less suited. This decision 
was attributed to an administrative mistake, by which the less suitable candidate was 
inadvertently selected; Condition 3. Inequitable outcome and improper procedure on purpose 
(because of nepotism): the profile of the chosen candidate clearly did not match the 
characteristics of the position to be filled, the participant thus had to write a rejection letter to 
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the candidate who was clearly best suited for the job and an acceptance letter to the candidate 
clearly less suited. This decision was attributed to nepotism, the less suited candidate (who 
got the job) having been unfairly selected by the permanent recruiting manager of the 
institution because she knew him and favored him “regardless of who else applies”. Condition 
2 was designed so that the procedural justice rules of voice, consistency, accurate information, 
and possibility of appeal were not respected. These relate mainly to the “could” counterfactual 
in fairness theory, i.e., the perpetrator could have behaved differently. In condition 3 I added 
the violation of the no bias rule and the violation of general ethical norms, both of which 
make the “should” counterfactual in fairness theory more salient. This allowed me to obtain 
different levels of proper vs. improper procedures, which could result in greater variance in 
managers’ procedural justice judgments, which would in turn better allow me to test my 
hypothesis H1b involving procedural justice.   
After having completed the letters, subjects were asked to rate the distributive and 
procedural fairness of the hiring decision. Three weeks prior to the letter exercise, participants 
had completed on line measures of empathy, assertiveness and identification with their 
organization (their business school, that they would write the letters on behalf of). 
Demographic information was provided by the MBA admission office.   
 
1.3.3. MEASURES 
 
1.3.3.1. Manipulation checks 
 The manipulation checks “after looking at the job posting and the candidates’ 
materials, to what extent do you feel that the candidate (name and file number) was well 
suited for the job?” (see appendix C.3.7.) showed a significant difference between candidates 
perceived qualifications for the position, in the expected direction (t=6,016 et p<0,001). Less 
qualified candidates were indeed perceived as being less qualified for the position offered 
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(m=2,62), and better qualified candidates were indeed perceived as more suited to handle the 
internship (m=4,14).  
 
1.3.3.2. Independent variables 
1.3.3.2.1. The adherence of the situation to rules of equity and procedural justice 
Depending on the condition to which they were randomly assigned, one third of the 
subjects had to announce a proper decision (which should be seen by an observer as 
distributively and procedurally fair), another third a wrong decision due to a clerical mistake 
(which should be seen by an observer as distributively unjust and moderately procedurally 
unjust) and the last third a wrong decision made on purpose on the basis of nepotism (which 
should be seen by an observer as distributively unjust and very procedurally unjust). 
Participants’ distributive and procedural justice judgments were measured using the 
Colquitt’s 2001 scales (see appendix C.3.8.). Four items were used to assess distributive 
justice, for example “is the decision consistent with the candidate’s qualifications?” or “does 
the decision reflect the candidate’s experience?” Cronbach alpha reliability was α=0,95. 
Seven items were used to assess procedural justice. Participants were asked to assess the 
procedures, which had been used by their business school to make the decision to recruit or 
not recruit the candidate for the internship job. For example “have those procedures allowed 
the candidate to show his (her) value?” or “have those procedures been free of bias?” 
Cronbach alpha reliability was α=0,89.  
Their judgments differed significantly between the three situations in terms of both 
distributive (F=72,562, p < 0,001) and procedural justice judgments (F=29,879, p<0,01). The 
situation in which the most qualified candidate had been offered the position was judged 
distributively fairer (m=14,61) in comparison to the situation in which the more qualified 
candidate was by mistake not chosen (m=6,14) or not chosen because of his or her 
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connections (m=6,27). Similarly, the situation in which the most qualified candidate was 
chosen was judged to be more procedurally fair (m=22,115) than the improper-by mistake 
(m=15,478) and improper-on purpose (m=11,600) situations. Thus, between conditions 2 and 
3, there was a significant difference only in procedural justice and not in distributive justice.  
1.3.3.2.2. Assertiveness 
Assertiveness was measured using two subscales of Arrindell and Van der Ende’s 
(1985) scale of general assertiveness (see appendix C.1.2.): initiating assertiveness (9 items) 
and positive assertion (8 items). I followed these authors’ advice not to use their overall 
assertion scale of 50 items whose multidimensional nature is likely to invalidate research 
findings. I chose initiating assertiveness because of its relevance for my research purpose and 
positive assertion because of its particular ability to adequately defining and operationalizing 
the assertion construct (Arrindell & van der Ende, 1985).  
Initiating assertiveness relates to expressing one’s opinion and contains such items as 
“offering an opinion that differs from that of the person you are talking to” or “telling a group 
of people about something you have experienced”. Positive assertion refers to the display of 
positive feelings and includes such items as “telling someone that you like him/her” or 
“telling someone that you are very pleased with something you have done”.  
Thus, the social skills measured by these two sub-scales account for the ability to 
clearly communicate news even if these news are not likely to be welcome by the employees 
while at the same time not distancing nor derogating the recipients and trying to maintain a 
positive affective relationship with them. The overall assertiveness scale and its sub-scales 
have been validated with North American, Dutch, and French subjects and also in samples of 
executive managers (Arrindell & van der Ende, 1985; Arrindell et al. 1999). I will refer to the 
two subscales I use as simply “assertiveness” in the current chapter. Cronbach alpha 
reliability was α=0,95.  
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1.3.3.2.3. Empathy 
Empathy was measured using the seven-item empathic concern subscale of Davis’ 
(1980; 1983) interpersonal reactivity index (see appendix C.1.1). Items included: “when I see 
someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity for them” (reversed) or 
“I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me”. Cronbach alpha 
reliability was α=0,73.  
1.3.3.2.4. Identification with the organization 
The six-item identification scale used was adapted from Okimoto (in press, a) and 
Okimoto and Tyler, (2007) (see appendix C.1.3.). Subjects rated rate their agreement with 
statements such as “the values of (the name of the business school) are similar to mine”, 
“when someone praises (the name of the business school) I feel proud” and “being a student 
in (the name of the business school) is a large part of who I am”. Cronbach alpha reliability 
was α=0,86. 
 
1.3.3.3. Dependent variables 
1.3.3.3.1. Informational and interpersonal justice – Coding 
Two coders (researchers in organizational justice) independently coded the letters 
written by the MBA students for interpersonal and informational justice (see appendix C.4.). 
The two-item interpersonal justice scale and the three-item informational justice scale were 
based Colquitt’s (2001) scales and adapted to the analysis of letters. For interpersonal justice, 
coders rated (1) politeness and courtesy of the letters, and (2) the respect and dignity shown to 
the candidates. Cronbach alpha reliability of interpersonal justice scale was α=0,88. 
Informational justice was measured by coders rating (1) the thoroughness of the explanations 
given (i.e., whether precise reasons were given to explain the decision), and (2) whether the 
communication was tailored to the candidate (i.e., whether the writers made references to the 
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candidates’ profiles or if they gave personalized advice about areas for improvement, etc.) 
Reliability of informational justice scale was α=0,72.  
 
1.4. RESULTS 
 
 
Table 2 presents the means, standard deviations and correlations. 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: 
Means, Standard Deviations, Correlations, and Reliability Estimates 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Situation (equity, no 
bias or mistake=1, 
inequity, procedural 
mistake=2, inequity, 
procedural bias=3) 
2.00 .80  n.a.        
2. Distributive justice 2.32 1.39 -.72** (.95)       
3. Procedural justice 2.35 1.01 -.65**   .72** (.89)      
4. Empathy 3.79 .50   .10 -.04   .05 (.73)     
5. Assertiveness 4.28 1.24 -.25*   .11   .26* -.01 (.95)    
6. Identification 3.73 .67   .04   .05   .08   .08  .14 (.86)   
7. Interpersonal justice 3.65 .73   .16 -.17 -.16   .04  .27** -.30** (.88)  
8. Informational justice 2.67 .80 -.20*   .26**   .26**   .03 -.10 -.23* .39** (.72) 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
 
Hypothesis 1a predicted a direct effect of the situation on informational justice, such 
that managers having to implement and communicate a decisions which involved unfair 
procedures and an unfair outcome would use less informational justice. ANOVA analysis (F= 
3.03, p<.05) showed that informational justice was significantly different between condition 1 
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(M= 2.97) and the two other conditions (condition 2 (M=2.53) and condition 3 (M=2.55)). 
Subjects in the two conditions with the inequitable outcomes and differing degrees of 
procedural impropriety wrote rejection letters characterized by less detailed and less tailored 
explanations. See Table 3. A post-hoc test showed no significant mean differences between 
conditions 2 (inequitable outcomes and improper decision by mistake) and 3 (inequitable 
outcomes and improper decision on purpose). Also, there were no differences in interpersonal 
justice across the conditions.  
 
 
TABLE 3: 
 
Cell Means for Informational Justice Behaviors 
 
                                              Condition 1      Condition 2           Condition 3  
 
Variable 
M SD  M SD  M SD  F 
Informational Justice 
Behaviors 
  2.97   .84  2.53  .91  2.55  .61  3.03* 
 
Note: * p < .05. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1b predicted that the relationship proposed between situation and 
informational justice will be mediated by managers’ perceptions of procedural justice. As 
shown in Table 4, full mediation was observed at p = .063. To demonstrate a mediated 
relationship, I used the regression procedures recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). The 
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situation affected managers’ procedural justice judgments, β = -.65, p < .001, and 
informational justice behaviors, β = -.20, p < .05. Finally, when I regressed informational 
justice behaviors on both situation and managerial procedural justice perceptions, procedural 
justice perceptions remained significant at p = .063, β = .25, while situation became non-
significant, β = -.04, n.s. Thus, Hypothesis 1b was only supported at p = .063 (which is below 
the conventional level of statistical significance).  
 
TABLE 4: 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Procedural Justice and Informational Justice 
 Procedural Justice Informational Justice Behaviors 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Control variable      
   Gender     .21     .05     .05     .00    -.01 
   Age    -.04    -.08     .07     .06     .08 
Independent variable      
   Situation     -.65***     -.20*    -.04 
      
Mediator      
   Procedural justice perceptions         .25†   
      
   R2     .05     .44     .01     .05     .08 
   F   2.44†  24.77***     .31    1.47   2.02† 
   Change in R2       .39       .04     .03 
            
Note: †  p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 
Hypothesis 2a predicted that managers’ empathy relates positively to their 
interpersonal justice behaviors. As shown in Table 5, Hypothesis 2a was not supported, β = 
.06, n.s.. Hypothesis 2b, which predicted that managers’ assertiveness relates positively to 
their interpersonal justice behaviors, was supported, β = .23, p < .05.  
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TABLE 5: 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for 
Interpersonal Justice 
 Interpersonal Justice 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 
Control variable   
   Gender     .11     .06 
   Age     .06     .06 
Independent variable   
   Empathy      .06 
   Assertiveness      .23* 
   Identification with organization     -.27* 
   
   R2     .01     .16 
   F     .57    2.86* 
   Change in R2      .14 
      
Note: * p < .05 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 3a, which predicted that managers’ identification with their organization 
relates negatively to their interpersonal justice behaviors, was supported, β = -.27, p < .05. See 
Table 5. As shown in Table 6, there was also support for Hypothesis 3b, which predicted that 
managers’ identification with their organization relates negatively to their informational 
justice behaviors, β = -.24, p < .05.  
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TABLE 6: 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for 
Informational Justice 
 Informational Justice 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 
Control variable   
   Gender     .05     .03 
   Age     .07     .08 
Independent variable   
   Identification with Organization     -.24* 
   
   R2     .01     .06 
   F     .28    1.85 
   Change in R2      .05 
      
Note: * p < .05 
 
Hypothesis 4a, which stated that the relationship between managers’ procedural justice 
perceptions regarding the situation and their informational justice behaviors would be 
moderated by managers’ identification with their organization, was supported, β = -.29, p < 
.01. See Table 7. As shown in Figure 1, managers’ procedural justice perceptions regarding a 
situation only positively affected their informational justice behaviors when they were low 
(versus high) in organizational identification. Notice, however, that the shape of the 
interaction was not the one that I hypothesized. I proposed that high identifiers would behave 
more informationally unfairly than low identifiers when the procedure was unjust. Instead, I 
found that high identifiers behaved informationally unjustly regardless of the injustice of the 
procedure. As for low identifiers, they behaved informationally unfairly only in negative and 
unfair situations and informationally fairly in negative and fair situations. 
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TABLE 7: 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Informational Justice for 
Interaction between Organizational Identification and Procedural Justice 
Perceptions 
 Informational Justice 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Control variables 
   
   Gender 
 .05 -.04    -.02 
   Age 
 .07   .10      .10 
Independent variables 
   
   Identification with organization 
     -.27*  -.25* 
   Procedural justice perceptions 
       .31**  .35** 
Interaction 
   
 Identification with organization x    
Procedural justice perceptions    -.29** 
R2 
     .01      .15   .23 
F 
     .26    3.34* 4.51** 
Change in R2 
       .14   .08 
Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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FIGURE 1: 
Interaction of Managerial Organizational Identification and Procedural Justice Perceptions in 
Predicting Managerial Informational Justice Behaviors 
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Hypothesis 4b stated that the relationship between managers’ empathy and their 
interpersonal justice behaviors would be moderated by managers’ identification with their 
organization. This hypothesis was not supported (see table 8).  
 
TABLE 8: 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Interpersonal Justice for 
Interaction between Organizational Identification and Empathy 
 Interpersonal Justice 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Control variables 
   
   Gender 
 .11   .08     .07 
   Age 
 .06   .09      .08 
Independent variables 
   
   Identification with organization 
      -.30**  -.31** 
   Empathy 
      -.07*   .07 
Interaction 
   
 Identification with organization x    
Empathy     .05 
R2 
     .01      .09   .10 
F 
     .57    2.32† 1.89 
Change in R2 
       .14   .04 
Note: †  p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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Hypothesis 4c stated that the relationship between managers’ assertiveness and their 
interpersonal justice behaviors would be moderated by managers’ identification with their 
organization. There was support for Hypothesis 4b at p = .069, β = -.23. See Table 9. As 
shown in Figure 2, managers’ low level of assertiveness related negatively to their 
interpersonal justice behaviors more strongly when they were high (versus low) in 
organizational identification, as hypothesized (however there was support for H4c only at p = 
.069, which is below the conventional level of statistical significance). 
TABLE 9: 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Interpersonal Justice for 
Interaction between Organizational Identification and Assertiveness 
 Interpersonal Justice 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 
Control variables 
   
   Gender 
 .11   .07    -.02 
   Age 
 .06   .05      .10 
Independent variables 
   
   Identification with organization 
      -.26*  -.39** 
   Assertiveness 
      -.23*  -.19† 
Interaction 
   
 Identification with organization x    
Assertiveness    -.23
†
 
R2 
     .01      .15   .19 
F 
     .56    3.42* 3.50** 
Change in R2 
       .14   .04 
Note: †  p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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FIGURE 2: 
Interaction of Managerial Organizational Identification and Assertiveness in Predicting  
Managerial Interpersonal Justice Behaviors 
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1.5. DISCUSSION 
 
 
In this study, I investigated predictors of interactional justice behaviors. This line of 
research is important, as organizations will be better able to encourage managerial justice 
behaviors in the workplace if one has a better understanding of factors predicting them.  
I found that a situational antecedent predicted informational justice behaviors and an 
interindividual antecedent predicted interpersonal justice behaviors. Namely, situations 
characterized by an inequitable outcome and an improper procedure (whether by mistake or 
on purpose) resulted in managers behaving informationally unfairly whereas a lack of 
assertiveness managers behaving interpersonally unfairly. I also found that identification with 
the firm related negatively to managers’ interpersonal and informational behaviors. 
Identification also moderated the relationship between the situation and the managers’ 
informational justice behaviors. 
However, the link between managers’ procedural justice judgments and their 
informational justice behaviors did not vary with their level of organizational identification in 
the way I had expected. The effect of identification was, in fact, much stronger than I 
hypothesized, changing the nature of the predicted effect. I proposed that high identifiers 
would be more likely to behave informationally unfairly than low identifiers when the 
procedure was unjust. Instead, I found that high identifiers were likely to behave 
informationally unjustly regardless of the injustice of the procedure. This means that high 
identifiers tried to protect their organization as soon as the situation was unfavorable for the 
victims, whether the situation was fair or unfair. Only low identifiers made the hypothesized 
distinction between negative and unfair situations (in which they also behaved 
informationally unfairly) and negative and fair situations (in which they behaved 
informationally fairly). The above suggests that identification with the firm made the 
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Churchill effect so strong that it applied in an unfavorable situation whether it was fair or 
unfair. I made a theoretical distinction between the Churchill effect that I predicted to apply 
when the situation was unjust and the moral outrage repair that I predicted to apply when the 
situation was unfavorable but just (Hypothesis 1). This distinction that I showed to apply for 
my whole sample was in fact only true for managers who did not identify with their 
organization. 
Notice that this result is consistent with hypotheses 3a and 3b in which I proposed and 
found that managers’ identification with their organization would make them behave 
interpersonally and informationally unjustly whatever the (in)justice or the negative situation. 
 
1.5.1. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
This research makes several contributions to organizational justice theory. First, my 
results help to better understand the mechanism by which the Churchill effect, an important 
cause of interactional injustice, operates (Folger, 1993, Folger & Pugh, 2002; Folger & 
Skarlicki, 1998; Folger & Skarlicki, 2001). This research sets boundary conditions on the 
Churchill effect, in terms of whether a decision is negative and just or negative and unjust. A 
situation leads to the Churchill effect and its corollary, managers’ interactional unjust 
behaviors, only if the situation as unjust, and more precisely procedurally unjust. However, 
the mediating role of managers’ procedural justice judgments (H1b) was not supported at the 
conventional level of statistical significance. This might be due to the fact that subjects knew 
they would not meet the victims, but only write a letter to them. Thus, they might have been 
less motivated to use their procedural justice judgment to shape their behavior in comparison 
to a condition in which they would have been involved in a real social interaction. Other 
dynamics could also have been at work. Subjects who behaved informationally unfairly may 
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have wanted to play down to themselves how procedurally unfair the situation was. In any 
case, further studies using different research designs should test again this hypothesis. 
 Building on recent research (Patient & Skarlicki, in press), I also showed that 
interactional unjust behaviors can be predicted not only by the situation but also by 
interindividual managers’ characteristics. My results shed a new light on managers’ tendency 
to be interactionally unjust by showing that it is not only managers’ desire to protect their 
social just self in unjust situations that is at stake but also their social ability to cope with 
unfavorable situations. Such abilities as precursors of justice behaviors have to date received 
little research attention although they can be what makes specific justice behaviors concretely 
possible (Ambrose & Schminke, 2007). 
Second, this research advances our understanding of the dynamics of informational 
and interpersonal justice, which were shown to be, respectively, more sensitive to situational 
and individual difference factors. On the one hand, a negative and unjust situation prompted 
managers’ unjust informational behaviors. On the other hand, a negative situation, whether 
just or unjust, lead to managers’ interpersonal injustice behaviors for managers low  (versus 
high) in assertiveness. These different antecedents for informational versus interpersonal 
justice behaviors provides further support for separating interactional justice into its 
informational and interpersonal components (Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993a; Masterson et 
al., 2005). In this respect, I did not find support for hypothesis H4c at the conventional level 
of statistical significance. This hypothesis predicted that managers’ identification would 
interact with their assertiveness to predict their interpersonal justice behaviors. However, 
assertiveness might be a context-independent interindividual characteristic. In this case, 
identification would only be able to interact with contextual variables, like the justice of the 
situation. This would explain why assertiveness and identification did not interact at p < .05. 
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My hypotheses involving empathy were not supported (H2a and H4b). No relationship 
was found between empathy and interpersonal justice behaviors (H2a) and identification did 
not interact with empathy to predict interpersonal justice behaviors (H4b).  It is possible that a 
situation involving face-to-face communication (versus written communication) of negative 
news would be necessary to prompt the vicarious experiencing of another person’s emotional 
state, and the feelings of warmth and concern for the victim that are characteristic of the 
empathic concern dimension I focused on. Future research should attempt to replicate my 
findings when the communication of the outcome is face-to-face.  
Third, while other research shows that at least in some circumstances managers may 
try to correct injustices at work (see chapters 2, 3 and 4), this study, on the contrary, show that 
managers, when facing an injustice stemming from their organization and experienced by 
their subordinates, are more likely to make bad times worse by adding interactional injustice 
to the already unjust situation.  
Fourth, I extend understanding of the deontic model of justice (Folger, 1998, 2001) 
and fairness theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998, 2001) by testing it in a proactive justice 
study. In terms of their distributive and procedural justice judgments, the subjects 
distinguished between the three experimental conditions. The right decision was seen as 
distributively fair. The wrong by mistake decision and wrong on purpose decisions were 
judged as equally distributively unfair. In contrast, the participants made clear and significant 
distinctions between the three conditions concerning their procedural justice judgments, the 
right decision was judged as the most fair and the wrong decision due to nepotism was judged 
as the least fair, with the wrong by mistake condition lying in between.  
Participants appear to have distinguished between the three conditions on the basis of 
their “would”, “could” and “should” counterfactuals. In the condition they judged 
distributively and procedurally fair (condition 1), only the “would” counterfactual was 
The fair hand of managers 
 72
relevant: the situation “would” have been better for the candidate if he or she would have 
been better suited to the position. In the condition participants judged distributively unfair and 
procedurally slightly unfair (condition 2), the “would” and “could” counterfactuals applied in 
the following way: the situation “would” have been better for the candidate if the clerk 
“wouldn’t” have made a mistake and this clerk indeed “could” have acted otherwise. 
However, because the mistake was not on purpose, the moral dimension and “should” 
counterfactual were not very relevant here. In contrast, in the condition where the outcome 
was judged unfair and the procedure very unfair (condition 3), all three counterfactuals 
applied: the situation “would” have been better if the manager “would” have behaved 
differently and the manager “could” and “should” (morally) have behaved differently. It is 
because of the accountability invoked by the “could” and “should” counterfactuals, by 
characteristics of the procedure, that subjects reacted more strongly to the injustice of the 
process rather than to the injustice of the distribution.  
A fifth contribution of this work lies in showing of the important role in justice 
behaviors of managers’ identification with the organization. Whereas usually organizational 
identification is seen as having primarily positive consequences for the organization and for 
employees (and other stakeholders, such as customers), I have shown that managers who 
identified more strongly with the organization can in some situations be more interactionally 
unjust. This means that managers who viewed their firm as an extended self, when having to 
react to an injustice produced by this firm, chose not to behave fairly toward the employee 
who experienced this injustice.  These managers might have thought that they had to choose 
between their organization and the victim. Although they could have remained loyal to their 
organization while being at the same time interactionally fair toward the employees, they 
might have felt an emotional contradiction between these two attitudes. This is plausibly the 
reason why these high identifiers reacted more strongly to the Churchill effect and also to 
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their lack of social skills. Participants high on organizational identification could also have 
been motivated to sustain a representation of a cohesive and legitimated in-group and might 
have thought that the unjustly treated victim could represented a threat in this respect. By 
being interactionally unjust with the victim, they could have tried to maintain a positive 
organizational identity. 
  
1.5.2. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
One of the strengths of my study is that it involved real experimented managers 
reacting to a situation they thought was real. In addition, many studies to date have assessed 
justice effects using cross-sectional data. My experimental design supports a causal argument 
- that differences in the way managers perceive the fairness of a situation impact their justice 
behaviors.  
I propose that if firms want to encourage managers’ interactional justice behaviors in 
difficult times, they should persuade the managers of the procedural justice relating to the 
outcome communicated. One way is to involve managers in the decisions they are going to 
implement and communicate about. This could help to foster fair decisions based on fair 
processes. First line managers are indeed sensitive to the justice of the decisions they have to 
implement and communicate to their subordinates (Greenberg, 1988; Greenberg, 1990b). 
Another possibility could be for upper managers in the case of ambiguous decisions that can 
be seen as unjust or just depending on their rationale (Lind & van den Bos, 2002), like in the 
case of a pay decrease (Greenberg, 1990a), to be interactionally just with their first-line 
managers. By giving sincere social accounts and showing respect to the managers themselves, 
upper managers can make them more likely to judge the decisions as procedurally just. 
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In addition, organizations should avoid selecting managers to communicate the 
negative outcome who lack assertiveness or who might identify too closely with the 
organization versus with the employee. Besides, studies have shown that assertiveness can be 
efficiently taught (Bouvard et al., 1999; Korsgaard et al., 1998; Lin, Shiah, Chang, Lai, Wang, 
& Chou, 2004; Nota, 2003; Sanz de Acedo Lizarraga et al., 2003).  
On the other hand, it could be argued that interactional justice can be used 
manipulatively and to cloak procedural and/or distributive injustice, thereby mitigating 
antagonistic reactions from subordinates and, in effect, making them better accept what is 
unacceptable. However, I believe that interactional justice can not be used manipulatively in 
the long run because of a frustration effect (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996; Folger, 1977; 
Shapiro & Brett, 1993; Tyler, 1987). Second, interactional justice is only one of several cues 
used to assess the justice of a decision. Nonetheless, I acknowledge the need to be cautious 
about the way my results might be used in the field and about the ethical questions that can be 
raised.  
A final implication of my results relates to the impact on justice behaviors of 
organizational identification and the “good soldier” syndrome. It is in part because they 
identified strongly with their in-group that some managers reacted unjustly toward victims of 
that in-group. So one should be cautious about the bad consequences of a too strong 
organizational identification, which is usually seen as having positive consequences. 
 
1.5.3. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
Given the impact rejected candidates might have on the organization (Gilliland & 
Hale, 2005), the results of this study can be valuable for recruitment researchers and 
practitioners. Moreover, the Churchill effect having been proposed to apply to various 
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situations (Folger & Skarlicki, 2001) and the theoretical mechanisms I have described being 
not specific to a kind of managerial decision, my results should also apply to a wide range of 
other managerial situations. It is possible, however, that recruiting managers consider 
candidates in a different way than already recruited employees. Thus, the conclusions I have 
drawn should be confirmed by future field studies, using real tasks, and actual managers with 
their current employees.   
Another limit of the present work concerns the fact that I did not have real victims 
who communicated their real justice judgments. This question is common in proactive studies 
in which the focus is on justice behaviors, which leads the subjects play the role of managers 
or allocators and not the one of recipients. Just as in the other proactive studies (Korsgaard et 
al, 1998; Patient & Skarlicki, in press) I answered this question by having coders rating the 
justice behaviors of the subjects. It would be interesting for future studies to build up designs 
in which two kinds of subjects would participate at the same time: allocators and recipients, 
which would make it possible to link antecedents of allocators’ justice behaviors with 
recipients’ justice judgments.  
More generally, further proactive research is called for on the antecedents of justice 
behaviors, whether distributive, procedural, or interactional. This body of research can 
provide valuable insights into how to produce fairer workplaces. Further, this research can 
help to bridge the domains of organizational justice and behavioral ethics (Cropanzano & 
Stein, in press). Whereas these two disciplines indeed have much in common, in particular 
because they often focus on similar behaviors and describe them with a concern for moral 
standards, the reactive focus of most organizational justice research to date has limited the 
potential rich connections between the two fields. Understanding the antecedents of justice 
behaviors could be an important step toward better understanding ethical behavior at work.  
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Finally, notice that among the 118 participants, 78 had to announce an unjust decision 
to the victim (because of a mistake for 39 of them or because of nepotism for 39 of them). 
Virtually all of them accepted to complete this task, with only 6 of them refusing, and having 
asked for more information during the experiment before handling the task. This means that 
most of these managers, even those who tried to correct the injustice by being more 
interactionally fair, went along with administering an unjust decision.  
However, many of the participants used in their letters some type of informal 
corrective justice strategy: they offered support (by encouraging the candidate to reapply), 
future help (they said that the candidates will be contacted if there is any other opportunity), 
an alternative positive outcome (for instance, free training) or even an alternative position 
(direct help to find another job). Unfortunately, it is not possible to know to what extent these 
proposals were sincere, as no concrete steps were taken by participants to make these offers 
really available. Perhaps some of participants offering alternatives thought that their proposal 
would engage or bind their organization. The extent to which managers use these kinds of 
informal corrective justice behaviors, distinct from interactional justice behaviors, should be 
further investigated. I conducted a second qualitative exploratory study in order to answer that 
question (see chapter 2). 
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CHAPTER 2: BEYOND THE CHURCHILL EFFECT, DISCOVERING THE 
INVISIBLE: THE MANAGERS’ OTHER CORRECTIVE JUSTICE STRATEGIES. 
 
2.0. ABSTRACT 
 
The principal objective of the study presented in this chapter was to identify other 
corrective justice strategies that may be used by managers in addition to their interactional 
corrective justice strategies. An exploratory study with 35 managers lead to the identification 
of a new strategy used by managers to correct injustice at work. Because this strategy 
consisted in allocating something extra, belonging to the company, not for its formal or 
intended use, to restore justice (for example, managers may distribute benefits such as free 
time, personal use of equipment, extra training or bonuses to victims of injustice) and because 
it occurred “under the radar” (without more senior managers’ or other employees’ 
knowledge), I name this strategy an invisible remedies strategy. The study presented here 
explored this strategy in comparison to the other managerial corrective justice strategies that 
emerged from the data. The results show that managers were more likely to use invisible 
remedies to compensate for organizational injustices due to the deficiencies of the formal 
reward system (i.e., lack of bonuses and pay increases, inappropriately low salaries, 
promotions that were refused…) rather than to correct other types of injustices. Managers 
were more likely to react in this way when injustices violated their sense of equity rather than 
other justice rules. As invisible remedies, managers usually diverted organizational 
allocations from their formal use. Thus, they allocated benefits like free days off or extra 
bonuses in order to compensate for the injustices experienced by their subordinates. Finally, 
their first motivation appeared to be the restoration of justice in the workplace even if they 
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knew that these attempts mainly mitigated negative reactions in the short run, without 
fundamentally solving any real injustice in the long run. 
 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The first chapter showed that managers often fail to use interactional justice in 
situations where employees experience distributive or procedural injustices, despite the 
known corrective effects of interactional justice behaviors. Indeed, when having to 
communicate an unjust decision, managers failed to provide sufficient explanations – a 
behavior which has been described as “Churchill effect”. Besides, if they lacked social skills, 
they also distanced themselves interpersonally from the employees. Moreover, those who 
identified with their organization were even more likely to show these two distancing effects.  
However, because many managers tried to correct the injustice in other (informal) ways, it is 
important to investigate which other corrective justice strategies managers are likely to use in 
the workplace. This is the focus of this chapter. As explained in the previous chapter, this 
kind of research question is characteristic of a nascent theory (Edmonson & McManus, 2004) 
and is therefore better addressed through qualitative methods, and through semi-structured 
exploratory interviews in particular. 
Thus, an exploratory study was conducted to investigate how managers react to and 
deal with their subordinates’ injustice experiences.  This exploratory study lead to the 
identification of invisible remedies and their situational and motivational antecedents. 
Furthermore, it also shed light on the way managers evaluate the consequences they have on 
their subordinates’ attitudes and behaviors. These results formed the foundation of a 
conceptual model (chapter 3), parts of which were consequently tested and confirmed (chapter 
4). 
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2.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODS 
 
Thirty-five managers were interviewed in a French logistics firm between December 
2006 and March 2007. Five hundred and fifty employees work in this firm, which is 
specialized in logistics of book publishing. Its aim is to stock, sell and carry books to 
booksellers for its parent company as well as for other publishers. The managers were invited 
by the president’s assistant to participate in a study about injustice at work. All invited 
managers met individually with me, who acted as interviewer.  
When meeting with me, each manager was welcomed, and was explained the study’s 
objectives as: “to better understand employees’ feelings of injustice at work” as part of a 
research program. They were informed that participation would consist of answering four 
questions and was entirely voluntary. Managers were also assured that their name would 
never be quoted in any document. No one declined to answer the questions. 
All the managers and their deputy managers at team and department levels were asked 
to participate. Only 6 team and department managers could not participate for practical 
reasons. Thus my sample of managers represents 85.4% of the first and second line managers 
of the firm. 58.9% were male and 41.1% were female. 74% worked in the factory and 26% 
managed administrative functions. The subordinates, the five directors, the general manager 
and the president were not asked to participate in the study.  
 Managers were asked four main questions: 1) to recall one or several events that had 
been experienced by their subordinates and that the subordinates had found unjust, 2) how 
they (the managers) reacted to this injustice, 3) what was their motivation to react as they did 
and 4) how their subordinates reacted to their way of managing the injustice (see Appendix 
D.1.). Question 2 is central to the main objective of the study, which was the identification of 
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managers’ corrective justice behaviors. Question 1 was added in order to contextualize 
question 2 and to make managers give their answers in relation to a real recent situation 
experienced and not in a general way. Moreover, it allowed me to identify the kinds of 
injustices that could predict specific types of managers’ corrective behaviors. The intent of 
question 3 was to take the opportunity of a qualitative exploratory design to get some insights 
about the motives that managers thought they had to correct injustices. The aim of question 4 
was to get a feedback from the managers about their views on the effects of their reactions, 
which would also help me to better understand the overall process of corrective justice in the 
workplace and of the strategy of invisible remedies in particular.  
The questions were open and did not ask specifically about interactional justice 
behaviors or any other kind of corrective strategy in order to avoid leading participants. 
Moreover, participants did not know when they answered the first question about the 
experience of an injustice by their subordinates that the further questions would concern the 
way they reacted to it as managers. This was done in order to prevent managers from 
choosing incidents that they felt they succeeded to manage well.  
The interviews lasted from 15 minutes to 2 hours (50 minutes on average). After 
discussions with the firm’s president and a number of employees, it was decided that the 
interviews would be conducted without an audio recorder in order to make participants more 
comfortable when recounting sensitive information. I prioritised honest replies over fully 
accurate transcripts, as the focus of this study was to explore which types of incidents and 
types of remedies occurred, rather than the way in which these instances were described.  
However, precise notes were taken, using the participants’ own words wherever possible. 
Immediately after each interview, these notes were transferred into a word file with the help 
of a dictation software (the Dragon Naturally Speaking software®). The resulting scripts were 
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checked again for accuracy before the analysis began. I also took notes of some important 
demographic data for each respondent, for example their position in the hierarchy.  
 
2.3. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
 
All 35 managers’ interviews were coded in a qualitative data analysis software 
(N’Vivo 7®). The 35 managers recounted 74 incidents of injustices. These incidents represent 
the unit of analysis. For each incident I coded 1) the types of injustice experienced, 2) the 
types of remedies chosen by the managers, 3) the motivation for choosing these remedies, 4) 
subsequent subordinates’ reactions.  These four themes represent the main categories or 
“nodes” in the coding tree structure (or coding scheme) I used (see appendix D.2.). 
While the coding scheme was informed by my four interview questions and by 
preconceptions from the organisational justice literature, I also allowed the final coding 
scheme to emerge from the data. This process could be termed qualitative content analysis 
(Bryman & Bell, 2003), as categories are emerging out of the data and underlying themes are 
analysed. The processes through which the themes are extracted are left implicit (as opposed 
to quantitative content analysis where detailed coding schedules are provided). I constantly 
revised the themes that arose from the analyses.  
 This process was supported by N’Vivo 7®, which allows to create nodes in different 
ways. For example, the four types of injustices (distributive, procedural, interpersonal and 
informational aspects) that were used to code the incidents were directly derived from the 
literature (Colquitt, 2001) and were therefore created a priori. By contrast, the managers’ 
corrective justice behaviors emerged from the engagement with the data. Sub-nodes 
representing the modalities of this main node of corrective justice behaviors were generated 
each time I coded a new incident. Each sub-node then served to guide the coding of the 
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remaining incidents. After a certain number of iterations, no new sub-nodes appeared, which 
meant that I had reached theoretical saturation (Huberman & Miles, 1994). As saturation was 
reached, I made sure that each document was coded with the final and complete coding 
scheme. Finally, I also linked so-called “attributes” to each incident (for example, the 
hierarchical position of the participant who described the incident). 
The coding process that I followed is typical for qualitative exploratory research (see 
for example Bryman and Bell, 2003), and results in complex data structures. Specifically, the 
incidents that formed my main unit of analysis are not independent, as most managers 
recounted more than one incident. Furthermore, each incident may have been addressed 
through several corrective strategies, and a manager may have identified several motivations 
for choosing any one strategy. Thus, the behaviors coded here are also highly interdependent. 
While this means that statistical tests cannot be used8 to compare the resulting groups of 
behaviors, it does not represent a problem for the kind of analysis presented here, the aim of 
which was to gain in-depth insights into a phenomenon in its natural ecology.  Therefore, 
quantifications are provided only for descriptive and illustrative purposes in the following. 
 
2.3.1. IDENTIFICATION OF INVISIBLE REMEDIES 
 
Importantly, the coding strategy outlined above allowed me to identify a corrective 
strategy that the justice literature had not previously identified. This strategy consisted in 
allocating invisible remedies to correct injustices. Because this strategy is both interesting and 
novel, it will be the main focus in the presentation of the results. I present the invisible 
remedies managers used, their event antecedents, their managerial antecedents, and their 
                                                 
8
 Even non-parametric tests such as Chi-Square tests assume independent observations and cannot be used to test 
differences between the type of correlated data that result from the analyses used here.  
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consequences on subordinates’ attitudes and behaviors at work (as managers viewed them) in 
comparison with the other more traditional corrective strategies that emerged.  
 
2.3.1.1. Invisible remedies as a form of corrective justice behavior 
I identified eleven different strategies that managers use when they react to an 
injustice experienced by their subordinates. These strategies are listed in Table 10.  Examples 
for each of these categories can be found in Table 11.  
 
TABLE 10:  
Managerial Corrective Justice Strategies 
Items representing managerial corrective justice strategies N % 
Used informational justice 46 28,4% 
Tried to fix the problem, at the origin of the injustice 24 14,8% 
Engaged in invisible remedies 17 10,5% 
Appealed to a better future 15 9,3% 
Refused to react to the injustice 12 7,4% 
Used procedural justice 11 6,8% 
Asked for help to correct the injustice 10 6,2% 
Used authority to ask perpetrators to respect the rules 8 4,9% 
Used interpersonal justice 8 4,9% 
Managed the way people react to injustice 8 4,9% 
Criticized the decision by upper management 3 1,9% 
Total 162 100,0% 
 
(n= number of incidents in which each strategy has been used, the total of 162 is superior to 74 as managers use 
different strategies to manage the same incidents) 
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In more than 10 % of the cases (17 incidents), managers used invisible remedies to try 
to correct an injustice. This was the third most widespread strategy after “informational 
justice” and “trying to concretely fix the problem, which is at the origin of the injustice” and 
just before “appealing to a better future” and “refused to react to the injustice”. The 
informational justice strategy (which mainly consisted in justifying what happened) has 
already been studied by organizational researchers and was the theme of my first study (see 
chapter one). The strategy consisting in erasing the concrete source of the injustice has been 
studied by the managerial literature as a traditional managerial problem solving behavior, 
which can be used to deal with unjust or only unfavorable events (Yukl, 2006). The strategies 
that appeared at the forth and fifth positions and that consisted respectively in telling that 
things should be better in the future or in refusing to react to the injustice are two modalities 
of a same more global strategy, which is well-known in the trust as well in the justice 
literatures and simply consists in doing nothing (Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007; Mikula, 
1986). The focus of this chapter, the use of invisible remedies, is a strategy that has not yet 
been identified by the organizational justice literature and that may be used precisely when 
managers do not have the power or the will to really erase the injustice at its source. Thus, I 
decided to focus on the analysis of this invisible corrective justice behavior rather than on the 
other forms of corrective strategies.  
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TABLE 11: 
Examples of Managerial Corrective Justice Strategies 
 
Items representing corrective justice 
strategies 
Examples 
 
Used informational justice Justified the decision 
Tried to fix the problem, which was at the origin of 
the injustice 
 
 
 
- Asked the employee who was at the origin of the 
injustice in order to then stop his behavior 
- Gave an easier task to a subordinate to replace a 
task this employee viewed as unjust because it was 
too difficult for him 
Engaged in invisible justice 
See items in table 12 and examples in table 15 
Appealed to a better future 
 
 
 
 
- Waited for things to change because the upper 
manager would retire soon (in three years) 
- Stated the problem would be taken into account 
when the same kind of decision is taken in the future 
Refused to react to the injustice 
 
 
 
- Waited until employees forget about the problem 
- Stated that he had no power to do anything and that 
things had to be accepted as they were 
Used procedural justice 
 
 
 
- Collected information about the process to check if 
there was really an injustice 
- Implemented a precise schedule to improve the task 
allocation process 
Asked for help to correct the injustice 
 
 
- Asked upper management to react to the injustice 
- Was helped by a coach to behave less unjustly 
Used authority to ask people to respect the rules 
 
 
 
- Reminded employees of the rules and asked that 
people respect them 
- Punished people who committed injustices 
Used interpersonal justice 
 
- Comforted or reassured the subordinate 
- Apologized 
Managed the way people reacted to injustice 
 
 
 
 
- Asked the subordinate to stop complaining and to 
react more positively 
- Asked the subordinate to talk about the incident 
directly with the other manager who was the source 
of the injustice 
Criticized the decision toward upper management 
 
- Sent a letter to upper management to criticize the 
decision 
 
 
2.3.1.2. Invisible remedies: A list of eleven behaviors 
In my data, I identified eleven different behaviors as part of the invisible remedies 
strategy. They are listed in table 12 below. These behaviors are classified as invisible 
remedies in that they are ways of compensating victims for an injustice by giving them 
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something extra, which is not formally intended for this use, without telling it to upper 
management nor to other employees who do not benefit from it. Thus, these remedies are 
allocated “invisibly”, or “under the radar”.  
 
TABLE 12: 
Invisible Remedies 
 
Invisibles remedies N % 
Allocated free days off or was more flexible in the allocation of time off 6 
26,1% 
Allocated a higher bonus  6 
26,1% 
Recruited temporary workers to help  3 
13,4% 
Allocated a higher salary increase  1 
4,4% 
Allocated small gifts (free lunches, chocolates, flowers)  1 
4,4% 
Allocated more training 1 
4,4% 
Helped subordinates  be promoted  1 
4,4% 
Improved the subordinates' status  1 
4,4% 
Gave personal help to the subordinate to handle their job  1 
4,4% 
Applied a formal allocation rule with flexibility for fringe benefits 1 
4,4% 
Improved working conditions  1 
4,4% 
Total 23 100,0% 
 
 (n= number of incidents in which this kind of remedy has been used, the total of 23 is superior to 
17 as managers sometimes use several different invisible  remedies to manage the same incidents) 
 
However, the particular behaviors I have identified may be specific to the setting in 
which the study has been conducted. There may be other forms of invisible remedies in other 
contexts, depending on the type of firm and the kind of resources that managers have at hand. 
Typically, in a manufacturing firm material objects or finished products may be given to 
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subordinates to compensate for an injustice. However, in this research setting, the firm 
provided a service (logistics) and did not produce any material objects.  Managers in this 
setting appeared to mostly allocate benefits that were formally planned (days off, bonuses, 
recruitment of  temporary workers…). What made their allocation an allocation of invisible 
remedies is that they did not allocate these benefits according to the formal rules of the firm 
but informally, in order to compensate for injustices without the agreement of upper 
management. For example, a bonus is typically intended to be allocated for excellent work 
performance, but I found that it may instead be given to someone who has suffered an 
injustice (other examples can be found in table 15). Thus, what makes these allocations 
“remedies” is the purpose intended by the allocating manager. 
 
2.3.2. SITUATIONAL ANTECEDENTS OF INVISIBLE REMEDIES  
 
 As in chapter one, I was interested in identifying two kinds of antecedents of managers’ 
corrective justice behaviors, namely situational and individual antecedents. This section 
concerns situational antecedents linked to the characteristics of the injustices. The first 
interview question concerning the injustices experienced by participants’ subordinates 
allowed me to gain insights on four themes that are presented here: the kind of injustice, the 
type of antecedent event, the justice rule that was violated and the source of the injustice. In 
order to better understand the specificity of invisible remedies, I systematically compare  this 
strategy to the other corrective justice strategies. 
 
2.3.2.1. Invisible remedies and types of injustices 
 As a first step, I investigated which types of injustice experienced by a subordinate 
(distributive, procedural, interpersonal and informational) was linked to the use of invisible 
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justice remedies in my sample. Table 13 presents an overview of the frequencies of type of 
injustice remedied by invisible remedies versus other managerial corrective strategies. 
 
TABLE 13: 
 
Types of Injustices and Invisible Remedies Strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
The strategy of 
invisible remedies 
n                % 
Other managerial 
corrective justice 
strategies 
    n                   % 
Distributive injustice 17 100,0% 108 71,1% 
Interpersonal injustice 0 0,0% 21 13,8% 
Procedural injustice 0 0,0% 13 8,6% 
Informational injustice 0 0,0% 10 6,6% 
Total 17 100,0% 152 100,0% 
  
 
 The results show that invisible remedies in this study were always used to correct a 
distributive injustice rather than other types of injustices. In comparison, other types of 
managerial corrective strategies (excluding invisible remedies) addressed distributive 
injustice, but also interpersonal, procedural, and informational injustices.  
 
2.3.2.2. Invisible remedies and types of antecedent events 
In a second step, I focused on the specific types of events that constituted the 
distributive injustices that were addressed through corrective strategies.  I identified the 
following ten categories.  
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TABLE 14: 
 
Types of Distributive Antecedent Events and Invisible Remedies Strategy 
 
 The strategy of invisible remedies 
Other managerial corrective 
justice strategies 
  N % n % 
Allocation of tasks 3 17,6% 36 33,3% 
Allocation of bonus and pay increase 6 35,3% 25 23,1% 
Allocation of cooperation in doing work 0 0,0% 15 13,8% 
Allocation of time off and duration of work 1 5,9% 12 11,2% 
Allocation of salary 5 29,4% 7 6,6% 
Allocation of working means 0 0,0% 4 3,7% 
Allocation of fringe benefits 1 5,9% 4 3,3% 
Allocation of promotions 1 5,9% 2 1,9% 
Allocation of offices 0 0,0% 2 1,9% 
Allocation of sanctions 0 0,0% 1 1,3% 
 Total 17 100,0% 108 100,0% 
  
The allocation of tasks was the most frequent antecedent for distributive injustices 
overall (though not for distributive injustice addressed through invisible remedies). This may 
be due to the fact that in this firm, one of the core tasks of managers was to distribute the 
weekly workload among the production line workers. Regarding invisible remedies, they 
were used relatively more often to correct injustices linked to bonuses, pay increases, salaries 
and promotions in comparison to the use of other corrective justice strategies. Notice all these 
antecedents were rewards. This means that, at least in my sample, invisible remedies first 
served to compensate for poor rewards that were viewed as unjust. 
Examples of event antecedents that constituted distributive injustices and the specific 
invisible remedies used to correct them are given in table 15. 
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TABLE 15: 
 
Illustrations of Invisible Remedies and Event Antecedents 
 
 
Invisible remedies 
 
Examples of  
event antecedents 
Illustrations 
 
Allocated free days off or was more 
flexible in the allocation of time off 
- Bonus  
 
- Time off and duration 
of work 
- Salary 
- Subordinates were given free days off to compensate for them having worked very hard during the strike 
without having been paid more. 
- Young mothers were given free days off on the ground they needed this flexibility more than other employees. 
- The manager thought his subordinates were not paid and appreciated enough in relation to the hard work 
they did. So he allocated time off to them flexibly in compensation. 
 
Allocated higher bonus  
- Pay increase  - Managers who could not allocate a salary increase despite subordinates deserving it allocated them bonuses 
from their own budget  in compensation. 
- Employees felt unjustly treated because they had to work in more difficult conditions without receiving any pay 
increase. Thus the manager allocated them a special bonus for dust to compensate, even if they did not work 
in more dust. 
Recruited more temporary workers 
- Salary 
 
- Tasks 
- The manager thought his subordinates were not paid and appreciated enough in relation to the hard work 
they did. So he hired temporary workers to alleviate their workload. 
- The manager could not rely equally on all subordinates in his team, and therefore gave much more work to do 
to only some of them. To compensate for this injustice in the allocation of tasks, he hired temporary workers to 
help the employees who got too much work.  
Allocated a higher salary increase  
Pay increase the year 
before 
The employee had not received a salary increase despite her deserving it. This made her manager promise to 
allocate her a salary increase the year after. The year after, the manager allocated  her a salary increase that 
was larger than deserved in order to compensate for the injustice of the former year. 
Allocated small gifts (free lunches, 
chocolates, flowers)  
Salary The manager thought subordinates were not paid and appreciated enough in relation to the hard work they did. 
So she allocated them little gifts. 
Allocated more training 
Promotion The subordinate did not get the promotion he applied for despite deserving it. His manager decided to allocate  
a very expensive and interesting training to him in compensation. 
Helped subordinates  be promoted  
Salary The manager thought her subordinates were not paid enough compared to the hard work they did. So she tried 
to help them to be promoted in compensation. 
Improved the subordinates' status  
Salary The manager thought her subordinates were not paid enough compared to the hard work they did. So she tried 
to help them to get a higher symbolic status in compensation by changing the titles of their jobs. 
Gave personal help to the subordinates 
to handle their jobs  
Tasks The manager could not rely equally on all subordinates in his team, and thus gave all the work to do to only 
some of them. To compensate for this injustice in the allocation of tasks, he gave personal help to the 
employees who got too much work. 
Applied a formal allocation rule with 
flexibility for fringe benefits 
Fringe benefits People were informally given the right to get more free books than officially allowed to compensate for some 
restrictions they found unjust in the choice of the book titles. 
Improved working conditions  Salary 
- Created a new job and hired a new worker so that the workload would be lower for her subordinates who 
were not justly paid for the work they did 
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2.3.2.3. Invisible remedies and types of justice criteria that were violated 
 The different types of justice judgments have been shown to be based on specific 
justice rules (Colquitt, 2001). For distributive justice, the main rule used in work settings is 
the equity rule, especially for rewards (Adams, 1965; Meindl, 1989). However, other rules 
like equality and need might be used as complementary rules depending on the kinds of 
outcomes that are allocated and the context in which the allocation takes place (Deutsch, 
1985). Other researchers have even found that one can identify 17 distinct distributive justice 
rules (Reis, 1984).  
 I present here the kinds of rules that were violated in the distributive injustices 
described by the participants and their link to the corrective justice behaviors used. The 
comparison between the invisible remedies strategy and the other corrective justice strategies 
is provided in order to support the discussion of the specific function of this strategy. 
Participants recounted distributive injustices that related to the norms of equity, need, 
equality, and some additional issues (mainly the respect of the firm’s formal norms, which 
appeared to be a rule that if violated, produced a perception of injustice, especially in relation 
with each employees’ job requirements). Equity was the distributive justice norm that was 
violated in most distributive injustices in my sample. Notice however that equality was quite 
often quoted as a violated rule, at least in comparison with its weak importance in the justice 
literature (Cropanzano & Greenberg, 1997). This might be due to the specificity of this work 
setting in which the equal allocation of tasks was very important for workers. Thus, most 
corrective strategies refer to problems with equity rather than equality or need. However, an 
even higher percentage of invisible remedies appeared to be linked to injustices that violate 
the sense of equity in comparison to the use of other corrective justice strategies. As the 
equity rule is often linked to the allocation of rewards, this finding suggests that managers 
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may view invisible remedies as an informal reward system with the aim to redress the official 
reward system when the latter doesn’t work efficiently. 
 
 
TABLE 16: 
Types of Distributive Justice Criteria Violated and Invisible Remedies Strategy 
 
 
The strategy of 
invisible remedies 
Other managerial 
corrective justice 
strategies 
   n %  n  %  
Equity 14 82,4% 39 36,1% 
Equality 2 11,8% 38 35,2% 
Need 1 5,9% 12 11,1% 
Other 0 0,0% 19 17,6% 
Total 17 100,0% 108 100,0% 
 
 
 
2.3.2.4. Invisible remedies and injustice sources 
A further issue of interest is how the injustices emanating from different sources are 
corrected. In this study, participants identified three different sources of the injustices 
experienced by employees: the firm or upper management, the line manager, and the 
coworkers.  
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TABLE 17: 
 
Injustice Sources and Invisible Remedies Strategy 
 
 
The strategy of 
invisible remedies 
Other managerial 
corrective justice 
strategies 
  n % n % 
Manager 5 29,4% 83 54,6% 
Firm or upper management 12 70,6% 38 25,0% 
Coworkers 0 0,0% 31 20,4% 
Total 17 100,0% 152 100,0% 
 
 
Invisible remedies were more often used to correct injustices stemming from the firm 
or upper management rather than from other sources in comparison to the use of other 
corrective justice strategies. This is in line with the previously suggested functions of invisible 
remedies: Managers addressed an unjust outcome stemming from a formal reward system 
through an informal reward system.  
 
2.3.3. MANAGERIAL ANTECEDENTS OF INVISIBLE REMEDIES 
 
 Apart from the situational antecedents linked to the kinds of injustices experienced, 
factors linked to each manager and his or her role in the organization are also important to 
consider. Knowledge on these antecedents might facilitate a better understanding of the 
underlying mechanism of the strategy of invisible remedies. 
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2.3.3.1. Managers’ motivations 
My third interview question referred to managers’ motivation for their reaction 
(question 2) to the subordinates’ injustice experience (question 1). Eight different types of 
motives for correcting an injustice emerged in this sample (see Table 18 below). Examples for 
each of these categories can be found in Table 19. 
 
TABLE 18: 
 
Invisible Remedies Strategy and Managers’ Motives 
 
 
The strategy of 
invisible remedies 
Other managerial 
corrective justice 
strategies 
  N % n % 
Because it was the right thing to do 10 28,6% 70 23,5% 
Relational motives 8 22,9% 65 21,8% 
Work performance instrumental motives 3 8,6% 51 17,1% 
To avoid problems 5 14,3% 46 15,4% 
To help the subordinate 4 11,4% 32 10,7% 
Thought there was no injustice 0 0,0% 13 4,4% 
To make the subordinate accept the decision 2 5,7% 11 3,7% 
To appear as being just 3 8,6% 10 3,4% 
Total 35 100,0% 298 100,0% 
 
(n represents the number of incidents for which a particular motive was claimed. Notice that any one 
incident may be managed using several different strategies and each strategy may be used for different 
motives) 
 
Managers first reacted to an injustice as they did because they thought it was the right 
thing to do, which may be viewed as a moral motive or a motive to restore justice. The two 
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other most frequent motives were relational (i.e., linked to the fostering of a satisfying 
relationship) and instrumental (i.e., linked to work performance of the subordinates).  
When comparing the motivation for using invisible remedies vs. other corrective 
justice remedies, I found that invisible remedies were more frequently used for moral reasons 
and less for instrumental reasons. Thus, using invisible remedies was seen not only as a way 
to motivate employees or to appear just, but also to re-establish justice in the workplace as an 
end in itself. However, it needs to be stressed that these are self-reported motives, and 
answers may of course have been affected by retrospective bias and social desirability bias.  
 
TABLE 19: 
 
Illustrations of Corrective Justice Motivations 
 
 
Managers' motives Examples  
   
Because it was the right thing to do 
- To handle one’s  role as a manager,  
- To be just 
- Because respect is important in itself 
Relational motives 
- To have better relations with the subordinate 
- To show recognition 
- To maintain a good social climate 
Work performance instrumental motives 
- So that employees do not give up their task 
- To maintain motivation 
- Because injustice is inefficient 
To avoid problems - So that people stop complaining 
- To have peace 
To help the subordinate 
- So that the employee suffers less 
- To help the employee wait until the problem 
is fixed 
- To help the subordinate progress 
Thought there was no injustice - Things are just 
- People always like complaining 
To make the subordinate accept the decision 
- To make the subordinate understand the 
decision is justified 
- So that the person understands and accepts 
the situation 
To appear as being just - Showing the image of someone who is just 
- Showing that rules are respected 
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2.3.3.2. Managers’ hierarchical position 
Furthermore, I found that invisible remedies appeared to be used more often by 
managers at a departmental level rather than team level, and more often by managers rather 
than deputy managers. Thus, the position in the hierarchy may also determine whether 
invisible remedies are likely to be used (see table 20 below).  
 
TABLE 20: 
 
Invisible Remedies Strategy and Managers’ Hierarchical Position 
 
 
The strategy of 
invisible remedies 
Other managerial 
corrective justice 
strategies 
  N % n % 
Department head 8 47,1% 29 19,1% 
Deputy department head 2 11,8% 31 20,4% 
At the department level 10 58,8% 60 39,5% 
Team manager 6 35,3% 49 32,2% 
Deputy team manager 1 5,9% 43 28,3% 
At the team's level 7 41,2% 92 60,5% 
Total 17 100,0% 152 100,0% 
 
 
This may be due to the fact that invisible remedies, at least in this sample, were 
benefits diverted from their formal use. Using these benefits necessitates the mastering of 
formal allocation procedures, which is usually not in the power of deputies and more likely to 
be in the power of managers at the department level.  
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2.3.3.3. Managers’ type of activity 
On the other hand, both managers of administrative teams and managers of manual 
labour teams appeared to be equally likely to use invisible vs. other corrective justice 
strategies (see table 21). As both types of teams perform quite different duties, this finding 
suggests that the phenomenon of invisible remedies may be generalizable to different 
contexts.  
TABLE 21: 
Invisible Remedies Strategy and Managers’ Activity 
 
 
 
 
The strategy of 
invisible remedies 
Other managerial 
corrective justice 
strategies 
  n % n % 
Productive function 12 70,6% 107 70,4% 
Administrative function 5 29,4% 45 29,6% 
Total 17 100,0% 152 100,0% 
 
 
2.3.4. CONSEQUENCES OF INVISIBLE REMEDIES FROM THE MANAGERS’ POINT OF VIEW 
 
The consequences of managerial corrective justice behaviors were not the main focus 
of this study (this question would have required another kind of methodology, using 
employees instead of managers as subjects). However, knowing the way the managers viewed 
the consequences of their corrective behaviors is of great interest in order to understand how 
managers evaluate their own efficiency, and to understand the managers’ interpretation of and 
motivation for invisible remedies better.  
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2.3.4.1. Invisible remedies and their general consequences on subordinates’ attitudes and 
behaviors 
The fourth and final interview question asked managers about the consequences that 
they believed their way of managing the injustices had on their subordinates’ reactions. Seven 
different types of consequences emerged from the interviews.  The consequences identified 
are listed in table 22 below, which also provides an overview of how frequently each of these 
reactions occurred as a consequence of invisible remedies vs. other corrective justice 
strategies.  Examples for some of these categories can be found in Table 23. 
 
TABLE 22: 
Invisible Remedies and their Consequences (as Viewed by Managers) 
 
 
The strategy of 
invisible remedies 
 
Other managerial corrective 
justice strategies 
  n % N % 
Positive attitudes and behaviors from employees 14 43,8% 101 42,3% 
Negative attitudes and behaviors from employees 10 31,3% 58 24,3% 
No impact 3 9,4% 31 13,0% 
Injustice was fixed 0 0,0% 16 6,7% 
Ambiguous consequences 3 9,4% 14 5,9% 
Employees learned to react differently to the injustice 0 0,0% 10 4,2% 
In the long run, the injustice disappeared by itself 2 6,3% 9 3,8% 
Total 32 100,0% 239 100,0% 
 
(n represents the number of incidents related to each consequence quoted for each strategy used. 
Notice that each incident may be managed using several different strategies and each strategy may be 
perceived as having different consequences) 
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 Overall, participants of this study found invisible remedies to be as effective as other 
strategies in producing positive attitudes and behaviors from employees. However, managers 
appear to have recognized that invisible remedies did not really fix injustices in a strict sense 
(“injustice was fixed”: 0%), contrary to the other strategies (“injustice was fixed”: 6,7%). 
Managers were conscious that invisible remedies were only a way to make people accept to 
live with the injustice they experienced because they had received something in 
compensation. For example, being unfairly passed over for a promotion cannot be rectified by 
receiving a training, but the training may make it easier for the employee to live with the 
unfairness. Moreover, invisible remedies appeared to have relatively more ambiguous 
consequences than the other strategies (9,4% versus 5,9%). And typically, invisible remedies 
did not help employees to learn how to react differently when they would experience an 
injustice (0%) which was sometimes the case with other corrective justice strategies (4,2%). 
Of course, the consequences recounted by the managers may be in sharp contrast to the 
consequences perceived by the employees themselves, which were not investigated in this 
study.  
TABLE 23:  
 
Examples of General Consequences of Invisible Remedies  
(from the Managers’ Point of View) 
 
 
Some general consequences of invisible  
remedies 
Examples  
   
Negative attitudes and behaviors from employees 
- Dissatisfaction 
- Fatalism 
- Decision refusal 
Ambiguous consequences 
- Difficulty to evaluate the consequences 
- The impact is not clear 
- Employees do not seem to give much 
importance to the problem 
Employees learned to react differently to the 
injustice 
- The subordinate recognizes he should 
have complained on another basis 
- The subordinate recognizes he should 
not have reacted so aggressively and 
apologizes 
In long run, the injustice disappeared by itself - The workload makes people forget 
about the problem 
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2.3.4.2. Invisible remedies and their specific positive consequences on subordinates’ 
attitudes and behaviors 
When analysing the items that have emerged as composing “positive attitudes and 
behaviors from employees” more closely, invisible remedies in this study appeared to cause 
different consequences in comparison to other corrective justice strategies (in managers’ 
opinion). Positive consequences of corrective justice strategies included psychological 
comfort for the subordinates, less injustice and frustration felt, maintained quality of work and 
performance, satisfaction, and others (Table 24 below provides an overview of positive 
consequences and their frequencies).  
TABLE 24: 
 
Invisible Remedies and their Positive Consequences (as Viewed by Managers) 
 
 
The strategy of 
invisible remedies 
Other managerial corrective 
justice strategies 
  N % n % 
Psychological comfort for subordinates 2 6,7% 34 16,3% 
Less injustice and frustration felt 1 3,3% 30 14,4% 
Maintained quality of work and performance 4 13,3% 27 12,9% 
Satisfaction 5 16,7% 27 12,9% 
Decision acceptance 3 10,0% 25 12,0% 
Maintained a good social climate 1 3,3% 19 9,1% 
More motivation 2 6,7% 12 5,7% 
People did not complain any more 1 3,3% 10 4,8% 
Good relationship between the subordinate and the manager 6 20,0% 9 4,3% 
Positive effects only in the short run 4 13,3% 8 3,8% 
Motivated people to go on telling problems to their manager 0 0,0% 6 2,9% 
Subordinates thanked the manager 1 3,3% 2 1,0% 
Total 30 100,0% 209 100,0% 
 
(n represents the number of incidents concerned by each positive consequence quoted for each strategy used. 
Notice that each incident is usually managed using several different strategies and that each strategy has 
generally different positive consequences) 
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Invisible remedies were seen by managers to be less able to maintain a good social 
climate, less able to improve people’s overall justice perception, less able to diminish 
frustration, and also less able to produce psychological comfort in comparison to the other 
corrective justice behaviors. They were also seen as less able to motivate people to go on 
telling their managers about the problems they had. Last, their positive impact was found to 
be relatively short-lived.  
However, invisible remedies were found to be more able to maintain a good 
relationship between the superior and the subordinate in comparison to the other corrective 
justice behaviors. This may be due to the fact that the invisible remedy is clearly attributed to 
the supervisor, and not to the organisation as a whole.  
 
2.4. DISCUSSION 
 
In summary, as shown in Tables 14 and 15, managers  in this study were most likely to 
use invisible remedies to compensate for distributive organizational injustices that occurred 
due to the deficiencies of the formal reward system (i.e. lack of bonuses and pay increases, 
inappropriately low salaries, promotions that were refused…). Managers were more likely to 
react in this way when injustices violated their sense of equity rather than other justice norms 
(see Table 16). As invisible remedies, managers usually diverted organizational allocations 
from their formal use. Thus, they allocated benefits like free days off or extra bonuses in order 
to compensate for the injustices experienced by their subordinates. The principal motivation 
for the use of invisible remedies appeared to be the restoration of justice in the workplace (see 
Table 18) even if managers knew that these attempts only mitigated negative reactions in the 
short run without fundamentally solving the underlying injustice(s) (see Table 22). 
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 The present study takes a unique perspective – that of a manager who is reacting to an 
injustice experienced by a subordinate. This perspective has received little research attention 
to date in the organizational justice literature. The main theoretical contribution of this study 
is the discovery of the strategy consisting for managers in allocating invisible remedies to 
correct injustices and the identification of some tentative links between this concept and some 
of its antecedents and consequences.  
The present study also has implications for organizational practice. The present study 
suggests that managers intuitively know how important it is to correct injustice at work. For 
organizational practice, corrective justice represents an important part of organizational 
reality. My work is a first attempt to answer to the need to acknowledge the central role of the 
manager as having the power to correct the impact of injustices. On a more general level, this 
study suggests that in organisational life, it may not always be the source of an injustice that is 
also involved in correcting it. Up to now, we know little about the effects of corrective 
practices at different levels, and with different degrees of formality. 
Of course the findings presented here are derived from a small sample of 35 managers 
in only one organisation, and the effects found may be context sensitive. Future research is 
needed to establish whether the tentative relationships found here are generalizable to 
different contexts. The approach chosen here might also suffer from social desirability bias, 
and with respect to motivations and consequences, managers may have been reporting their 
own theories rather than true processes. Triangulation of the data is therefore necessary to 
gain more confidence in the validity of the results (for example, interviews with employees 
who experienced the injustice, and observation). However, the qualitative exploratory 
interview approach has enabled me to gain deep insights into the managers’ perceptions and 
interpretations, and importantly has allowed me to identify a new phenomenon (invisible 
remedies). 
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The exploratory study presented here suggests that managers might use invisible 
remedies to alleviate unfairness at work. Having gained preliminary insights into this specific 
corrective justice strategy, I went back to the literature to search for theories or empirical 
studies that would be close to this new concept and that could help me to better understand its 
dynamics. The results of this literature search will be presented in the following chapter. My 
goal was to develop theoretically founded propositions that could constitute a model of the 
use of invisible remedies (chapter three). Then, a preliminary empirical test could be applied 
to this model (chapter four). 
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CHAPTER 3: THE INVISIBLE HAND OF MANAGERS: ANTECEDENTS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF MANAGERS USING INVISIBLE REMEDIES TO CORRECT 
WORKPLACE INJUSTICE 
 
3.0. ABSTRACT 
 
Research suggests that supervisors often have discretion to allocate to their 
subordinates benefits including free time, personal use of equipment, extra training or bonuses 
for uses other than those for which they were formally intended. Study 2 showed that the 
correction of injustices is one motivation for such managerial behavior. Thus, allowing the 
employees to take company-owned time or items or to benefit from extra training or bonuses 
can be an invisible remedy endorsed by managers. I name Robin Hoodism the strategy 
consisting for managers in allocating invisible remedies to correct injustices. In this chapter, I 
offer several research propositions concerning the different forms this corrective justice 
strategy might take in the workplace and the conditions under which managers are most likely 
to use it. I then describe the impact of such behaviors, and I define the Robin Hood effect as 
the impact that invisible remedies can have on employees’ subsequent attitudes and 
behaviors. Finally, I propose that invisible remedies can reduce the negative reactions 
resulting from distributive, procedural and interactional injustices due to their ability to 
address employees’ instrumental, relational and moral motives. I conclude with managerial 
and theoretical implications. 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The taking of resources from their firms by employees for their personal use is usually 
seen as being deviant workplace behavior (Robinson & Bennett, 1995). From a different 
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perspective, Greenberg and Scott (1996, p. 120) suggested that organizations “may well be 
expected to be the victims of modern-day Robin Hoods”. The present chapter elaborates on 
this idea and suggests that managers can sometimes act as Robin Hoods, taking resources 
from their organizations and reallocating them to their subordinates, for the sake of justice.  
People can react to injustice at work in at least three different ways (Conlon, Meyer, & 
Nowakowski, 2005). They can decrease their good behaviors (organizational citizenship 
behaviors, compliance, or performance), increase their bad reactions (absenteeism, turnover, 
or negligence), and even start to behave in ugly ways (by sabotage or organizational 
retaliatory behaviors). Given the negative impact these reactions can have on organizations, 
when an employee feels unjustly treated, it is a good policy for managers to try to correct the 
injustice. Actions taken to correct injustices are not only likely to mitigate negative 
consequences, but they also have the potential to result in other unintended consequences, 
making them important to study. 
Employees’ perceptions of injustice are common in organization. For instance, they 
might concern a pay cut or a smoking ban that are experienced as unjust (Greenberg, 1990a; 
1994) or a too great gap between high objectives and low means (Vermunt, 2002). For Frost 
(2006), emotional pain in general and injustice in particular are likely to be a normal by-
product of organizational life. However, the organization doesn’t often try to correct these 
systemic injustices that remain and produce negative effects (Beugré & Baron, 2001; 
Sheppard, Lewicki & Minton, 1992).  
How do front-line managers react to the perception that an employee has been 
mistreated? They are said to be in a dual position (Vermunt, 2002). They are expected to 
remain loyal to their firm and not blame the firm for injustices that it invokes for employees. 
At the same time, they have to foster their subordinates’ cooperation and try to behave fairly 
toward them. Under these conditions, managers might use their discretion and informal 
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decision making power (Blader & Tyler, 2003) to correct injustices that were not caused by 
them but that could still have negative consequences on the work of their subordinates, 
without conflicting with their organization and its formal policies.  
 Recent research has begun to empirically investigate the actions taken to correct and 
mitigate perceived injustice at work labelled remedial actions (Reb, Goldman & Cropanzano, 
2006). When these actions are implemented at the organizational level to correct injustices 
provoked by the manager, they are called organizational remedies. Correcting injustices by 
compensating the victim is referred to as compensatory justice, and correcting injustices by 
punishing the perpetrator is known as retributive justice (Darley & Pittman, 2003). 
Restorative justice has been widely used in reference to action aimed at restoring a sense of 
justice through renewed value consensus between the victim, the perpetrator and the whole 
community (Umbreit & Coates, 2006; Wenzel, Okimoto & Feather, 2006; Zehr, 2002). In this 
sense, restorative justice can be distinguished from retributive justice, which corresponds to 
the imposition of punishment, in the form of adjudication or revenge.  
In the present chapter, I refer to the range of actions aimed at correcting injustices in 
the workplace as corrective justice. This label was introduced by French (1964) who used this 
term to describe a way of seeking “to remedy mistakes in the allocation of rewards and 
penalties” (p. 412) on the basis of Aristotle’s writings (see also French, 1964, p. 403). 
 The present chapter concerns a specific type of corrective justice strategy used by 
managers. As many writers have argued, managers often use special kinds of allocations to 
complement employees’ formal remuneration (Henry, 1981; Ditton 1977; Mars & Nicod, 
1981; see chapter 2). These allocations can take the form of authorization to take items home 
(e.g., small tools, raw materials, finished small products), borrowing tools, personal use of 
machines, or granting employees time off (Greenberg & Scott, 1996). They can also consist 
of allocating formal benefits (e.g., bonuses, training) not for their intended formal purpose but 
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for justice restoration motives. These allocations have been described as representing a 
significant part of an invisible-wage system, whose aim is usually to compensate for 
injustices, for instance due to too low wages (Ditton, 1977, p. 45). Higher level  managers are 
usually outside of this reallocation system (Mars & Nicod, 1981).  
I define invisible remedies as managers’ allocations to their subordinates of something 
extra, belonging to the company, not for its formal or intended use, for the purpose of 
restoring justice (hence the term remedy), usually without more senior managers’ or other 
employees’ understanding of the motivation (hence the term invisible). I define Robin 
Hoodism as the strategy consisting for managers in allocating invisible remedies to correct 
workplace injustice. The allocation of invisible remedies is meant to have favorable and 
unfavorable effects on employees’ attitudes and behaviors at work. I define the Robin Hood 
effect as the consequences of managers’ allocations of invisible remedies on their 
subordinates’ reactions, those who benefit from these remedies as well as their coworkers. 
I provide a conceptual model to account for the antecedents and to a lesser extent for 
the consequences of managers’ allocations of invisible remedies (see figure 3). First, I review 
empirical evidence about invisible remedies, which shows how managers allocate them. 
Second, I discuss how employees react to invisible remedies, and then show how these 
remedies can produce a favorable effect and other unintended negative consequences. Third, I 
explain why managers engage in this specific kind of corrective justice behavior. Last, I 
provide theory regarding why invisible remedies might be effective in correcting injustices for 
employees. By so doing, I provide a framework that takes into account both a reactive (how 
and why people react to corrective justice attempts) and a proactive view (how and why 
people produce corrective justice attempts) (Greenberg, 1987; Greenberg & Wiethoff). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3: The Model of Invisible Remedies 
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3.2. EVIDENCE OF THE EXISTENCE AND FORMS OF INVISIBLE REMEDIES  
 
3.2.1. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
Numerous sociological studies (mostly ethnographic studies) report that managers use 
invisible remedies toward their subordinates (see Greenberg & Scott, 1996 for a review). 
Managers were found to often allow or even encourage employees to take free time, materials 
or products for their personal use. For example, textile workers (Sieh, 1987), cashiers in 
supermarkets (Altheide, Adler, Adler & Altheide, 1978) and workers in a gypsum factory 
(Gouldner, 1954) were allowed by their managers to take raw materials, small objects or 
finished products, or could borrow tools or access machines for personal use during their 
working time. In some cases, managers were even found to have organized an entire parallel 
distribution system. Post office workers (Bradford, 1976), employees of large chain stores 
(Altheide et al., 1978), workers in a bakery (Ditton, 1977), employees of chemical plants 
(Dalton, 1959) and toll-collectors (Zeitlin, 1971) were allocated free time, small products, 
small sums of money and even products specifically manufactured to be informally allocated 
to employees. Certain activities, such as longshoremen’s jobs (Ditton, 1977) or even entire 
industries, such as the hotel and restaurant industry (Mars & Nicod, 1981) work on the basis 
of such an informal allocation system. 
These works also show that invisible remedies can have an important organizational 
function. Ditton (1977) labelled this process as an invisible wage system. Henry (1981) and 
Zeitlin (1971) described this process as a way of allocating “hidden economic rewards” or a 
“controlled larceny system”, respectively. However labelled, it allows a significant part of the 
reward system to be redistributed and, according to these authors, serves a corrective justice 
function of compensating, in these studies, for wages that are deemed as too low. 
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I’ve also begun to explore this issue. In chapter 2, I investigated how managers (n = 
35) reacted to and dealt with their subordinates’ injustice experiences (74 incidents quoted). 
Their responses allowed me to identify different strategies that managers are likely to use 
when they react to an injustice felt by their subordinates. Allocating invisible remedies was 
the third most frequently used strategy after “using informational justice” and “trying to 
concretely fix the problem at the origin of the injustice”. In this study, invisible remedies 
consisted of different behaviors consistent with the results that emerged from sociological 
studies, including: “allocating free days off”, “allocating more bonuses”, “allocating little 
gifts like free lunches”, “allocating extra training”, “helping subordinates being promoted”. 
These behaviors were efforts to compensate a victim for an injustice by giving him or her 
something extra not for its intended purpose, and without revealing the real reason to upper 
management or coworkers (i.e., to offset a perceived injustice). In this study, managers 
appeared to allocate benefits that were formally planned (days off, bonuses, training, 
promotions) rather than material objects. What made their allocation invisible was that they 
diverted these benefits from the original organizational purpose they were designed for. For 
example, a bonus was formally intended to be allocated for excellent work performance, but 
was instead informally given to a subordinate who had previously suffered an injustice (e.g., 
he or she did not receive the promotion he or she expected) by the supervisor.  
 
Proposition 1: Managers engage in invisible remedies to correct injustice at work. 
 
Based solely on the existing studies, invisible remedies can take four different forms 
(Greenberg & Scott, 1996; see chapter 2). First, managers can allocate free time to employees, 
which is often under the managers’ control. This remedy could be considered minor 
workplace deviant behavior (Robinson & Bennett, 1995) and likely to go unnoticed. Second, 
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managers can allocate formal benefits (e.g., bonuses, training) that tend to have been initially 
derived for a different purpose. These benefits are also under managers’ control and the real 
purpose behind the allocation is also unlikely to be noticed. A third form of remedy involves 
the borrowing of tools, or personal use of machines. This form appears to be relatively less 
used because they are more visible and under a more formal organizational control. Fourth 
managers can allow subordinates to take material objects home, which also tends to be less 
frequent, and usually for objects of small value.  As discussed above, the choice of invisible 
remedies is likely to be a function of which are under the managers’ control and least visible 
to higher level executives. 
 
Proposition 2: Managers are more likely to use invisible remedies that are under their control 
and that are least visible to upper management and other employees. 
 
3.2.2. INVISIBLE REMEDIES ARE MANAGERIAL REMEDIES 
 
Of course, managers can reallocate resources for motives other than justice restoration. 
They might, for example, want to reward their subordinates for remaining silent about the 
manager’s own indiscretions. Allocating invisible remedies can be a way of persuading the 
subordinate not to divulge inappropriate behaviors by the manager, making the subordinate an 
accomplice, an effect known as “parallel deviance” (Kemper, 1966). In the present chapter, 
however, I only focus on invisible remedies that are intended to correct injustices. There are 
also cases in which employees might deliberately take free time or help themselves to objects 
belonging to the firm for their personal use to correct injustices they experience without 
informing their managers. This behavior is a widespread and well-known reaction to injustice 
(Greenberg, 1993; 1996), and is more generally viewed as theft. However, the present chapter 
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focuses on the invisible remedies consciously allocated by managers to correct injustice and 
the impact of these remedies on their subordinates (the Robin Hood effect). Besides, 
researchers who have conducted qualitative studies on this phenomenon conclude that it 
should be clearly distinguished from theft because of the motive behind it, its organizational 
usefulness and its limits (only certain categories of goods are concerned) that are maintained 
by strong informal norms (Dalton, 1959, Ditton, 1977, Horning, 1970). For Ditton, a manager 
would not likely be prosecuted for allocating an invisible remedy because he or she can justify 
it. However, this behavior is likely to violate organizational rules and as such is likely to 
represent a risk to be reprimanded for a manager who implements it (Ditton, 1977, pp. 47, 48 
and 53). 
 Invisible remedies allocated by managers to correct injustices represent a form of 
organizational justice remedy that has not yet received empirical quantitative study. Research 
on organizational justice remedies generally concern situations in which a manager decides 
how to correct an injustice caused by an individual, usually a lower level manager (Reb et al., 
2006). My perspective, in contrast, considers the opposite situation: How can lower level 
managers correct an injustice caused by the organization or upper managers? From this point 
of view, the following question becomes relevant: What can managers do when their 
subordinates experience an organizational injustice?  
On the one hand, numerous injustices at work are beyond the control of the managers. 
Some injustices can occur at the systemic level of the global organization (Beugré & Baron, 
2001; Sheppard, Lewicki & Minton, 1992). For instance, employees might experience 
injustice by learning of a pay cut or a smoking ban from their company president (Greenberg, 
1990a; 1994). On the other hand, in addition to the task of treating their subordinates 
interactionally well, managers also have an important function of informal decision making 
(Blader & Tyler, 2003). Thus, front-line managers may want to react to the organizational 
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injustices that were not caused by them, but which can  have negative consequences on the 
work of their subordinates, by using their informal decision making power.  
Could managers use regular organizational remedies? For example, can they decide by 
themselves to allocate formal material compensation? They rarely have the power to use 
monetary distributions without being officially accountable for them (Bies, Shapiro, & 
Cummings, 1988). Can they offer an apology in the name of their company or top executives? 
Although this may have a positive effect, it is likely to be insufficient if the harmdoers 
themselves do not apologize and if this kind of remedy is not appropriate to the context. Can 
they punish the harmdoers? Clearly they cannot, at least officially, since they have less 
hierarchical power than the perpetrators. As a consequence, managers may have to find 
another managerial remedy.  
Voicing their subordinates’ concerns to upper managerial levels might facilitate a 
solution (Bourguignon & Chiapello, 2005), but it is rarely done due to the loyalty that the 
manager is duty bound to show to formal organizational policies (Vermunt, 2002). According 
to the empirical findings presented here, another possible answer to this dilemma is for 
managers to correct injustices by allocating invisible benefits to their subordinates. However, 
as invisible remedies are invisible, managers are also likely to under-report their allocation for 
fear of reprimand, or to keep them invisible. This might explain why only deep qualitative 
interviews and ethnographic sociological studies have been able, so far, to identify such a 
phenomenon. 
 
Proposition 3: Managers are likely to under-report their use of invisible remedies. 
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3.3. THE ROBIN HOOD EFFECT: HOW DO EMPLOYEES REACT TO INVISIBLE 
REMEDIES? 
 
Considering the possibility that invisible remedies occur, an important question 
becomes: What is the impact of the Robin Hood effect on the organization, its managers and 
its employees?  
 
3.3.1. THE JUSTICE LITERATURE AND THE IMPACT OF MANAGERS’ CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
ATTEMPTS 
 
3.3.1.1. The corrective role of the manager’s interactional justice behavior 
Skarlicki and Folger (1997) hypothesized that employees reacted the most negatively 
when both  distributive fairness (the fairness of the outcomes received, Adams, 1963) and the 
process fairness were at a low level. They also proposed that interactional justice (the justice 
of the interpersonal treatment and the justifications given, Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 
2001) provoked by the manager could be a substitute for organizational procedural justice (the 
fairness of the procedures used to make the decision and implement it, Leventhal, 1980; 
Leventhal, Karuza & Fry, 1980) . Indeed, they found that a manager behaving interactionally 
fairly could compensate for unjust formal procedural rules. More precisely, when 
experiencing low levels of distributive and procedural justice, employees engaged in 
retaliatory behaviors at work only if interactional justice was also at a low level. In other 
words, the results showed that managers could correct distributive and procedural injustices 
by being interactionally fair and thus reducing retaliatory behaviors by their subordinates.  
Further studies provide evidence that managers’ interactional justice behaviors can 
compensate for low distributive and procedural injustice (Cropanzano, Slaughter & 
Bachiochi, 2005; Goldman, 2003). Research has even shown that managers who were trained 
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to be interactionally fair helped their subordinates to better react to a distributive injustice and 
experience less insomnia (Greenberg, 2006).  
 Although this stream of research shows how a manager can be effective in correcting 
injustice, it only focuses on interpersonally and informationally fairness. Being 
interpersonally fair is also a corrective strategy identified by Frost (2006): being 
compassionate toward their subordinates is a successful way for managers to handle the “toxic 
emotions” produced by organizational stress and injustices. Robin Hoodism however, 
provides another way for managers to correct injustices, one that is not included in the 
concept of interactional justice. 
 
3.3.1.2. Invisible remedies used in services recovery settings 
In one study that took place in a services recovery setting, Sparks and McColl-
Kennedy (2001) found that invisible remedies can have a positive effect on recipients’ 
satisfaction with service recovery. The context involved a hotel customer complaining 
because of a service failure with respect to distributive (the client was charged for things he or 
she did not use) and procedural (the slowness of the service) injustice. When the service 
employee proposed a token amount of compensation to rectify these injustices (offering a 
couple of drinks vouchers) by saying “I’m not supposed to do this, but I’m doing a special 
favor for you” and by emphasizing that his or her supervisor wouldn’t agree with it (Sparks & 
McColl-Kennedy, 2001, p. 217), high levels of customer satisfaction with the service resulted. 
However, this positive effect only occurred when the employee offered a remedy of small 
value. In contrast, when monetary compensation offered was judged to be excessive, 
consumers expressed lower satisfaction unless the allocation was in compliance with a formal 
policy. In the later case, recipients might have considered that the remedy’s value was too 
high compared to the level of injustice they had experienced. 
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 The results suggest that by correcting injustices stemming from the organization by 
discretionally allocating something extra belonging to the company to the victim of the 
injustice, (i.e., by allocating an invisible remedy), a manager could produce a favorable 
attitude by the recipient. 
 
3.3.2. MULTIFOCI JUSTICE AND RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS 
 
In order to derive propositions concerning the way employees react to invisible 
remedies, it may be beneficial to consider two streams of research. First, different types of 
(in)justice sources have been distinguished: in particular, the direct supervisor and the 
organization (Cropanzano, Byrne, Bobocel & Rupp, 2001). Second, social exchange theory 
proposes that employees can be in an exchange relationship with their employer where the 
contributions of the two parties remain largely unspecified and the exchanges are mutual but 
not simultaneous (Blau, 1964; Cropanzano & Rupp, this volume). Over time, each party 
develops an obligation to reciprocate. Interestingly, the agent-system model has integrated 
these two streams of research. More precisely, this model states that employees are involved 
in two distinct patterns of social exchange relationships: one with their immediate supervisor 
and another with their organization (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & 
Ng, 2001; Cropanzano, Prehar, & Chen, 2002; Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000).  
This model derives that employees will tend to reciprocate the (un)fair treatment they receive 
toward the source from which it comes (see also Homans, 1961). Thus, the fairness of the 
relationship with the manager is more likely to impact supervisor-referenced outcomes while 
the justice of the relation with the organization is more likely to impact organization-
referenced outcomes. Empirical research has supported the model, showing that interactional 
justice is more likely to be seen as coming from one’s supervisor and is therefore more 
closely linked to attitudes and behaviors directed at one’s supervisor, such as supervisory 
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citizenship behaviors, whereas procedural justice is perceived as coming from the 
organization, and is therefore more closely linked to attitudes and behaviors directed at the 
organization, such as organizational citizenship (Cropanzano et al., 2002; Masterson et al., 
2000).  
The multifoci model of justice has built on this model to propose that each source of 
justice can produce all the different types of justice judgments (Byrne, 1999; Rupp & 
Cropanzano, 2002). Interactional justice was shown to exist at the supervisor level as well as 
at the organization level. Similar effects were observed, for procedural justice, which 
appeared to be either supervisor-focused or organization-focused. Again, supervisor-focused 
procedural and interactional justice predicted supervisory citizenship and organization-
focused procedural and interactional justice predicted organizational citizenship. One 
conclusion of this research is that the source of justice has more explanatory power than the 
type of justice on employees’ attitudinal and behavioral outcomes (Rupp & Cropanzano, 
2002).  
Building on this line of reasoning, since Robin Hoodism represents a means 
implemented by managers to correct injustices, managers are more likely than the 
organization to benefit from subordinates’ positive reactions to it. In contrast, the organization 
is likely to be seen not only as the transgressor but also as the source that did not attempt to 
correct the injustice it created. The fact that managers react by allocating invisible remedies 
may even emphasize the absence of remedy coming from the organizational level and make 
the injustice even more salient. As a consequence, the overall organization may suffer from 
employees’ reactions to invisible remedies.  
 
Proposition 4: Invisible remedies positively impact employees’ attitudes and behaviors 
toward their managers, supervisory citizenship in particular. 
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Proposition 5: Invisible remedies have a negative impact on employees’ attitudes and 
behaviors toward their company, organizational citizenship in particular. 
 
3.3.3. HOW DO OTHER EMPLOYEES REACT TO INVISIBLE REMEDIES? 
 
Invisible remedies can also negatively impact the employees who do not receive them 
in case these remedies become visible for them, i.e. if they are told or understand by 
themselves the real remedial motive that is under their allocation. It is plausible that invisible 
remedies directed toward some employees create feelings of unfairness among the co-workers 
who discover them. One the one hand, according to Mars and Nicod (1981), members of 
minority groups may be discriminated against through the allocation of invisible remedies. 
Indeed, because these remedies are invisible, they are not allocated through a formal 
procedure. Thus, privileged groups may receive more invisible remedies than discriminated 
groups, who would not have the opportunity through any formal mechanism to complain. 
Therefore, they might feel unjustly treated. On the other hand, Rousseau, Ho, and Greenberg 
(2006) proposed that official idiosyncratic arrangements (named I-deals) between an 
employee and the manager might be seen as unjust by co-workers who do not benefit from the 
arrangement and who do learn about it but not about the exact terms of the agreement in a 
complete and precise manner. As far as invisible remedies are concerned, they are usually not 
clearly explained to every co-worker (Greenberg & Scott, 1996, p. 127) as this might make 
them too visible. The paradox is then that invisible remedies, whose purpose is to restore 
justice, can create new feelings of injustice among coworkers in case they become visible to 
them.  
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Proposition 6: Coworkers who do not benefit from invisible remedies and learn about them 
are likely to deem that these remedies are unfair. 
  
3.4. WHEN ARE MANAGERS MOST LIKELY TO ENGAGE IN INVISIBLE 
REMEDIES? 
 
As noted above, managers in firms typically stand in a dual position (Vermunt, 2002). 
They have to simultaneously manage their firm’s demands and their subordinates’ needs. 
When an organizational injustice occurs, it might be because of incompatibility between what 
the firm asks and what the subordinates want. For instance, managers may receive tough 
assignments and lack the means to complete them. Regarding their relationship to their firm, 
managers are duty bound do their best and not complain about these kinds of injustices. 
Regarding their relationship to their subordinates, managers are expected to be fair. Robin 
Hoodism appears as a way to respond to this paradox: managers try to correct injustices 
experienced by their subordinates stemming from the organization without openly criticizing 
formal organizational policies. In these conditions, managers’ willingness to allocate invisible 
remedies depends on the distance between the two ends of their dual position. 
 
Proposition 7: The more the managers view the organization as unfair, the more they are 
motivated to use invisible remedies. 
 
3.4.1. THE FIRM’S ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ROBIN HOODISM 
 
Proposition 7 contends that it is to the extent that invisible remedies have a justice 
restoration function, that they are expected to be more important in situations considered to be 
less just. Notably, they should occur more in firms whose structure is considered as being 
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more unjust. Larger firms are generally considered as being less fair, at least interactionally 
(Schminke, Ambrose, & Cropanzano, 2000). Indeed, as an organization grows, it becomes 
more difficult to treat individuals with dignity and respect and to demonstrate that they are 
valuable to the group as a whole. Moreover, as size increases, the use of political sources of 
power is likely to become more widespread and detrimental to interactional fairness. Higher 
centralization is also associated with lower procedural fairness (Schminke et al., 2000), with 
larger and more centralized organizations deemed as highly rule-driven and bureaucratic. In 
these organizations, rather than trying to change the system, managers are likely to work 
“under the radar”. In small firms, on the other hand, fewer things are invisible to upper 
management, and this may deter managers from using invisible remedies.  
Research also suggests that employees are more willing to take objects from large 
organizations than from small ones (Greenberg & Scott, 1996). A questionnaire-based study 
showed that while 50% of respondents did not agree with pilfering from small firms, only 
34% disapproved of pilfering from large ones (Smigel, 1970). Of course, these results concern 
employee theft, which is clearly different from Robin Hoodism. These results may still give 
some insights into the conditions in which a manager may be more likely to take objects or 
benefits from the company in order to divert them from their formal use and allocate them to 
their subordinates as invisible remedies.  
 
Proposition 8: The larger the company, the more likely its managers will use invisible 
remedies. 
 
Proposition 9: The more centralized the company, the more likely its managers will use 
invisible remedies. 
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3.4.2. MANAGERS’ INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND ROBIN HOODISM 
 
In addition to situational differences, managers’ individual differences can also impact 
their tendency to allocate invisible remedies. The more the managers are motivated to act 
justly, the more they tend to correct injustices, and the more they are likely to allocate 
invisible remedies. Justice research has identified three main motivations for managers to 
behave in a fair way: instrumental (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982), socio-emotional (Patient & 
Skarlicki, 2005), and moral motives (Folger, Cropanzano, & Goldman, 2005, Turillo, Folger, 
Lavelle, Umphress, & Gee, 2002). Individual differences may be associated with each of 
these motives. 
 
3.4.2.1. Managers’ material instrumental orientation 
Managers may be instrumentally motivated to behave fairly in the workplace. Because 
they believe that “justice works” (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982, p. 457), managers are motivated 
by the rewards associated with appearing to be fair to their employees and thus generally 
“manage impressions of organizational justice” (Greenberg, 1990b). Fairness can be a means 
for managers to improve their subordinates’ performance at work and to improve the 
realization of their own objectives. Thus, correcting injustice by allocating invisible remedies 
may be for managers a strategy to show their fairness in order to achieve their own objectives 
of work performance. According to Barrick and Mount (1991) and Salgado (1997), 
managerial work performance can be operationalized by the construct of conscientiousness. 
Indeed, conscientiousness was shown as being a strong predictor of performance across all 
job criteria and across all occupational groups (Barrick & Mount, 1991). More precisely, 
conscientiousness was shown to be composed of two separate factors: achievement striving 
and duty (Jackson, Paunonen, Fraboni, & Goffin, 1996; Jackson, Ashton, & Tomes, 1996). 
Achievement striving is linked to a more self-centered commitment, for instance, an 
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individual’s concern for the advancement of his or her career. It characterizes “good actors”. 
In contrast, duty is linked to a more other-oriented commitment, for example an individual’s 
concern for the welfare of the organization. It characterizes “good soldiers” (Moon, 2001, p. 
534). Achievement striving has been shown to be correlated with escalation of commitment, 
which is a decision making process in which people’s self-interest is pursued even to the 
detriment of the organization (Moon, 2001). To the extent that allocating invisible remedies 
may help managers to maintain their subordinates’ cooperation, which enables them to 
achieve their personal performance goals, I make the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 10: Managers’ level of achievement striving is positively related to their use of 
invisible remedies. 
 
Because “good soldiers” may be willing to help their subordinates and at the same 
time be reluctant to impose invisible costs on their organization, no proposition is made 
concerning the link between managers’ level of duty and their use of invisible remedies.  
 
3.4.2.2. Managers’ socio-emotional motivations 
When a manager wants to correct an injustice, he or she can apply different 
techniques. The organizational justice literature has identified one of them: behaving 
interactionally fairly, which mitigates negative reactions to distributive and procedural 
injustices (Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). However, this technique can be difficult to implement. 
It consists of showing respect to the subordinates, adapting to their needs when 
communicating and being honest with them when giving thorough justification of the decision 
that they view as unjust, all behaviors that managers find difficult to implement when they 
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have to communicate about an injustice: “tough times [tend to] make tough bosses”, at least 
as far as interactional justice is concerned (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998). 
Patient and Skarlicki (2005) proposed that lower self-esteem relates to more unjust 
interactional behaviors. Having to announce and justify unfair news to one’s subordinates 
threatens the communicator’s self-esteem and relates to fears of social rejection. Low self-
esteem individuals, because their self-evaluation is negative, anticipate equally negative social 
evaluation and are more likely to expect failure. In these conditions, they tend to protect 
themselves rather than behave interactionally fairly. In contrast, high self-esteem managers 
are likely to be more confident that they will succeed, they are less affected by negative 
feedback, and tend to respond to it by trying harder. They do not fear being associated with 
the unfair decision itself, and this makes them tend to behave interactionally fairly when 
announcing an unjust decision.  
As a consequence, when trying to correct an injustice, low self-esteem managers are 
more likely to use invisible remedies compared to high self-esteem managers. In this way, 
they can correct an injustice and protect their social image in the eyes of their subordinates 
without taking the risks involved in trying to justify a decision that is viewed as unfair. 
 
Proposition 11: The lower the managers’ self-esteem, the more likely they are to use invisible 
remedies. 
 
3.4.2.3. Managers’ moral motivations 
In contrast to the former motives, managers may also be intrinsically motivated by 
justice. This means that their efforts are intended to satisfy internalized moral standards 
(Tetlock, 1985). According to the moral perspective of justice, people for whom morality 
matters will be more likely to deal with justice issues in social situations and, accordingly, to 
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strongly react to injustices (Folger, 1998, 2001; Folger et al., 2005). Morality has indeed been 
shown to influence managers’ justice behaviors (Patient & Skarlicki, in press) and to 
moderate the relationship between workplace fairness and performance (Colquitt, Scott, Judge 
& Shaw, 2006). Research also shows that people’s usual reaction is to retaliate against the 
source of an injustice (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Turillo et al., 2002). In 
particular, moral identity, defined as the importance people attach to morality as a component 
of their self-concept has been shown to be an important determinant of the congruence 
between moral judgment and moral conduct (Aquino & Reed, 2002).   
Aquino, Reed, Lim, Felps, and Freeman (2006) found that employees’ moral identity 
positively relates to the taking of resources from the organization in an unjust situation. The 
authors found that higher moral self-identifiers were more prone to act in a way that was 
likely to impose invisible costs on the organization after an injustice had occurred. More 
precisely, employees who self-identified themselves as high on moral identity were more 
likely to react to organizational injustices by taking property from work without permission or 
by falsifying receipts or time sheets to obtain more money for business expenses or overtime. 
Interestingly, when no injustice was at stake, lower moral identifiers were in fact more prone 
than higher moral identifiers to behave in such a way. Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld and Walker 
(2007) also found that moral identity moderated the relationship between unfair treatment by 
customers and employee’s retaliation. This positive relationship was more pronounced for 
employees high versus low on moral identity. Reynolds and Ceranic (2007) also showed that 
moral identity interacted with moral judgment to predict when managers would be likely to 
invisibly give free time off to an excellent worker to avoid an injustice. High moral identifiers 
were shown to be more likely to use this invisible remedy, but only if they tended to use 
consequentialist (versus formalist) moral reasoning. Consequentialists were defined as more 
likely to make ends-based decisions, whereas formalists tended to give more importance to 
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formal standards of moral behavior. In contrast, formalist high moral identifiers were less 
prone to use this kind of remedy to correct an injustice.  These different results are not 
inconsistent with the results found with another operationalization of the concept of morality, 
namely the level of moral development. Provided there are no strict and salient ethical rules 
prohibiting theft in their firm, workers who scored higher on their level of moral development 
were as likely as workers who scored lower on their moral development level to steal in order 
to correct a distributive injustice (Greenberg, 2002).  
As a consequence, managers for whom morality is more important may be morally 
outraged by the injustice experienced by their employees and may want to punish their 
employer. In other words, they may use Robin Hoodism as a means of restoring justice for 
moral reasons. In contrast, managers for whom morality is more important may be more 
likely to use invisible remedies when an injustice is at stake and less likely to engage in 
deviant behaviors when there is no injustice to correct compared to managers for whom 
morality is less important. Stated differently, because the motive underlying invisible justice 
entails correcting justice violations, managers for whom moral concerns are higher (versus 
lower) are more likely to be motivated to correct injustices. 
 
Proposition 12: The more important morality is for a manager, the more likely he or she is to 
use invisible remedies to correct a work injustice. 
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3.5. THE MOTIVATIONAL MECHANISM OF THE ROBIN HOOD EFFECT:  
WHY DO EMPLOYEES REACT FAVORABLY TO INVISIBLE REMEDIES? 
 
The same three motives used to understand why managers want to behave fairly have 
also been used to identify why subordinates react to injustice. Thus, current justice research 
has identified instrumental, relational and moral motives to explain why victims value justice. 
First, employees have an interest in receiving favorable outcomes. Because they generally 
think that their contributions are valuable, they see distributive justice as ensuring the receipt 
of favorable outcomes. Likewise, according to the instrumental model of justice (Thibault & 
Walker, 1975, 1978), procedural justice is a sign that, at least in the long run, individuals will 
be allocated valued resources. In this respect, being unjustly treated means that they will not 
get what they think they deserve.  
A second motive pertains to people’s socio-emotional needs. The relational model of 
justice (Tyler & Lind, 1992) proposes that employees value being considered as full-fledged 
members of their work groups. In particular, being unfairly treated may question their identity 
and importance as group members. Finally, people are motivated by morality. The moral 
perspective of justice contends that people give importance to fairness as an end in itself 
(Cropanzano, Rupp, Mohler, & Schminke, 2001; Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003; 
Folger, 1998; Folger, 2001; Folger, et al., 2005). People do not like injustice simply because 
they think it is wrong to be unjust.  
 
3.5.1. THE SYMBOLIC MEANING OF ORGANIZATIONAL REMEDIES 
 
On the basis of the above taxonomy, Reb, Goldman and Cropanzano (2006) explained 
why organizational remedies have a favorable impact on employees. They defined an 
organizational remedy as “an action carried out by an organization with the intention of 
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creating in the mind of an aggrieved worker the judgment that the perceived injustice has been 
atoned for.” (Reb et al., 2006, p. 34). They distinguished three types of remedies and showed 
that each of them corresponds to one of the three motives of justice because they respond to 
three fundamental human needs. “Instrumental remedies” may take the concrete form of 
monetary payoffs. These remedies address the need for control, which the authors associate to 
an instrumental motive. They are particularly adapted to restore distributive injustices 
(employees’ subjective judgments of the fairness of the outcomes they receive at work; 
Adams, 1965), and, to a lesser extent, procedural injustices (employees’ subjective judgments 
of the fairness of the procedures that lead to these outcomes; Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978; 
Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza & Fry, 1980). Thus, instrumental remedies are a form of 
compensatory justice.  
“Socio-emotional remedies” consist of a symbolic affirmation of social standing and 
take the concrete form of public apology or an explanation. They address the need to belong, 
a relational motive. They are suitable responses to procedural and interactional injustices 
(employees’ subjective judgments of the fairness of the interpersonal and informational 
interactions that can occur when outcomes are allocated; Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; 
Greenberg, 1993; Shapiro, Buttner & Barry, 1994).  
Last, “punitive remedies” consist of making harmdoers suffer to atone for the injustice 
they have caused, and may take the concrete form of some monetary penalty or other 
disciplinary actions. Punitive remedies address the need for meaning; that is, the moral need, 
and are especially appropriate when an interactional injustice has occurred. These are often 
referred to as retributive justice. Okimoto (in press, b) presented a similar taxonomy. He 
identified material compensation, apologies and punishments as the main means of justice 
restoration.  
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This taxonomy has been partially tested. In a field study, as well as in a laboratory 
experiment, people preferred an “instrumental remedy” to a “punitive remedy” when a 
procedural injustice had occurred, and a “punitive remedy” to an “instrumental remedy” when 
an interactional injustice had occurred (Reb et al., 2006). Other research suggests that the 
substantive benefit from a remedy has less importance than its symbolic meaning.9 For 
instance, a socio-emotional remedy, such as an apology (admitting responsibility and 
expressing remorse) is able to atone for a perceived distributive injustice and to decrease 
negative reactions toward the harmdoer (Ohbuchi, Kameda & Agarie, 1989; O’Malley & 
Greenberg, 1983). For Ohbuchi and colleagues (1989, p. 220), an apology can be instrumental 
in promising “a full restitution of harm”, speak to relational motives in “restoring self-esteem 
and social identity”, and have a moral function by “punishing the harmdoer”. Similarly, 
Okimoto (in press, b) found that monetary compensation can be an effective way of 
addressing relational concerns resulting from procedural and interactional injustices. In five 
experiments, he showed that giving monetary compensation with a benevolent intent could 
reaffirm victims’ perception of membership value and protect their group identity. Thus, this 
material remedy resulted in positive reactions toward the organization because of its relational 
benefits. The same results were found for unjustly treated customers (Okimoto, 2006).  
More complex patterns among the variables have also been found. Consumers’ 
reactions to service recovery strategies showed an interactive effect of material and socio-
emotional remedies: consumers experienced more fairness and satisfaction when they were 
provided with both monetary compensation and an apology in comparison to when they 
received only an apology (Goodwin & Ross, 1992). In summary, organizational remedies 
have the potential to alleviate employees’ negative reactions caused by distributive, 
procedural and interactional injustices. Remedies are effective because they address victim’s 
                                                 
9
 To more clearly disentangle the concrete form and the symbolic meaning of a remedy, I refer to instrumental 
remedies as material remedies and use the term instrumental only to account for a type of motive. 
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instrumental, relational and moral motives. Even though certain remedies are more linked to 
certain types of motives,  usually their symbolic meaning makes them able to respond to all 
the three types of a victim’s motives.   
 
3.5.2. WHY DO INVISIBLE REMEDIES WORK? 
 
Invisible remedies are a special form of organizational remedies at a managerial level. 
Invisible remedies take a material form. In this way, they correspond to Reb et al.’s (2006) 
definition of instrumental remedies. Referring to Okimoto’s analysis (in press, b), invisible 
remedies can have an instrumental, as well as a relational and a moral function, which 
consequently enables them to atone for distributive, procedural as well as interactional 
injustices. Invisible remedies can be viewed by victims as compensation for an injustice (an 
instrumental function), as a way of restoring their self-esteem and their social identity (a 
relational function) or as a way of punishing their organization (a moral function).  
First, empirical research has indeed shown that taking resources from the workplace is 
as a way for victims of making up for injustices because it addresses instrumental as well as 
moral motives. Underpaid employees may want to find ways of increasing their outcomes in 
order to make up for the imbalance between what they take from and what they give to their 
employer, which pertains to an instrumental motive. Taking resources allows feelings of 
inequity to be reduced and distributive justice to be re-established (Greenberg, 1990a).  
Taking resources can also serve as an act of retaliation by disgruntled employees who 
also feel interactionally mistreated, and respond by punishing their employer by means that 
are available to them. In a study by Greenberg (1996), these two motives were clearly 
disentangled, and both explained why people engage in taking resources from their 
companies.  
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Second, taking resources is also likely to be a response to a relational motive. Little 
justice research has investigated how employees can build strong relational links with other 
groups in an attempt to compensate for their lack of recognition by their firm. However, 
informal work groups are powerful sources of identity (Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939). To 
receive the social rewards provided by fellow group members, one has to conform to strong 
group norms (Etzioni, 1975). These norms may contradict the norms of the firm’s dominant 
coalition (Cyert & March, 1963). In particular, group norms often condone taking resources 
(Greenberg, 1997; Greenberg & Scott, 1996). It has been argued that “in many jobs, it is 
considered abnormal not to steal” (Greenberg & Scott, 1996, p. 128) and that stealing is a way 
of “enhancing one’s status within one’s work group” (Greenberg, 1997, p. 93). As a 
consequence, even if theft is different from the allocation of invisible remedies, one can view 
taking resources as a reaction to injustice with a view to finding a compensating source of 
valued membership in informal peer work groups especially if it is endorsed by their manager. 
Similarly, by using Robin Hoodism, managers might succeed in reaffirming employees’ 
membership value that has been harmed by the organization. Interestingly, in so doing, they 
replace the sense of belonging to the organization by the sense of belonging to the managers’ 
work team.   
In summary, invisible remedies are proposed to have a positive impact on employees 
because the invisible remedies can correct justice violations by addressing fundamental needs 
of the employees that were harmed by the injustice. Saying that invisible remedies can correct 
injustices is consistent with my definition of corrective justice as a way of seeking to “remedy 
mistakes in the allocation of rewards and allocations” (French, 1964, p. 412). This is not to 
say that invisible remedies can completely restore perceptions of justice, especially toward the 
organization. Even after receiving an invisible remedy, an employee can still deem the 
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organization unfair. Instead, invisible remedies function as a kind of compensation allocated 
by the manager of the unjustly treated employee. 
 
Proposition 13: Invisible remedies correct injustice perceptions because they respond to 
employees’ instrumental, relational, and moral employees’ motives. 
 
Proposition 14: Invisible remedies are able to correct distributive, procedural and 
interactional injustices. 
 
 
3.6. DISCUSSION 
 
According to Adams (1965, 1963), employees assess the equity of the exchange with 
their firm by taking into account not only their salary, but also a host of other outcomes. In 
particular, as “positively valent outcomes”, he identified “fringe benefits” and “a variety of 
formally and informally sanctioned perquisites” (Adams, 1965, p. 278). This chapter proposes 
that when the exchange with the organization is viewed as distributively, procedurally or 
interactionally unjust, the manager may restore justice by allocating specific kinds of 
outcomes referred to as invisible remedies. However, it is more the exchange with the 
manager that benefits from this strategy that I named Robin Hoodism rather than the 
exchange with the firm as a whole.  
 
3.6.1. THE ROBIN HOOD EFFECT AND THE FAIR PROCESS EFFECT 
 
Building on earlier writings on the motives of justice (Cropanzano, Byrne et al., 2001), 
I have proposed that invisible remedies have the potential to address employees’ material, 
relational as well as moral needs that are violated by an injustice. I have also offered 
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propositions concerning the antecedents of the manager engaging in Robin Hoodism, 
including individual differences and situational factors, Another group of propositions regards 
the consequences of invisible remedies: How do employees react to them? On the basis of 
social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), the agent-system model (Bies and Moag, 1986; 
Masterson et al., 2000; Colquitt et al., 2001) and the multifoci model of justice (Byrne, 1999; 
Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002), I propose that invisible remedies are likely to encourage 
employees to react favorably toward their managers but their reactions toward their 
organization can result in negative consequences. Besides, invisible remedies can create 
feelings of injustice among co-workers who do not benefit from them (Mars & Nicod, 1981). 
These consequences of invisible remedies on employees’ behaviors have been named the 
Robin Hood effect. This means that the Robin Hood effect refers at the same time to good 
feelings about the manager and bas feelings toward the company (and bad feelings among the 
coworkers). Finally, some of the forms of invisible remedies, which were identified at the 
beginning of the chapter, are likely to be a function of what activities are under managers’ 
control.  
As with the well-known fair process effect (Van den Bos, 2005), the Robin Hood 
effect may foster perceived justice in the workplace. However, the two mechanisms are 
different in the way they operate and in their consequences. The fair process effect 
corresponds to the positive impact fair procedures can have on employees’ reactions. In 
contrast, the Robin Hood effect refers to the positive and negative impact invisible remedies 
have on subordinates’ subsequent behaviors. Indeed, negative consequences are likely to 
result as well for the organization. To cite an interesting analogy, according to the legend, 
those who benefited from Robin Hood were likely to have increased antagonism toward the 
heads of state that oppressed them.  
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3.6.2. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
Invisible remedies may have some advantages: they provide the manager with 
increased flexibility to repair injustice without bureaucracy (Dalton, 1959), they are likely to 
be faster to implement, and more convenient than formal rewards (Altheide et al., 1978) and 
not as costly as a formal system (Zeitlin, 1971). This may explain why, even if upper 
managers are normally out of this invisible reallocation system, in certain industries, they 
seem to be aware of “much of what goes on” without reacting in any way to it, which “helps 
to institutionalize its practice” (Mars & Nicod, 1981, p. 67). Interestingly, because Zeitlin not 
only described an example of this system but also tried to defend it, his article was rejected 
for publication in the Harvard Business Review for moral and ethical reasons (Zeitlin, 1971). 
In addition to this moral problem, invisible remedies also imply the drawbacks that have been 
described in this chapter, a factor that might discourage organizational authorities from using 
them. An important point here is that invisible remedies are likely to benefit the individual 
manager more than the firm as a whole. Indeed, even if adverse reactions from employees are 
mitigated, their negative fairness judgments toward the source of the injustice – the company 
or upper management – remain unchanged, or perhaps are greater and this is expected to have 
a negative effect on their citizenship behaviors toward the firm. This is why usually firms are 
unlikely to encourage the use of invisible remedies and are likely to reprimand the managers 
who use them. This means that managers allocating invisible remedies do it at their personal 
risk. Another drawback is that invisible remedies can create more new injustices than the ones 
they purport to solve.  
Thus, managing invisible remedies can be paradoxical. Can the invisible be managed? 
To some extent, this could be possible through making the invisible more visible. 
Empowering front-line managers and visibly allocating them discretionary budgets for 
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invisible actions may be a way of recognizing and utilizing the power of invisible remedies 
not only for the managers’ but also for the company’s benefit. This could be a fast and 
powerful remedy for unjust events. In this respect, the mechanism of invisible remedies may 
be analogous to the “invisible hand” (Smith, 1776/1994; p. 485). Like a market, a formal 
organization might better work itself out without an overabundance of rules. However, as far 
as systemic injustices are concerned, there is a contradiction in imagining a systemically 
unfair firm using invisible remedies as a systemically fair practice. Moreover, fair 
organizations are more likely to use visible organizational remedies such as official monetary 
compensation, public apologies or disciplinary action. Thus, invisible remedies may be 
viewed for low-rank managers as a way of reacting when “the visible hand of [upper-] 
managers” (Chandler, 1960) produces too many dysfunctional injustices. By reintroducing 
into the organization the kind of flexibility typical of the “invisible hand” of the market, these 
low-rank managers may want to correct organizational injustices with a view to achieving 
greater efficiency. However, the question of whether the “invisible hand of managers” is 
globally more favorable or unfavorable remains unknown. 
 
3.6.3. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
 
The theoretical implications of this work are threefold. First, whereas most 
organizational research tends to focus on the employees’ (the victims of injustice) or third 
party perspectives, the Robin Hood effect considers the actors’ (the manager’s) perspective. 
This perspective is not intended to be prescriptive work. Rather, it simply aims to describe 
and explain a phenomenon that occurs in work settings, thus enabling researchers to expand 
understanding of how people address justice concerns in the workplace. Second, this work 
proposes new links between organizational justice research and important sociological works, 
The fair hand of managers 
 135  
which have often been categorized as works about employee theft. In particular, this 
perspective uses the concept of corrective justice to propose that managers’ allocations of 
benefits taken from their firm can be an attempt to restore justice by allocating the only 
remedy over which they have some control. The framework presented here draws on the 
typology of justice motives to account for the power of this invisible remedy. This provides a 
theory to understand why taking resources from a firm can restore not only distributive but 
also procedural and interactional justice, even if empirical findings are so far limited to 
distributive injustices. Third, this chapter defines some boundary conditions to this 
phenomenon using situational as well as managers’ individual differences antecedents, and it 
attempts to predict which forms invisible remedies may take. This might help to clearly 
distinguish Robin Hoodism from other phenomena such as the “parallel deviance” mechanism 
(Kemper, 1966). 
Research is needed to empirically test propositions offered in this conceptual model 
and to investigate the ultimate effect of invisible remedies on the organization overall. It 
would also be of interest to distinguish between the relative explanatory power of the 
instrumental, relational and moral motives that can account for employees’ reactions to 
invisible remedies as well as for the managerial propensity to use them. In addition, future 
studies could identify and investigate the effects on fairness perceptions of managers publicly 
criticizing their unfair organizations. Future research could also aim to delineate more 
precisely the importance of justice restoration as a reason for managers allocating invisible 
remedies in the workplace.  
 Some anecdotes about life in organizations (Villette, 1999) suggest that invisible 
remedies are common. However, organizational theory has so far under-researched this 
phenomenon which can have a significant impact on employees’ attitudes and behaviors in 
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the workplace. I hope, by this chapter, to begin a discussion to better understand the 
importance of, and mechanisms for, invisible remedies. 
 The next chapter presents a study whose objective was to empirically test aspects of 
the model of invisible remedies.  
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CHAPTER 4: WHO ARE THE MODERN ORGANIZATIONAL ROBIN HOODS? 
SITUATIONAL AND INTERINDIVIDUAL FACTORS PREDICTING MANAGERS’ 
ALLOCATIONS OF INVISIBLE REMEDIES. 
 
 
4.0. ABSTRACT 
 
Managers often make efforts to restore workplace unfairness by using “invisible 
remedies” under the radar of senior executives’ awareness, including providing mistreated 
employees with special favors, giving them time off, or other benefits under the manager’s 
control (see chapter 2). These corrective justice behaviors have been termed Robin Hoodism 
(see chapter 3).  The research presented here investigated when Robin Hoodism was more 
likely to be chosen by managers, and whether managers’ morality could predict these actions. 
An experimental scenario study with 187 managers tested firstly whether an interaction 
between distributive and interpersonal injustice experienced by a subordinate predicted 
managers’ Robin Hoodism, and secondly whether the moral identity of managers moderated 
the combined impact of distributive and interpersonal injustice. Results showed that managers 
who were low moral identifiers did behave as modern organizational Robin Hoods to correct 
either distributive or interpersonal injustices experienced by their subordinates. However, 
only managers who were high moral identifiers corrected interpersonal injustices in this way 
even at a high level of distributive justice. Theoretical and managerial implications conclude 
the chapter. 
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4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Organizational justice research shows that employees can react to injustice at work in 
at least three different ways (Conlon, Meyer, & Nowakowski, 2005). They can decrease their 
good behaviors (organizational citizenship behaviors, compliance, or performance), increase 
their bad reactions (absenteeism, turnover, or negligence), and even start to behave in ugly 
ways (by sabotage or organizational retaliatory behaviors).  
Noticeably, there is an interaction between the justice of the outcomes received and 
the justice of the process on employees’ attitudes and behaviors at work so that they react 
most negatively toward their organization when both the outcome and the process are unfair 
(Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). This interactive effect is especially strong for the 
interpersonal justice component of the fairness of the process (the respect, politeness, dignity 
and emotional support shown by the managers, Bies & Moag, 1986; Greenberg, 2006) as this 
is the most likely to raise moral concerns (Folger, 2001).  
Given the negative impact employees’ reactions to unfair treatment can have on 
organizations, it is a good practice for managers to try to correct injustices experienced by 
their subordinates. Chapter 2 has found that managers engaged in different corrective justice 
behaviors, including the use of “invisible remedies” under the radar of senior executives’ 
awareness, such as providing mistreated employees with special favors, giving them time off, 
or other benefits under the manager’s control. These hidden corrective justice behaviors that 
seem to be common have been termed Robin Hoodism (see chapter 3). 
However, only scarce research has investigated the factors that predict managers’ just 
behaviors in general, including their corrective justice behaviors and their Robin Hoodism in 
particular. Knowing when and why managers engage in this kind of corrective justice 
behaviors would be useful not only to understand and predict but also to improve the way 
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leaders manage the relationship with their subordinates. I argue that corrective justice 
behaviors are likely to be predicted both by situational factors -- including the type(s) of 
injustice experienced by the subordinate -- and also by the managers’ individual differences. 
As suggested in chapters 2 and 3, the extent to which managers see themselves as being moral 
human beings seems to be one of the individual variables that could have a strong explanatory 
power on managers’ reactions to unfairness (Patient & Skarlicki, 2005, in press; Masterson, 
Byrne & Mao, 2005).    
Propelled by these concerns, I investigated when managers used the specific 
managerial corrective justice strategy of Robin Hoodism. Specifically, I simultaneously 
investigated both individual differences in managers’ sense of morality and the variability of 
the situation regarding the distributive and interpersonal injustices experienced by the 
subordinates as predictors of Robin Hoodism. I am therefore following the interactionist 
model, which asserts that behavior is affected by the interplay between person and situation 
(Cervone & Shoda, 1999a; 1999b; Mischel, 1968), particularly concerning moral behaviors 
(Murphy, 1993; Treviño, 1986, Greenberg, 2002).  
I begin by reviewing the work on the interaction effect between the justice of the 
distribution and the justice of the process; I then describe the concepts of Robin Hoodism and 
moral identity in more detail. Moral identity is chosen here as a construct able to 
operationalize morality and to predict managers’ corrective behaviors. The construct of moral 
identity has indeed emerged as a viable construct in social and developmental psychology for 
explaining moral functioning (Aquino & Reed, 2002). I then present an experimental scenario 
study that investigated whether managers, when they correct injustices, show the same kind of 
interactive relationship that the literature has identified so far between the justice of the 
distribution and the justice of the process, and the extent to which their moral identity 
moderates this interactive relationship. 
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4.2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
4.2.1. THE INTERACTIVE EFFECT BETWEEN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND INTERPERSONAL 
JUSTICE 
 
Organizational justice researchers have identified different aspects of perceived  
justice at work. Employees’ justice perceptions encompass their subjective judgments of the 
fairness of the outcomes they receive at work (Adams, 1965) and of the justice of the decision 
procedures that lead to these outcomes (Leventhal, 1980; Leventhal, Karuza & Fry, 1980; 
Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978). The justice of the process is often seen as being composed of 
the fairness of the formal procedures and of the interpersonal treatment and information that 
employees receive (Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Greenberg, 1993; 2006; Shapiro, 
Buttner & Barry, 1994). Each of these two broad types of judgments is made based on 
distinctive rules and has been labelled distributive and procedural justice respectively. The 
concept of procedural justice is often used in this broad sense to encompass the three 
subcomponents of formal procedural justice, interpersonal justice and informational justice 
(Blader & Tyler, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992).  
Individuals feel unjustly treated when they perceive specific justice rules to be 
violated. The main rule of distributive justice in the workplace is the equity rule, which makes 
people feel justly treated if the outcomes they receive are seen to correspond to their 
contributions, and if their perceived ratio of contributions and outcomes is similar to the ratio 
received by comparison others (Adams, 1963). For instance, American and Chinese 
employees perceived a bonus to be distributively unjust because it didn’t measure up to what 
employees thought was the level of their contributions (Chen, 1995). Each of the different 
aspects of procedural justice is also based on specific rules. Concerning formal procedural 
justice for example, a decision procedure might be seen as unfair when it is not designed to 
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give the opportunity for input or “voice”. As an illustration, appraised employees felt unjustly 
treated when they were not granted bidirectional communication with their manager during 
the appraisal process (Greenberg, 1986). Regarding informational justice, people tend to 
perceive injustice on that dimension for example if they are not given appropriate excuses or 
justifications for unfavorable outcomes (Shaw, Wild, & Colquitt, 2003). Finally, employees 
experience interpersonal injustice when a decision maker makes derogatory statements or 
more generally when they perceive a lack of respect, politeness, or dignity (Bies & Moag, 
1986). Intimidating or manipulating subordinates or not giving them emotional support also 
has been proposed to lead to interpersonal injustice judgments (Greenberg, 2006). 
The justice of the outcomes received and the justice of the process have main effects 
on employees’ reactions. Interestingly, these two dimensions also interact to predict 
significant attitudes and behaviors at work. The interaction between the justice of the 
distribution and the justice of the process is an important, robust and well-grounded finding 
(Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). This interaction takes a specific shape (see figure 1). There 
are three ways of describing this interaction. First, when outcomes are unfair, a fair process 
significantly mitigates unfavorable reactions. Second, when outcomes are fair, an unfair 
process is not given much importance and is not a strong predictor of employee’s reactions. 
Third and last, it is when outcomes and the process are both unfair that employees show the 
strongest unfavorable reactions.  
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Three theoretical explanations have been proposed to account for the interactive effect 
between the fairness of a distribution and the fairness of a process (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 
2005). The first explanation relates to the relational models of justice (De Cremer & Blader, 
2006). Employees control fewer resources than their managers and are likely to feel 
dependent on them. This makes them concerned with determining if their managers and more 
generally the organization in which they work may be trusted. One indicator of a party’s 
trustworthiness is their procedural fairness. Thus, when authorities are procedurally just, 
employees give less importance to the fairness of their short term outcomes and remain 
confident that in the long run, their interests will be fairly taken into account by their 
managers. 
The second explanation is given by Fairness Theory (Folger & Cropanzano, 2001). 
According to this theory, the effect of outcome fairness on employees’ reactions depends on 
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FIGURE 4: 
 
The Interactive Effects of Distributive and Interpersonal Justice on 
Employees’ Reactions toward the Firm 
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the degree to which they hold the decision maker accountable for the decision. A fair process 
means that the manager is not responsible for the bad outcomes. In this case, unfavorable and 
unfair distributions are seen as caused by back luck due to unexpected environmental or 
market changes; For example an external factor, such as loss of customers, can mean 
employees earn less despite having worked as hard as usual (Greenberg, 1990a). People view 
their manager to be more responsible for the bad outcomes of the exchange when he or she 
exhibits lower procedural fairness.  
The third explanation might have the power to subsume the two others (Brockner & 
Wiesenfeld, 2005). For Uncertainty Management Theory, employees give importance to 
procedural fairness to make sense of the events that affect them in situations that have a high 
degree of uncertainty, which is the case in numerous work situations (Lind & van den Bos, 
2002).  This means that a high level of procedural fairness may make employees think that 
even if their current outcome seems distributively unfair, in fact procedural fairness either 
makes them change their mind and think the outcome is fair or at least may give them a sense 
of global control and reassurance concerning the general rules and functioning of their firm.  
Each of these three explanations can be drawn on when explaining the role of the 
interpersonal component of procedural justice. First, when supervisors show consideration 
(which heightens the subordinates’ interpersonal justice judgment), this makes employees 
think their manager is trustworthy. Second, when employees see their managers trying to 
appear fair by communicating with respect and compassion about a negative decision, this can 
make people think that their manager is not responsible for their negative outcome, and they 
may attribute it to circumstances or other sources instead. Third, a manager behaving 
interactionally fairly provides also emotional support to his or her subordinates, which helps 
them to find the psychological resources to cope with the injustice and overcome uncertainty 
(Greenberg, 2006).  
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Moreover, from the moral perspective of justice (Folger, 2001; Folger & Cropanzano, 
1998, 2001), interpersonal justice raises moral concerns more strongly than other aspects of 
justice because it constitutes a lack of dignified treatment from a clearly identified source. 
Although negative or unfair outcomes are an inevitable part of organizational life, all 
individuals consider being due by virtue of their humanity to the right to be treated with 
dignity and respect. Therefore, when interpersonal and distributive injustices coincide, 
employees tend to be particularly willing to retaliate against their managers (Skarlicki & 
Folger, 1997). 
Empirical work has shown that interactive effects between distributive and 
interpersonal justice are common. For example, in a firm in which the employees had their 
salaries reduced by 15%, a fair interaction with the President showing respect and explaining 
the reasons for the situation made employees less willing to steal the firm. In contrast, 
employees who where unfairly treated by their vice-President were more prone to steal their 
company as a consequence of their pay loss (Greenberg, 1990a). In the same way, nurses 
whose salaries were reduced by 10% were less likely to experience insomnia when their 
managers behaved interpersonally fairly towards them (Greenberg, 2006). 
Whether this effect occurs among managers, however, has received limited research 
attention. The perspective of a manager is especially interesting to study. Managers are in a 
unique position because (a) they can observe occasions of employee mistreatment, and (b) 
they often have the opportunity to restore unfairness. To my knowledge, no empirical study 
has so far tried to answer how managers react to the distributive and interpersonal injustices 
experienced by their subordinates from the organization.  
However, some studies have tried to identify which kind of interactive pattern 
managers show when they personally feel distributively and interpersonally unjustly treated 
by their own subordinates or by lower status parties (Chen, Brockner & Greenberg, 2003). 
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Even if this is far from being the same question, the results could provide some insights useful 
for my current research. Indeed, as I am interested in identifying how managers correct 
distributive and interpersonal injustices experienced by their subordinates, knowing how they 
react to these two kinds of injustices when they experience them by themselves might give 
some preliminary elements on which to build my hypotheses.  A pilot study and two full 
studies showed that in cases in which lower status parties like subordinates had the power to 
shape the allocations of higher status parties like managers (in a real negotiation as well as in 
a lab in which managers were said it is their subordinates who would allocate them rewards) 
managers showed a contrary interaction between outcome and interpersonal fairness (Chen et 
al., 2003). High interpersonal fairness heightened instead of reduced the influence of outcome 
favorability on desire for future interaction with the lower status party (see figure 2). 
Managers had positive reactions only toward subordinates who were interpersonally just and 
allocated them favorable outcomes. When subordinates allocated unfavorable outcomes by 
being interpersonally just, this did not reduce their managers’ negative reactions. The authors 
explained that managers’ motivation was to maintain their social status and power. Thus, they 
were only likely to favor interactions that did not threaten their social self. In the case their 
subordinates were at the same time interpersonally fair and distributively unfair this made 
them think that the subordinates were not responsible for the outcomes and this could have 
threaten their own self-esteem. Thus, managers gave more importance to outcome fairness 
rather than to process fairness.  Even if this explanation holds well, it also might be the case 
that managers simply tend to be more outcome oriented. 
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In short, it appears that interpersonal justice is most likely to interact with distributive 
justice in predicting reactions to injustice, because interpersonal justice is the most central to 
moral concerns. It also appears that managers are likely to show a different interactive 
relationship compared to their subordinates. It remains to be tested whether corrective justice 
behaviors of managers are also predicted by an interaction of interpersonal and distributive 
justice. If an interaction occurs, what would be its specific shape? Do managers take 
corrective actions only when both types of injustice are experienced by their subordinates? 
This would be the case if managers are fully aware of the interactive pattern their subordinates 
show. They would indeed try to restore justice only when their subordinates react negatively. 
Do managers attempt to correct the injustice only when distributive injustices arise? This 
would be the case if they give more importance to outcomes rather than to interpersonal 
interactions. Do they take corrective actions when interpersonal justice is at stake whatever 
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the fairness of the outcome? This would be the case if they are particularly sensitive to moral 
concerns. I investigated these issues with respect to one particular type of corrective action, 
namely Robin Hoodism. 
 
4.2.2. ROBIN HOODISM 
 
How do front-line managers react to the perception that an employee has experienced 
an injustice stemming from the organization itself (Beugré & Baron, 2001; Sheppard, Lewicki 
& Minton, 1992) or from upper management (Greenberg, 1994). In chapter 2, I investigated 
how managers (n = 35) reacted to and dealt with their subordinates’ injustice experiences (74 
incidents were quoted). I found that direct managers used their discretion and informal 
decision making power to correct these kinds of injustices that -- while not caused by the 
managers -- could have a negative impact on the work of their subordinates. 
 Different terms have been used to label general remedial actions taken to restore 
justice at work. One common label is restorative justice. However, restorative justice has also 
been widely used in specific reference to action aimed at restoring a sense of justice through 
renewed value consensus between the victim, the perpetrator and the whole community 
(Umbreit & Coates, 2006; Wenzel, Okimoto & Feather, 2006). Thus, I prefer to use the more 
general and neutral term of “corrective justice” coined by French (1964) and defined in the 
introduction to account for behaviors aimed at correcting for the consequences that a victim of 
injustice suffers.  
In study 2 (see chapter 2), managers used different strategies to correct work injustice. 
A specific strategy, which was the third most frequently used strategy after “giving 
explanations” (which refers to an informational justice behavior) and “trying to fix the 
problem at the origin of the injustice” consisted in “allocating invisible remedies”. I defined 
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this strategy as “managers’ allocations to their subordinates of something extra, belonging to 
the company, not for its formal or intended use, for the purpose of restoring justice (hence the 
term remedy), usually without more senior managers’ or other employees’ understanding of 
the motivation (hence the term invisible)”. This phenomenon was named “Robin Hoodism” in 
chapter 3 because it reminds of the actions of the folk hero Robin Hood, who tried to remedy 
injustices perpetrated against citizens by an unjust authority in non-sanctioned ways. 
Concretely, Robin Hoodism can take the form of authorization for subordinates to take 
items home (e.g., small tools, raw materials, finished small products), borrowing tools, 
personal use of machines, or granting employees time off (Greenberg & Scott, 1996). It can 
also consist of allocating formal benefits (e.g., bonuses, training) not for their intended formal 
purpose but for justice restoration motives.  
Many illustrations of invisible remedies were given in chapter 3 involving textile 
workers (Sieh, 1987), cashiers in supermarkets (Altheide, Adler, Adler & Altheide, 1978) 
workers in a gypsum factory (Gouldner, 1954), Post office workers (Bradford, 1976), 
employees of large chain stores (Altheide et al., 1978), workers in a bakery (Ditton, 1977), 
employees of chemical plants (Dalton, 1959) and toll-collectors (Zeitlin, 1971). These 
allocations have been described as representing a significant part of an invisible-wage system, 
the aim of which is usually to compensate for injustices, for instance unfairly low wages 
(Henry, 1981; Ditton 1977; Mars & Nicod, 1981, see also chapters 2 and 3).  
Managers might have different motives to act as modern organizational Robin Hoods. 
They might be motivated to avoid the negative effects produced by the injustice to maintain 
their subordinates’ work performance. In this respect, corrective fairness can be a means for 
them to improve their subordinates’ performance at work and as a consequence, to improve 
the realization of their own objectives. Thus, correcting injustice by allocating invisible 
remedies might be a strategy that managers employ to demonstrate their fairness in order to 
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achieve their performance targets.  This motive pertains to the instrumental motive, which is 
said to be one strong justice motive (Thibaut & Walker, 1975, 1978).  
In contrast, managers may also be intrinsically motivated to correct injustice just 
because they think it’s the right thing to do (see chapter 2 and chapter 3). According to the 
moral perspective of justice, people for whom morality matters will be more likely to deal 
with justice issues in social situations and, accordingly, to strongly react to injustices (Folger, 
1998, 2001; Folger, Cropanzano & Goldman, 2005, Rupp, 2003). Morality has been shown to 
influence managers’ justice behaviors (Patient & Skarlicki, in press) and to moderate the 
relationship between workplace fairness and performance (Colquitt, Scott, Judge & Shaw, 
2006). Research also shows that people’s usual reaction is to be willing to punish the source 
of an injustice (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986; Turillo, Folger, Lavelle, Umphress, & 
Gee, 2002). Interpersonal injustice in particular has been shown to be perceived as a moral 
transgression, much more than distributive or procedural injustices. Indeed, it more clearly 
shows that the moral transgression is made on purpose and allows to identify the perpetrator 
without ambiguity (Folger, 2001). In line with this, interpersonal justice has been found to be 
a strong antecedent to third parties’ punishing behaviors (Turillo et al., 2002).  
Thus, managers for whom morality matters less might correct injustices for 
instrumental reasons, while managers for whom morality matters more might correct 
injustices for intrinsic reasons. This means that managers might show a different interactive 
pattern between the justice of the distribution and the justice of the process on their Robin 
Hood behaviors depending on the importance they put on morality. In particular, managers 
who put more importance on morality are likely to react more strongly to interpersonal 
injustices, which are considered as stronger moral transgressions. In my research, I used 
moral identity to operationalize managers’ morality. 
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4.2.3. MORAL IDENTITY 
 
Moral identity is a personality variable that is intended to explain moral behavior. 
Moral behavior can be defined as behavior that is subject to generally accepted moral norms 
of behavior (Treviño, Weaver,  & Reynolds, 2006). These norms usually consist in acting in 
the service of human welfare (Aquino & Reed, 2002), which sometimes implies to act at odds 
with one’s material and relational self-interest (Folger, 2001). 
For the cognitive-developmental model, it is competent moral reasoning that explains 
moral behavior (Piaget, 1932, Kohlberg, 1971, Rest, 1979). However, people’s behavior is 
not always consistent with their moral cognitions. This is why researchers have called for 
complementary approaches considering social-psychological motivators of moral conduct like 
self-regulatory mechanisms (Blasi, 1984). Moral identity has been found to be able to propose 
such a complementary approach. It is a social identity, which refers to a mental representation 
that a person holds about his or her moral character. (Aquino & Reed, 2002).  
According to this perspective, the extent to which a person views certain moral traits 
as being central to his or her self-concept makes moral behavior consistent with moral 
judgment. This consistency is based on the need for the individual to be true to himself or 
herself (Erickson, 1964). Without moral identity, even a competent moral reasoning doesn’t 
necessarily lead to moral action, especially when costs are attached to this action. People may 
have identical views about what is moral or immoral but act in very different ways because 
they vary in the priority they attach to their moral self relative to other aspects of their 
identity. 
Aquino and Reed (2002) define moral identity as a self-conception organized around a 
set of moral traits. Each person has a unique moral identity consisting of specific traits, but 
some of these traits are usually shared by most people as a central set shaping their moral self-
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definition. These common traits form an associative network with the more specific traits of a 
particular person. Thus, only a subset of these common traits has to be activated in order to 
invoke a person’s moral identity, which is the method that Aquino and Reed (2002) used to 
build the scale of moral identity that I used in this study. 
On the basis of the dual nature of identity as “rooted in the very core of one’s being” 
and meaning being true to oneself in action (Erickson, 1964), Aquino and Reed (2002) have 
proposed that moral identity is composed of two subcomponents: a private and a public 
dimension. The private dimension is named internalization and corresponds to the degree to 
which moral traits are central to the self-concept. The public dimension taps the degree to 
which these traits are expressed publicly through a person’s actions in the world and is named 
symbolization. However, internalization has been shown to have more significant effects than 
symbolization. Internalization indeed refers to the individual’s self-conception, and, as such, it 
seems much more representative of moral motivation than does symbolization (Reynolds & 
Ceranic, 2007) in accordance with Rest’s view that the strength to act morally originates from 
within (Rest, 1986) 
Aquino and Reed built a scale of moral identity (2002) that they showed to be 
internally consistent, stable in its underlying factor structure, construct valid and 
nomologically valid, predicting psychological and moral behaviors (selfreported volunteering 
and actual donation behavior). Further studies that have used this scale have shown that moral 
identity indeed predicts moral behaviors like help given to out-group members even when 
these were responsible for transgressions against in-group (Reed & Aquino, 2003).  
Closer to the concept of Robin Hoodism, Aquino, Reed, Lim, Felps and Freeman 
(2006) found that employees’ moral identity positively related to the taking of resources from 
the organization in an unjust situation. Higher moral self-identifiers were more prone to react 
to organizational injustices by taking property from work without permission or by falsifying 
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receipts or time sheets to obtain more money for business expenses or overtime. Notice that, 
when no injustice was at stake, high moral identifiers were less likely than low moral 
identifiers to behave in such a way. Skarlicki, van Jaarsveld and Walker (2007) also found 
that employees who were high moral identifiers were more likely than low moral identifiers to 
retaliate after having experienced  unfair treatment by customer.  
These results showed that what is considered moral in a given situation might depend 
on the interpretation of the event. Along the same lines, Reynolds and Ceranic (2007) showed 
that moral identity interacted with moral judgment to predict when managers would be likely 
to invisibly give free time off (which is an invisible remedy) to a very efficient worker to 
avoid an injustice. High moral identifiers were shown to be more likely to use this invisible 
remedy (but only if they also tended to use consequentialist versus formalist moral reasoning).  
What is the impact of moral identity on the way managers correct injustices 
experienced by their subordinates? What is particularly interesting to find out is whether high 
and low moral identifiers show different interactive patterns relative to distributive and 
interpersonal injustices suffered by their subordinates. Do low moral managers try to correct 
injustices by behaving as modern organizational Robin Hoods? In which case, are they more 
likely to be concerned by outcomes and thus tend to correct mainly distributive injustices?  
For managers high on moral identity, does any transgression appear as important, which 
would mean that a high level of distributive justice may not be able to compensate for a low 
level of interpersonal justice? Thus do managers who are high moral identifiers correct 
interpersonal injustices even at a high level of distributive justice?  
 
4.2.4. SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Based on my review of the interactive effect between distributive and interpersonal 
justice, and of the concepts of Robin Hoodism and moral identity, I propose that distributive 
The fair hand of managers 
 153  
justice and interpersonal justice experienced by a subordinate will interact in a specific way to 
predict managers’ corrective justice behaviors. Furthermore, I predict that this interactive 
effect will depend on managers’ level of moral self-identity.  
As reviewed, managers as victims of injustice showed a specific interactive pattern in 
which they placed more importance on the outcome they receive than on the process (Chen et 
al., 2003). It is not clear whether managers are aware of the different patterns of justice focus 
among their employees. More specifically, managers might not be aware of the importance of 
behaving interactionally fairly and they might not know that a fair interaction can reduce the 
negative impact of unfair outcomes on their subordinates’ behaviors. Empirical studies have 
indeed shown that managers commonly do not behave in interactionally just ways when 
communicating unfair news to their subordinates (see chapter 1). When communicating unfair 
or negative news, managers are even likely to behave less fairly than when communicating 
fair or positive news. This reaction has been explained with self-protective motives as it is 
less threatening to distance oneself from subordinates who experience an injustice. An 
alternative explanation is simply a lack of awareness on the part of managers of the 
importance of interpersonal fairness. 
Based on the arguments and findings described above, I proposed that usually 
managers do not give much importance to interpersonal injustices when trying to correct 
distributive injustices experienced by their subordinates. Therefore, I did not expect that a fair 
interpersonal interaction experienced by subordinates would reduce their managers’ tendency 
to correct a distributive injustice. In other words, I proposed that managers would try to 
correct distributive injustices whatever the level of interpersonal justice experienced by their 
subordinates.  I expected this effect to hold independently of whether a manager was a high or 
a low moral identifier. 
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Low moral identifiers, who are likely to correct injustices for instrumental reasons and 
who tend to give more importance to outcomes should correct distributive injustices even at a 
high level of interpersonal injustice. For high moral identifiers, I predicted the same result but 
the reason might be somewhat different. Managers who are high moral identifiers should give 
importance to any injustice and might not be likely to think that one can really compensate the 
other. For instance, research on moral mandates (Skitka, 2002) shows that when an outcome 
is judged to be unjust, people whose moral values are strong in relation with that outcome do 
not think that a fair process is able to legitimate an unfair outcome. Thus, they tend to react 
negatively even if the process is fair. This means that managers are likely to want to correct 
distributive injustices even at a high level of interpersonal justice, but for moral reasons rather 
than due to a lack of awareness of the fact that victims do react less unfavorably when 
interpersonal justice interacts with distributive injustice. 
Regarding the way managers react to interpersonal justice, I predicted the same kind 
of effect for high moral identifiers. Managers who are high moral identifiers are more 
sensitive to moral transgressions, and therefore are also likely to want to correct interpersonal 
injustices even at a high level of distributive justice. This effect may not hold for low moral 
identity managers who may not give importance to interpersonal injustices and who may 
think that if the outcome is just, then there is no need for corrective action.  
I therefore formulated the following hypotheses regarding Robin Hoodism as a 
specific form of managerial corrective justice: 
 
Hypothesis 1: A three-way interaction between outcome fairness, interpersonal justice, and 
moral identity predicts managers’ tendency to engage in Robin Hoodism. 
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Hypothesis 1a: For individuals low on moral identity, high distributive justice results in low 
levels of Robin Hoodism at both high and low levels of interpersonal justice and low 
distributive justice results in high levels of Robin Hoodism at both low and high levels of 
interpersonal justice. 
Hypothesis 1b: For individuals high on moral identity, high distributive justice combined 
with low interpersonal justice results in high levels of Robin Hoodism, and low distributive 
justice results in high levels of Robin Hoodism at both low and high levels of interpersonal 
justice. 
 
4.3. METHOD 
 
In the present study, I provided managers with a scenario describing an employee 
mistreatment and I asked them to report how they would respond to the situation. In the 
scenario, I manipulated both outcome fairness (high versus low) and the interpersonal fairness 
(high versus low) of the treatment by a senior officer of the company toward one of the 
manager’s subordinates. 
 
4.3.1. PARTICIPANTS 
 
Participants consisted of 187 managers enrolled in an MBA program in Paris, France. 
Their average age was 29.8 (SD = 8.1) years and they had an average 5.8 (SD = 4.9) years of 
managerial experience. Of the total participants, 33% were female and 67% were male.   
Three participants declined to participate in the research, bringing the final total to 184. 
This study consisted of a 2 x 2 factorial design with participants randomly assigned to 
either outcome fairness (high versus low) or interpersonal treatment fairness from upper 
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management (high versus low) conditions. Participants were asked to read a scenario in which 
I manipulated the outcome and interpersonal fairness experienced by a fictitious employee, 
whose name was Marc. Participants were asked to assume the role of Marc’s manager. To 
provide participants with a variety of situations where an employee might be mistreated, I 
randomly assigned participants to read one of three different scenarios: Marc was not selected 
as team lead for a major project (Scenario 1), Marc was denied a promotion (Scenario 2), and 
Marc did not receive a bonus (Scenario 3). The three scenarios are presented in full in 
Appendix E.2.. 
 
4.3.2. MEASURES 
 
4.3.2.1. Manipulation checks 
 
In order to test whether my manipulations were effective, I assessed participants’ 
perceptions of the mistreatment. I measured participants’ perception of distributive justice 
using one item, with a response set ranging from (1) – (3): “Compared to his coworker(s) in 
the scenario, Marc was (1) more qualified, (2) equal to, (3) less qualified than his coworker(s) 
(check one).”  I measured the interpersonal justice manipulation using one item: “The 
President treated Marc with sensitivity and respect”. Participants responded to this item using 
a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). See 
appendix E.3.1.. 
 
4.3.2.2. Moral Identity 
I measured Internalization using the scale developed by Aquino and Reed (2002). The 
subjects moral traits were invoked by the presentation of the nine moral traits that have been 
shown to have the ability to invoke most people’s moral identities (caring, compassionate, 
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fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind).  Five items like “being 
someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am” or “I would be 
ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics” (reversed) taped the degree to which 
the person’s moral traits were central to the self-concept. The items used a 5-point Likert-type 
scale, with the response set ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The items 
were summed to form the measure (see appendix E.1.). 
 
4.3.2.3. Justice Restoration by Robin Hoodism 
Robin Hoodism was measured by a five item-scale developed on the basis of study 2 
(see chapter 2). Participants were asked to respond to the following questions: “How likely is 
it that in response to this situation you would…” (a) “Provide the employee some alternative 
form of compensation”; (b) “Give the employee a small bonus from your own budget”; (c) 
“Think of a fringe benefit to make up for the employee’s loss”; (d) “Give the employee some 
unofficial time off”; and (e) “Try to improve the employee’s working conditions.” The 
response scale ranged from 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely). The items were summed to 
form the measure such that higher numbers signify high levels of justice restoration by Robin 
Hoodism (allocation of invisible remedies to correct workplace injustice). Notice that subjects 
could also choose among 32 other behaviors so that not to bias their choice in favor of Robin 
Hoodism (see appendix E.4.). These 32 items were also developed on the basis of study 2 (see 
chapter 2). 
 
4.3.2.4. Control Variables 
I proposed to control for age and gender in my analysis because these variables have 
been shown to be related to moral identity (Reed & Aquino, 2003). Age and gender were self-
reported, with gender coded 0, and 1 for males and females, respectively. 
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4.4. RESULTS 
 
I first tested whether there was a difference in response between the three different 
scenarios. I dummy coded the scenarios into three groups (1, 2, and 3) and conducted a 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with group as the independent variable and my 
measured variables as the dependent variables. The results revealed no differences with regard 
to any of the measured variables: internalization F(2, 146) = .62, ns, gender F(2, 146) = .01, 
ns, age F(2, 146) = .25, ns, justice restoration F(2, 146) = .27, ns. Therefore, I aggregated the 
data into one group, and conducted the analysis on the entire sample. 
I then tested whether my manipulations were effective. Participants in the low 
interpersonal justice condition rated the manipulation check significantly lower (M = 5.00, SD 
= 2.18) than the participants in the high interpersonal justice condition (M = 7.12, SD = 3.30), 
F(1, 183) =  33.24, p < .01. Participants in the low distributive justice condition rated the 
distributive justice manipulation check significantly lower (M = 1.79, SD = .61) than the 
participants in the high distributive justice condition (M = 2.35, SD = .57), F(1, 183) =  51.85, 
p < .01). I concluded that the manipulations produced their intended effects. 
The means, standard deviations, correlations, and Cronbach’s alphas are given in 
Table 1. My hypothesis stated that a three-way interaction among distributive justice, 
interpersonal justice, and moral identity predicted manager’s Robin Hoodism tendencies. 
Following Aiken and West (1991), I centered the moral identity predictor, and used 
hierarchical regression analysis to test for a significant interaction. Gender was found not to 
be significant in the regression equation and was therefore not included in the subsequent 
analysis. I entered age and the main effects in Step 1, the two-way interactions in Step 2, and 
the three-way in Step 3. As shown on Table 2, the three-way interaction among outcome 
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fairness, interpersonal fairness and internalization was significant (β = -.64, p < .05). The 
shape of the interaction is shown on Figure 3.  Further tests showed that the two-way 
interaction between distributive justice and interpersonal justice was significant at a high level 
of managers’ moral identity (β = -.42, p < .05) and not significant at a low level of managers’ 
moral identity (β = .091, n.s. ).Thus my hypothesis was supported. 
 
 
TABLE 25:  
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Distributive Justice _ _       
2. Interpersonal Justice _ _ .06      
3. Gender .66 .47 .07 .01     
4. Age 29.86 3.64 -.06 -.12 .17*    
5. Internalization 29.89 4.01 -.04 .01 .04 -.00 (.74)  
6. Robin Hoodism 11.88 4.90 -.21* -.22* -.03 -.06 .19* (.83) 
 
Note: N = 184; Gender is coded female (0), male (1); Reliabilities are given in parentheses along the diagonal 
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TABLE 26: 
Hierarchical Regression Results Predicting Managers’ Tendency to Engage in Robin Hoodism 
 
Variable Step 1 95% CI Step 2 95% CI Step 3 95% CI 
Age -.19* -.39, -.07 -.17 -.37, -.01 -.16 -.35, .03 
Distributive Justice (DJ) -2.39** -3.73, -1.04 -8.32 -18.62, 1.97 -18.18* -32.56, -3.81 
Interpersonal Justice (IJ) -3.27** -4.64, -1.91 -6.97 -17.20, 3.24 -16.30* -30.27, -2.36 
Internalization (I) .20** -.04, .37 .02 -.24, .28 -.10 -.40, .18 
DJ x IJ   -3.29** -5.95, -.64 16.00 -3.94, 35.94 
DJ x I   .25 -.08, .58 .57** .10, 1.05 
IJ x I   .17 -.15, .50 .48* .02, .93 
DJ x IJ x I     -.64* -1.30, -.01 
F 11.05**  8.11*  8.01*  
Partial F   3.58*  3.70*  
Df 4  7  8  
R square .19**  .23**  .26**  
Adjusted R .17**  .21**  .23**  
Change in R2 .19**  .04*  .03*  
 
Note: N = 184; * p < .05, ** p < .01 
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The Interactive Effects of Distributive and Interpersonal Justice on 
Managers’ Robin Hoodism at Low and High Levels of Moral Identity 
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4.5. DISCUSSION 
 
The first contribution of the present study was that I explored the effects of employee 
mistreatment from the perspective of the manager. Managers are in a unique position because 
(a) they can observe occasions of employee mistreatment, and (b) they have the opportunity to 
restore unfairness, and (c) they often do so in a covert way named Robin Hoodism. 
My second contribution was to assess whether the two-way interaction between 
distributive and interpersonal elements on reactions to injustice can also be found with respect 
to the corrective actions of managers of injustice victims.  
A third contribution consisted in exploring whether moral identity moderated the 
effect of the two-way interaction between outcome and interpersonal fairness on Robin 
Hoodism tendencies. Said differently, I tested whether a three-way interaction among 
outcome fairness, interpersonal treatment, and moral identity predicted managers’ corrective 
actions.   
My hypotheses were supported. The results showed that moral identity qualified the 
two-way interaction between distributive and interpersonal justice that had been observed in 
previous justice research. For managers low on moral identity, Robin Hoodism tendencies 
increased as both interpersonal and distributive justice went up (i.e., two main effects). This 
suggests that it is not only for a moral motive but also for performance motives that managers 
might use Robin Hoodism. This also shows that managers were not likely to take into account 
the mitigating effect that interpersonal justice can have on distributive injustice and tended to 
correct distributive injustices whatever the level of interpersonal fairness experienced by their 
employees.  
For managers who were high on moral identity, however, the shape of the interaction 
was different. They reacted more strongly to interpersonal injustices: Low interpersonal 
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justice resulted in high justice restoration by Robin Hoodism at both high and low levels of 
distributive justice. Consistent with the moral perspective of justice, these results suggest that 
violations of interpersonal justice violate moral and social norms in a way that are not offset 
by improvements in distributive justice. 
This study has several strengths. First, I studied a unique perspective – that of a 
manager who was observing an employee (a subordinate) being mistreated by a senior officer 
of the company. The manager’s perspective has received little research attention to date in the 
organizational justice literature. Second, this is among the first empirical studies to explore 
the tendency for managers to demonstrate behaviors akin to modern day organizational Robin 
Hoods, attempting to restore justice using “invisible remedies” that are often under the radar 
of the senior executives. Third, the results showed that managers were likely to use invisible 
remedies to correct distributive injustices (as also shown in chapter 2) but also to correct 
interpersonal injustices (as proposed in chapter 3). Fourth, I provided three different situations 
for the managers to consider, and the results were consistent across all three scenarios. This 
provides greater confidence in the study’s findings. Fifth, most research to date has assessed 
justice effects using cross-sectional data. My scenario experiment design supports a causal 
argument - that differences in fairness impacts justice restoration. 
For organizational practice, management of injustices in general and corrective justice 
in particular represent an important part of organizational reality. My work is a first attempt to 
answer to the need to acknowledge the central role of the manager not only as perpetrator and 
as victim of injustice, but also as third party that often has the power to correct the impact of 
injustices. Besides, as a corrective justice strategy, Robin Hoodism is a common managerial 
phenomenon. It is worth to be better understood as it is likely to have a significant impact on 
organizations, which is not always a positive one. By acting as Robin Hoods, managers can 
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indeed mitigate employees’ negative reactions towards themselves, but probably not the 
negative reactions towards the organization itself (as proposed in chapter 3). 
Although a scenario study permits me to draw conclusions regarding how managers 
react to fairness violations as a function of moral identity, quantitative field research is 
necessary next step to assess whether there are situational factors that might enhance or 
reduce managers’ reactions, and to ensure the external validity of my findings. Future 
research would also need to study other third parties. Will there be the same interaction 
pattern for other types of third party reactions, like customers, or suppliers?  Finally, I appeal 
for research that would investigate the effect of Robin Hoodism in different types of situations 
on the employees’ reactions rather than on the factors that predict whether Robin Hoodism 
occurs, which was my focus in this research. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
G.D.1. FOUR MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 
RESEARCH  
 
 
The present work makes four main contributions to organizational justice reserach. 
First, I chose a proactive instead of a reactive perspective. I focused on the managers’ justice 
behaviors and their antecedents instead of studying employees’ justice judgments and their 
consequences. The proactive view complements well the reactive view in the sense that it can 
give clear directions regarding how to foster the delivering of justice in the workplace.  
Second, I analysed what managers did after their subordinates had experienced 
injustice instead of studying how they shaped their employees’ justice judgments at the origin. 
Injustice is pervasive at work and often independent of managers’ own behaviors. Thus, 
managers have to react to injustices that they have not produced. Given the negative impact 
injustice can have on organizations, when an employee feels unjustly treated, it is a good 
policy for managers to try to correct the injustice. For instance injustice leads to a lower level 
of organizational citizenship behaviors and  managers can reverse this trend. Two important 
follow-up questions become: What factors predict when managers try to correct the injustices 
experienced by their subordinates? What are the concrete strategies that managers use to 
correct these injustices?  The important role managers have at work is already well recognized 
by the leadership literature (Yukl, 2006). By attempting to answer these two questions, my 
objective was to better understand the importance of, and mechanisms for, the managers’ role 
in correcting injustice that is currently under-researched.  
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The third main contribution concerns the way managers’ action is conceptualized in 
the organizational justice field. Most often distributive and procedural justice are seen as 
stemming from the organization while only interactional justice is linked to the manager’s 
behavior (see Blader & Tyler, 2003 and Rupp & Cropanzano, 2002 for exceptions). My 
results showed that managers were not only fair because they showed respect and justified 
their decisions (they even showed in fact the opposite tendency) but also because they used 
their informal and discretionary decision-making power as a powerful source of justice and of 
corrective justice in particular.  
Fourth, while most organizational justice research is quantitative, I used different 
methodologies to better address the specific research questions I posed. In particular, in 
chapter 2, I used a qualitative study to explore the corrective justice strategies that managers 
might use in the workplace in addition to their traditional interactional justice behaviors. I 
followed Tripp and Bies’ advice (2007) to conduct qualitative research in order to discover 
new principles linked to the justice phenomena. In this way, I strove to expand the literature’s 
conceptual grasp of proactive justice.   
 
 
 
G.D.2. FROM THE CHURCHILL EFFECT TO ROBIN HOODISM 
 
 
The four chapters that are presented in this dissertation give four complementary 
insights into the research question of how and why managers correct workplace injustice.  
The first study presented in chapter 1 concerns the managers’ ability to interactionally 
correct injustice. According to the reactive literature on organizational justice, interactional 
justice is an efficient way for managers to correct injustice at work (Skarlicki & Folger, 
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1997). However, according to the proactive literature on organizational justice, interactional 
justice is unlikely to be used by managers to correct injustice because of the existence of the 
Churchill effect (Folger, 1993). My results confirmed this effect and showed that when 
managers had to implement and communicate a decision that didn’t respect the equity rule 
and that was procedurally improper, they were more likely to behave informationally unjustly 
rather than informationally fairly. The distributively and procedurally unjust a decision, the 
less informationally fairly the managers behaved. The results also showed that managers 
tended to behave interpersonally unfairly especially when they were low on the social skill of 
assertiveness, whatever the injustice of the situation.  
Further, I found that identification with the firm related negatively to managers’ 
interpersonal and informational behaviors. Moreover, identification moderated the 
relationship between the inequity and the procedural impropriety of the situation and the 
managers’ informational (in)justice behaviors. Low identifiers behaved informationally 
unfairly in negative and unfair situations and behaved informationally fairly in negative and 
fair situations. However, high identifiers were likely to behave informationally unjustly 
regardless of the injustice of the procedure. This suggests that low identifiers acted in a injust 
manner to protect their self image, but high identifiers tried to protect their organization in a 
situation that was unfavorable to the victims, whether the situation was fair or unfair. 
These results suggest that managers are unlikely to correct injustice at work. However, 
there is another possibility.  In the experimental situation I used, participants did not have any 
concrete means to react to the injustice at their disposal, except their pens to write a letter. In 
spite of this limitation, in unjust cases, many participants tended to push their organization to 
correct the injustice by promising to the victims that the injustice they experienced would be 
compensated or even fixed. They used some type of informal corrective justice strategies: 
they offered support (by encouraging the candidate to reapply), future help (they said that the 
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candidates will be contacted if there is any other opportunity), an alternative positive outcome 
(for instance, free training) or even an alternative position (direct help to find another job). 
These behaviors suggest that managers might use other means to correct injustice than 
only their interactional justice behaviors. These results sparked a second study to investigate 
what other means managers might use to correct injustice at work. This study was presented 
in chapter 2. I asked 35 managers in one firm to describe an event that they found unjust and 
that was experienced by their subordinates. Then, they had to describe how they reacted to 
this injustice. This study made it possible to identify an under-researched corrective justice 
strategy that I named Robin Hoodism and that consisted in allocating invisible remedies. 
Thus, even if managers may not visibly correct injustice by being interactionally fair, they 
might correct the injustice invisibly.  
In study 2, three other main corrective strategies emerged that were not investigated 
further as they were already well known in the literature. The informational justice strategy 
mainly consisted in justifying what happened and was the first strategy quoted by managers. 
This was in contradiction with my findings in study 1 about the Churchill effect. I elaborate 
on this seeming inconsistency below. The strategy consisting in fixing the injustice at its 
source appeared to be the second most frequently used strategy. Robin Hoodism was the third 
most common corrective behavior. Notice that interpersonal justice was one of the strategies 
used least often by managers. 
Results also showed that managers were more likely to use invisible remedies to 
compensate for organizational distributive injustices due to the deficiencies of the formal 
reward system rather than to correct other types of injustices. They were more likely to react 
in that way when injustices violated their sense of equity rather than other justice rules. As 
invisible remedies, managers often diverted organizational allocations from their formal use. 
Their first motivation was the desire to behave fairly even if they knew that these attempts 
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mainly mitigated negative reactions in the short run, without fundamentally solving any real 
problem at its source in the long run. Finally, one of the important favorable consequences of 
this strategy was that it fostered a favorable relationship between the manager and the 
subordinate. 
These results formed the foundation of a conceptual model to explain the strategy of 
invisible remedies. This model was presented in chapter 3. I theoretically explored which 
forms invisible remedies would take in the workplace. I proposed that managers can allocate 
free time and formal benefits (e.g., bonuses, training) that tend to have been initially derived 
for a different purpose. Another form of remedies involves the borrowing of tools, or personal 
use of machines. Managers can also allow subordinates to take material objects home. I 
proposed that the choice of invisible remedies is likely to be a function of which means are 
under the managers’ control and least visible to higher-level executives. 
I also investigated in chapter 3 which situational and interindividual antecedents 
would characterize the use of this corrective justice strategy that the literature had not 
identified before. I proposed that the more the managers view the organization as unfair, the 
more they are motivated to use invisible remedies. As more centralized and larger companies 
are likely to be seen as more unjust, this lead me to propose that those features would make 
managers more likely to appeal to Robin Hoodism. I also proposed that managers’ orientation 
towards performance, their motivation to protect their social self, and the importance they 
give to morality would positively impact their tendency to allocate invisible remedies. 
Further, I explored what I called the Robin Hood effect, which consists of the positive 
consequences of the use of invisible remedies towards the manager, and its negative 
consequences towards the organization and from the coworkers who do not benefit from 
them. At the end of chapter 3, I identified the psychological mechanisms that could explain 
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why invisible remedies work by emphasizing how they address employees’ material, 
relational and ethical motives.  
The fourth chapter consisted in a last scenario study testing some important aspects of 
the model of invisible remedies. I first studied which kind of injustices would predict Robin 
Hoodism. Specifically, I tested whether the well known interactive effect between the justice 
of the distribution and the justice of the process applied to managers’ allocation of invisible 
remedies. Second, I explored the three-way interaction between managers’ moral identity and 
these two types of injustices on their invisible corrective behaviors. 
I found that managers used invisible remedies to correct distributive as well as 
interpersonal injustices. Moreover, these two kinds of injustices interacted to predict Robin 
Hoodism. I also found that this interaction took a different shape depending on managers’ 
moral identity. Low moral identifiers mainly attempted to correct distributive injustices and to 
a certain extent interpersonal injustices. High moral identifiers also corrected distributive 
injustices. Moreover, they were much more likely to correct interpersonal injustices at a high 
level of distributive justice than low moral identifiers. 
 
 
 
 
G.D.3. AN ANALYSIS OF MY RESULTS 
 
 
A close comparison between the results and the propositions of these different studies 
and conceptual works shows some interesting findings. First, in the exploratory study 
presented in chapter 2, in contradiction with the experimental study of chapter 1, managers 
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were likely to use informational justice as a corrective justice strategy. Second, only managers 
who had a high level of assertiveness and a low level of identification with their organization 
behaved interpersonally fairly in study 1 (chapter 1) when reacting to a negative situation, 
whatever its injustice. In the same way, in study 2 (chapter 2) in which the participants 
reacted to an injustice experienced by their subordinates, they were very unlikely to use 
interpersonal justice. Third, managers used invisible remedies to correct distributive injustices 
in study 2 (chapter 2). They also appealed to this strategy to correct interpersonal injustices in 
study 3 (chapter 4). Notice that in chapter 3, I proposed that invisible remedies are able to 
correct any type of injustice. Even some participants of the study presented in chapter 1 tried 
to correct the injustice using means close to an invisible remedy. Fourth, moral motives were 
shown to be important in predicting Robin Hoodism in study 2 (chapter 2) and moral identity 
indeed impacted the use of this corrective justice strategy in study 3 (chapter 4). This was 
consistent with the proposition made in chapter 3 that the more important morality for 
managers, the more likely they are to use this strategy. Fifth, managers were likely to use a 
corrective justice strategy, consisting in trying to fix the problem at its roots in study 2 
(chapter 2). Some participants also tried to use this strategy in study 1 (chapter 1). Sixth and 
last, in study 2 (chapter 2), many managers did nothing instead of correcting the injustice 
experienced by their subordinates, which was also the case of most participants involved in 
the study presented in chapter 1. I will return to these results after a reminder of the 
characteristics of the different studies. 
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G.D. 3.1. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STUDIES 
 
Each of the three empirical studies involved managers who had to react to an injustice 
experienced by their subordinates. The conceptual model proposed in chapter 3 took also this 
perspective.  However, each situation had specific characteristics and was studied using 
specific methods.  
In the first study, managers had to communicate a decision that was either unfavorable 
or unjust. Thus, even if they were not at the origin of the injustice, they were closely 
associated with it. Besides, participants in this study could only react to the injustice by 
writing a letter to the victim. This did not leave them many choices in the case they wanted to 
correct that injustice. The design was experimental and the large number of subjects (n = 118) 
allowed me to analyse the results using statistical inference. 
In the second study, managers described events that had been experienced by their 
subordinates and that they found unjust. Each of the interviewed managers described an 
injustice that had really happened at work, most of which originating at the organizational 
level. Thus, they were usually not directly at the source of the injustice and could react to it 
using all the possibilities of the real world. However, contrary to study 1, I could not observe 
the real behaviors of the participants. The stories they told could have been biased for 
multiple reasons, including a social desirability motive. Moreover, the design was explorative 
with open-ended questions that were asked to a small number of participants (n=35) in only 
one firm. Thus, the results should be taken only as facilitating the discovery of characteristics 
of new phenomena and new links between constructs rather than as robust results that could 
be compared to other studies in order to check if they are generalizable. 
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The third chapter provided a conceptual model and therefore propositions based on 
previous research and respecting an internal theoretical consistency. As such, they have to be 
empirically tested in order to be confirmed. 
In the third empirical study presented in chapter 4, managers had to face a hypothetical 
injustice experienced by one of their subordinates and produced by their own manager, the 
President of the firm. In this case also, they were not directly associated with the injustice. In 
the scenario, their subordinate asked them, in a face-to-face encounter, to react to this 
injustice. The scenario study gave them the possibility to choose among 37 behaviors those 
that they would have implemented if the situation were real, five of them corresponding to the 
concept of Robin Hoodism. The large number of participants (n=187) makes me confident 
about the robustness of the statistical analyses. However, because of the scenario design, 
quantitative field research is necessary next step to ensure the external validity of my findings. 
 
G.D.3.2. DISCUSSION OF CONSISTENCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES IN MY RESULTS 
 
G.D.3.2.1. Consistent results 
Despite differences in the kinds of unjust situations faced, in the ways managers could 
react to them, and in the methodologies used, some results appear to be consistent through the 
different empirical studies and the conceptual model.  
First, managers were unlikely to use interpersonal justice to correct an injustice 
experienced by their subordinates. In study 1, interpersonal justice was not related to 
unfairness. Managers were equally interpersonally fair in the unfavorable and in the unjust 
situations. In other words, managers did not use interpersonal justice to correct the injustice of 
the situation. In study 2, interpersonal justice was one of the less often used corrective justice 
strategies. 
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Second, managers were likely to use invisible remedies to correct an injustice 
experienced by their subordinates. In study 1, the setting did not include the possibility to use 
this kind of behavior. However, even in this case, many participants tried to use informal 
remedies to correct the injustice. Some participants even clearly used invisible remedies to 
correct for the injustice (by proposing to the candidate to offer him some compensation for the 
injustice, for example a free training10). In study 2, managers used invisible remedies as the 
third most widespread corrective strategy. The conceptual model presented in chapter 3 
proposed that invisible remedies are able to correct every kind of injustice. Along the same 
lines, study 3 (chapter 4) showed that managers commonly used invisible remedies to correct 
distributive and interpersonal injustices.  
Third, managers sometimes tried to really correct the injustice at its source. In study 
1, the setting did not formally include the possibility to use this kind of behavior. However, in 
unjust situations, some participants tried to fix the problem (for instance, they proposed to the 
candidate that the organization would offer him/her another internship to replace the one that 
he/she could not get because of the injustice). In study 2, the strategy consisting in fixing the 
problem, which was at the origin of the injustice, was the second most widespread strategy. 
Fourth, the importance given to morality by managers appeared as an important factor 
to explain their Robin Hoodism. Study 2 showed that one of the most salient motives of 
managers to use this strategy was the desire to do the right thing. In chapter 3, the conceptual 
model also proposed that the more managers are sensitive to morality the more they are going 
to use invisible remedies. Finally in study 3 (chapter 4), managers’ moral identity interacted 
with distributive and interpersonal justice to predict this corrective strategy.  
Finally, some managers were also likely to do nothing about the injustice. In study 1, 
the candidates were not aware of the injustice. Only the managers knew that the situation was 
                                                 
10
 However, this remedy is not strictly an invisible remedy according to my definition. Indeed, in the case the 
candidate asked for this promise to be implemented, he would have asked it to the management of the Internship 
Program. Thus, this remedy could not remain invisible to the hierarchy. 
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unjust. Therefore, they could simply behave as if the situation were just, which almost all of 
them did. Only six of them refused to participate to the experiment when the situation was 
unjust. In study 2, “appealed to a better future”, and “refused to react to the injustice” were 
the most common strategies chosen after allocating invisible remedies. Both simply consisted 
in doing nothing. 
These results were consistent through the different studies despite the use of different 
designs and methodologies. This strengthens their potential to generalizability.  
 
G.D.3.2.2. Inconsistent results 
Only results concerning informational justice were not consistent across study 1 and 
study 2. This might be due to the characteristics of the kinds of injustices that the participants 
had to deal with, but also to the different kinds of settings and methodologies used.  
In study 1, managers behaved less informationally fairly in unfavorable and unjust 
situations than in unfavorable but just situations, which corresponds to the Churchill effect. 
Thus, in study 1, informational justice behaviors did not appear as a usual corrective justice 
strategy. By contrast, in study 2, managers used informational justice as the first most 
widespread corrective strategy to react to an injustice experienced by their subordinates. 
One explanation might be linked to the different levels of managers’ involvement in 
the injustice across the two studies. In study 1, they were closely associated with the injustice, 
whereas in sstudy 2, they usually described situations in which the organization was 
concerned. Thus, it might be the case that the less the managers are associated with an unjust 
decision, the more likely they are to use informational justice.  
Another explanation might be related to the fact that in the second study, I collected 
data on the basis of managers’ declarations. In contrast, in study 1, managers’ behaviors were 
directly observed through the analysis of the letters they really wrote. It might be the case that 
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either managers really think they clearly justified and gave information about a decision while 
the victim or an observer would have a different opinion, or that managers just wanted to 
appear as able to justify injustices in the eyes of the interviewer.  
  This difference deserves future research. However, it should be noted that study 1 and 
study 2 responded to different research objectives and were conducted using different 
methods. 
 
 
G.D.3.3. A PRELIMINARY TYPOLOGY OF MANAGERIAL CORRECTIVE JUSTICE STRATEGIES 
 
The strategies that I studied in the present dissertation can be organized according to 
the two criteria that I used in my definition of managerial corrective justice strategies (see the 
introduction). The first one refers to the kind of behavioral action: Do managers act to achieve 
real tangible change (by giving a real material compensation or by really trying to fix the 
problem) or do they only react in a symbolic way (by justifying the incident or trying to show 
compassion and respect at this occasion)? The second criterion refers to the focus of the 
managers’ reaction. Does the reaction target the root cause of the injustice (in which case 
managers either justified what the perpetrator did or tried to fix the injustice) or is it focused 
on the final consequence of the injustice (in this case managers either helped the employee to 
cope with what he or she experienced or gave an invisible remedy to compensate for it)? 
Thus, the four strategies can be organised in a two by two matrix:  
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TABLE 27: 
Preliminary Typology of Managers’ Corrective Justice Strategies 
 
Managers’ type of behavior 
Focus of managers’ behavior 
Real Symbolic 
Cause 1. Fixing 
(problem solving)  
3. Justifying  
(informational justice) 
Consequence 2. Compensating  
(invisible remedies) 
4. Accompanying 
(interpersonal justice) 
 
 I mainly studied the corrective justice strategies corresponding to quadrants 3 and 4 in 
chapter 1 and to quadrant 2 in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Most strategies appeared to some extent in 
most of the chapters. In particular, in chapter 2, strategies corresponding to quadrants 1, 2 and 
3 appeared most frequently.  
 I was interested in the present work to study the forms and antecedents of managerial 
corrective justice strategies. The different strategies investigated alre likely to have distinct 
consequences on subordinates’ attitudes and behaviors. For example invisible remedies 
probably have more favorable consequences on the quality of the relationship with the 
manager than informational justice. Fixing the problem might have a positive impact on 
employees’ attitudes toward the company, which seems not to be the case of invisible 
remedies (see chapter 3). Interpersonal justice is more likely than the other remedies to help 
subordinates to find means to correct the injustice by themselves, by helping them to better 
cope with the situation (see Greenberg’s 2006 study in which managers helped their 
subordinates not to experience insomnia). These distinct consequences should be studied by 
further studies in the more trational reactive research paradigm. 
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G.D.4. THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
My work extended the burgeoning field of the proactive perspective on organizational 
justice. Managers tried to correct injustices experienced by their subordinates. I have 
attempted to better understand the way they behaved and the factors that could explain these 
corrective reactions.    
The first chapter made several contributions to organizational justice theory. First, the 
results help to better understand the mechanism by which the Churchill effect, an important 
cause of interactional injustice, operates. A situation leads to the Churchill effect only if the 
situation is distributively and procedurally unjust. I also showed that interactional unjust 
behaviors can be predicted not only by the situation but also by interindividual managers’ 
characteristics. It is not only managers’ desire to protect their social just self in unjust 
situations that was at stake but also their social ability to cope with unfavorable situations.  
Second, this research advances our understanding of the dynamics of informational 
and interpersonal justice, which were shown to be, respectively, more sensitive to situational 
(the injustice of the decision) and individual (assertiveness) difference factors. These different 
antecedents for informational versus interpersonal justice behaviors provide further support 
for separating interactional justice into its informational and interpersonal components. 
Third, I extended understanding of the deontic model of justice and fairness theory by 
testing them in a proactive justice study. Participants appear to have distinguished between 
the three experimental conditions on the basis of their “would”, “could” and “should” 
counterfactuals. 
A fourth contribution of this first study lies in showing of the important role in 
managers’ justice behaviors of their identification with the organization. Whereas usually 
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organizational identification is seen as having primarily positive consequences for the 
organization and for employees, I showed that managers who identified more strongly with 
the organization can in some situations be more interactionally unjust. This means that 
managers who viewed their firm as an extended self, when having to react to an injustice 
produced by this firm, chose not to behave fairly toward the employee who experienced this 
injustice.  
 Finally, in this first study many of the participants used some type of informal 
corrective justice strategies. This phenomenon provided the rationale for investigating the 
other kinds of corrective justice behaviors, distinct from interactional justice behaviors, used 
by managers. 
In the second chapter, I identified the corrective justice strategies used by managers, 
among which the specific strategy of Robin Hoodism consisting in allocating invisible 
remedies. The comparison between Robin Hoodism and the other corrective justice strategies 
allowed me to build some tentative links between this concept and some of its antecedents and 
consequences. As a consequence, this made me able to propose a global conceptual model in 
chapter 3 attempting to better understand the importance of, and mechanisms for, invisible 
remedies. 
The theoretical implications of chapter 3 were threefold. First, this work proposed new 
links between organizational justice research and important sociological works, which have 
often been categorized as works about employee theft. In particular, this perspective proposed 
that managers’ allocations of benefits taken from their firm can be an attempt to restore justice 
by allocating the only remedies over which they have some control.  
Second, the framework presented built on the typology of justice motives to account 
for the power of invisible remedies. This provided a theory to understand why taking 
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resources from a firm can restore not only distributive but also procedural and interactional 
justice.  
Third, this chapter defined some boundary conditions to this phenomenon using 
situational as well as managers’ individual differences antecedents, and it attempted to predict 
which forms invisible remedies might take. This might help to clearly distinguish invisible 
remedies from other phenomena in which informal allocations are not based on justice 
restoration motives.  
As for chapter 4, its first contribution was to test some aspects of the conceptual model 
presented in chapter 3. This was among the first empirical studies to explore the tendency for 
managers to demonstrate behaviors akin to modern day organizational Robin Hoods, 
attempting to restore justice using invisible remedies that are often under the radar of the 
senior executives.  
Specifically, this study showed that the two-way interaction between distributive and 
interpersonal elements on reactions to injustice can also be found with respect to the 
corrective actions of managers of injustice victims. By this way, I confirmed that, as proposed 
in chapter 3, invisible remedies can be used to correct different forms of injustices, namely 
distributive and interpersonal injustices. 
A third contribution consisted in showing that moral identity moderated the effect of 
the two-way interaction between distributive and interpersonal fairness on Robin Hoodism 
tendencies. This confirmed the proposition of chapter 3 according which the importance 
managers give to moral identity predicts their invisible corrective justice behaviors. 
More generally, the present dissertation has applied the organizational behavior 
perspective to management, which is still a new way to analyse organizational phenomena in 
France (Robbins, Judge, & Gabilliet, 2006). To date, organizational justice theory has only 
begun to been investigated in France (El Akremi, Nasr, Camerman, 2006; Steiner, 1999),  and 
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it has only recently been applied to strategy (Kim & Mauborgne, 1996; Monin, Ben Fathallah 
& Vaara, 2005), and human resources management (Allouche, 2003; Manville, in press; 
Tremblay & Roussel, 2001).  
 
G.D.5. MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS  
 
My work shows that managers do correct injustice at work. Knowing how and why 
can help managers to improve the performance of their attempts, thus producing favorable 
consequences on their subordinates’ attitudes and behaviors at work. In addition to this 
instrumental consideration, the study of this phenomenon at work is also a matter of adding 
knowledge to the understanding of organizational ethics. In this perspective, morality can also 
be viewed as an end in itself.    
Studies 1 and 2 showed that managers were unlikely to spontaneously use 
interpersonal justice. Paradoxically, reactive organizational justice studies have shown that 
interpersonal justice has a positive impact on subordinates on account of its power to correct 
distributive and procedural injustices. According to study 1, managers’ low level of 
interpersonal justice behaviors was due to a lack of social competencies or to a strong 
identification to the firm. One implication is that organizations should avoid selecting 
managers to communicate the negative outcome who lack assertiveness or who might identify 
too closely with the organization versus with the employee. However, studies have shown that 
assertiveness can be efficiently taught. This constitutes a second managerial implication. 
Fostering managers’ interpersonal justice behaviors seems to be a very promising avenue to 
improve managers’ competencies to correct injustice in the workplace. 
Another managerial implication of study 1 is that managers should not be asked to 
communicate about decisions that they think are unjust. Indeed, unjust decisions are likely to 
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produce the Churchill effect. I therefore propose that if firms want to encourage managers’ 
informational justice behaviors in difficult times, they should persuade the managers of the 
procedural justice relating to the outcome communicated. One way is to involve managers in 
the decisions they are going to implement and communicate about. Another possibility could 
be for upper managers in the case of ambiguous decisions that can be seen as unjust or just to 
be interactionally fair with their first-line managers. By giving sincere social accounts and 
showing respect to the managers themselves, upper managers can make them more likely to 
judge the decisions as procedurally just. However, these implications should be taken with 
caution, given the manipulative possibilities they can involve. 
A last implication of study 1 is that one should be cautious about the “good soldier” 
syndrome. It is in part because they identified strongly with their in-group that some 
managers reacted unjustly toward victims of that in-group. A too strong organizational 
identification, which is usually seen as having positive consequences is also likely to have bad 
consequences. 
In studies 2 and 3 (chapters 2 and 4), managers who did not justify or fix an injustice 
at its source often decided to correct it by using invisible remedies. This means that they 
intuitively knew how important it is to correct injustice at work. It is plausible that if they had 
formal means available to them, they would have used them. Instead, they decided to engage 
in a less overt strategy, probably at the expense of their own firm.  
In chapter 3, I proposed that invisible remedies can have some advantages: they 
provide the manager with increased flexibility to repair injustice without bureaucracy, they 
are likely to be faster to implement, more convenient than formal rewards, and not as costly as 
a formal system. Invisible remedies also imply the drawbacks that have been described in this 
chapter, a factor that might discourage organizational authorities from using them. An 
important point here is that invisible remedies are likely to benefit the individual manager 
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more than the firm as a whole. This is why usually firms are unlikely to encourage the use of 
invisible remedies and are likely to reprimand the managers who use them. Another drawback 
is that invisible remedies can create more new injustices than the ones they purport to solve.  
Invisible remedies can be seen as a form of organizational slack (Cyert & March, 
1963). If managers are not allocated enough formal means and if they need them in their day-
to-day management, they discretionally create the informal means they need and use them. 
Therefore, empowering front-line managers and allocating them discretionary budgets for 
invisible actions may be a way of recognizing and utilizing the power of invisible remedies to 
help them correct systemic injustices that an organization cannot be aware of. However, there 
is a contradiction in imagining a systemically unfair firm using invisible remedies as a 
systemically fair practice. Moreover, fair organizations are more likely to use visible 
organizational remedies such as official monetary compensation, public apologies or 
disciplinary action. Thus, invisible remedies should rather simply be viewed as an emergent 
way for low-rank managers of reacting when the upper management produces too many 
injustices that prevent the usual job to get done. 
One important finding of study 3 is that managers used invisible remedies to correct 
interpersonal injustices stemming at the upper management level. This result, which is in line 
with the propositions of chapter 3, extends the qualitative results of chapter 2. This might 
seem counterintuitive that managers were willing to compensate for an injustice experienced 
by their subordinates due to a lack of respect of their upper manager by giving them some 
unofficial time off or a fringe benefit. However, it is the way they chose to react.  Thus, 
organizations should be aware of the negative impact that interactional justice stemming from 
the highest level of the hierarchy can have, not only on the base-rank employees’ attitudes and 
behaviors but also on their low-rank managers’ ways of reacting.  
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A further interesting implication is that managers were not likely to take into account 
the mitigating effect that interpersonal justice can have on distributive injustice. This 
interaction between the justice of the distribution and the justice of the process is well known 
by justice researchers. For instance, in study 3 (chapter 4), the negative reactions of an 
employee who was the victim of distributive injustice probably were mitigated by the 
interpersonal justice showed by the president. However, managers seemed to be not aware of 
this effect. This is consistent with studies 1 and 2 in which I found that managers were 
unlikely to use interpersonal justice. Obviously, managers were far from understanding the 
favorable impact interpersonal fair behaviors can have in the workplace. As a result, in stdy 3 
(chapter 4) they tended to correct distributive injustices whatever the level of interpersonal 
fairness experienced by their employees. 
Interestingly, this shows that managers were aware of the negative effects of 
interpersonal injustice (they attempted to correct it), but not of the positive effects of 
interpersonal justice (they still tried to correct distributive injustice when interpersonal justice 
was at a high level).  
A last managerial implication of study 3 (chapter 4) is the importance or moral 
identity. One might think that managers who self-identified as highly moral would have been 
reluctant to take materials or to not obey formal allocation rules. This seems true as long as no 
injustice is at stake. However, as soon as their subordinates faced an injustice, higher moral 
self-identifiers were more likely to react in ways that imposed invisible costs on their 
organization because this could help to correct the injustice. Thus, firms might be wrong in 
emphasizing morality as a trait of their culture in order to improve compliance. Or, at least, 
they should not depend on exploiting the morality of their employees if the organization itself 
is unable to practice just and fair processes.  In fact, if future studies show that my results are 
generalizable, then the more salient the moral issues, the less likely the managers obey rules 
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when an injustice is experienced. Thus, giving more importance to morality in a firm should 
go hand in hand with organizing formal means to correct the systemic injustices that might 
happen. Another solution, which might however be paradoxical (as discussed above), consists 
in formally giving more slack to managers so that they can correct organizational injustices 
informally at their level without having to invisibly disobey to formal rules. 
 
 
G.D.6. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
 
G.D.6.1. LIMITATIONS  
 
One of the strengths of study 1 is that it involved real experienced managers reacting 
to a situation they thought was real. In addition, many studies to date have assessed justice 
effects using cross-sectional data. My experimental design supported a causal argument - that 
differences in the way managers perceived the fairness of a situation impacted their justice 
behaviors. However, the conclusions I have drawn should be confirmed by future field 
studies, using real tasks, and actual managers with their current employees.   
Another limit of study 1 concerns the fact that I did not have real victims who 
communicated their real justice judgments. This question is common in proactive studies in 
which the focus is on justice behaviors, which leads the subjects play the role of managers or 
allocators instead of the one of recipients. Just as in the other proactive studies I answered this 
question by having coders rate the justice behaviors of the subjects.  
As far as study 2 is concerned, all the relations found between variables remain 
tentative because the study involved only 35 managers. This is the usual limit of a qualitative 
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exploratory study, which is designed to allow identifying new phenomena and relationships 
but cannot at the same time promise generalizability.  
Chapter 3 consists of a conceptual model. This means that all the proposed 
relationships between variables remain to be tested in the real world.  
Study 3 (chapter 4) had tested some aspects of the conceptual model of invisible 
remedies. Although this scenario study permitted me to draw conclusions regarding how 
managers reacted to fairness violations as a function of moral identity, quantitative field 
research is necessary next step to assess whether there are situational factors that might 
enhance or reduce managers’ reactions, and to ensure the external validity of my findings. 
Finally, a general limit when applying the findings of the present studies is that one 
should be cautious that corrective justice is not used manipulatively in the field. Interactional 
justice in particular could cloak procedural and/or distributive injustice, thereby mitigating 
antagonistic reactions from subordinates and, in effect, making them better accept what is 
unacceptable.  
 
G.D.6.2. COMING FULL CIRCLE  
 
 The present dissertation has made me go through a cycle. First, I used the literature on 
organizational justice, and the several proactive studies that have been conducted so far in 
particular, to develop a model of the antecedents of managers’ interactional (in)justice 
behaviors. I empirically tested this model using an experimental design. This allowed me to 
show that even if interactional justice has the power to be an efficient corrective justice 
strategy it was unlikely to be used by managers.  
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Then, I delved into the results of this first study by using an explorative qualitative 
study. I analysed the results of this study using N’Vivo® and this helped me to identify the 
corrective justice strategy of Robin Hoodism.  
This lead me back to theory to see to what extent this new phenomenon could be 
understood by crossing the literature about organizational justice with the one that concerns 
theft at work. This made me build a theoretical model accounting for this strategy. 
 Then, I partially tested this model using a quantitative scenario study and found that 
types of injustices and the moral identity of managers interacted to predict Robin Hoodism.  
In sum, theory helped me to build a first model, which I tested using an experimental 
design. Then, a qualitative design allowed me to have new insights concerning the research 
question I investigated. I again used theory in complement to my qualitative results to 
elaborate a second model accounting for the identified phenomenon and finally I tested it 
partially using an experimental scenario design. Thus, I followed a complete cycle going 
through all the four steps of literature review, theory building, and qualitative and quantitative 
inquiries in an order created by my findings.  
 
 
G.D.6.3. FURTHER STUDIES  
 
Future research should investigate the relationships between the different corrective 
justice strategies that this work has identified. One intriguing question is for example the 
extent to which some strategies are used in combination or as alternatives. Managers who are 
more likely to use invisible remedies might also be less likely to use interpersonal justice. A 
related point consists in understanding the dynamics of the choice of a corrective justice 
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strategy. Do managers first try to solve the problem at its origin and only if they do not 
succeed appeal to invisible remedies?  
My studies always involved managers who either confidentially knew that the 
situation was unjust (in study 1, chapter 1) or agreed with their subordinates about the 
injustice of the situation (in studies 2 and 3, respectively in chapters 2 and 4). An interesting 
question that could help to better understand managers’ reactions could consist in studying 
situations in which managers and subordinates do not agree on the injustice of the situation. 
Methodologically, it would be interesting for future studies to use designs in which 
two kinds of subjects would participate at the same time: allocators and recipients. That would 
make it possible to link antecedents of allocators’ justice behaviors with recipients’ justice 
judgments. 
More generally, further research using the proactive perspective of justice is called for 
on the antecedents of corrective justice behaviors, whether visible or invisible. This body of 
research can provide valuable insights into how to produce fairer workplaces. Further, this 
research can help to bridge the domains of organizational justice and behavioral ethics. 
Whereas these two disciplines indeed have much in common, in particular because they often 
focus on similar behaviors and describe them with a concern for moral standards, the reactive 
focus of most organizational justice research to date has limited the potential rich connections 
between the two fields. Understanding the antecedents of corrective justice behaviors could be 
an important step toward better understanding ethical behavior at work for justice researchers 
and the importance of organizational justice for ethical researchers.   
Finally, reactive studies are common in justice research. However, no studies to date 
have investigated how employees react to managers’ use of corrective justice strategies other 
than interactional justice behaviors. To what extent is the Robin Hood effect negative towards 
the firm and positive toward the manager? Is the favorable impact of Robin Hoodism on the 
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relationship between the manager and the subordinate only a short-term effect? Does the 
strategy of “fixing the problem at its roots” produce more favorable effects in the long run? 
Future research would need to study these questions. The cycle from reactive to proactive 
research would then go again toward its reactive end. 
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- Nadisic, T. (2008). Situational and interpersonal antecedents of the Churchill effect. Presented 
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CNRS, γ HEC, 2 ESSEC). 
 
5) The empirical paper will be submitted to an international management journal. 
 
- Nadisic, T, Patient, D. & Fanelli, A. (to be sent for review). Unfair managerial interactional 
behaviors. Journal of Management. (Ranking: 2 CNRS, β HEC, 1 ESSEC). 
 
 
APPENDIX B.3.: CHAPTER 2 
 
1) I presented the design and preliminary findings of the exploratory study presented in 
the second chapter in the Ph. D. program of the University of Graz as an invited 
speaker. After I redesigned and conducted the study, I wrote a paper presenting the 
preliminary results in English with the assistance of Marion Fortin, Assistant Professor 
at Durham University, UK, and under the guidance of Daniel Skarlicki, Professor, 
Edgar Kaiser Chair of Organizational Behavior at the University of British Columbia, 
Vancouver, Canada. These results were presented at an international management 
conference. 
- Nadisic, T. (2005, November). Invisible justice. Presented at the Ph. D. Program of the Institut 
für Psychologie, Sozialpsychologie, Karl-Franzens-Universität, Graz, Austria. 
- Nadisic, T., Skarlicki, D. & Fortin, M. (2007, August). Corrective and Invisible Justice: An 
exploratory study. Academy of Management meetings, Philadelphia, USA. 
 
2) An empirical paper adding to the results used in chapter 2 additional results involving 
the subordinates’ point of view and comparing managers’ and subordinates’ point of 
view will be finished with Marion Fortin, Assistant Professor at Durham University, 
UK, under the guidance of Daniel Skarlicki, Professor, Edgar Kaiser Chair of 
Organizational Behavior at the University of British Columbia, and will be submitted 
to an international journal of human resource management. 
- Nadisic, T., Skarlicki, D. & Fortin, M. (to be finished). Corrective and Invisible Justice: Do 
managers and subordinates live in two different worlds? Human Resource Management. 
(Ranking: 2 CNRS, α HEC, 2 ESSEC). 
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APPENDIX B.4.: CHAPTER 3 
 
1) The conceptual model presented in chapter 3 was presented in a Ph. D. workshop. A 
revised version was presented at a French-speaking international management 
conference. A final version was presented at an international organizational justice 
conference. 
 
- Nadisic, T. (2005, April). Invisible justice. Presented at the 6th HEC-INSEAD Forum, 
Fontainebleau, France 
- Nadisic, T. (2005, September). La justice organisationnelle invisible et le management de 
l’injustice par l’encadrement intermédiaire. 16ème congrès annuel de l’Association 
francophone de Gestion des Ressources Humaines, Paris, France. 
- Nadisic, T. (2006, November). Invisible Organizational Justice: A conceptual model. 
Presented at the 4th International Round Table on Innovations in Organizational Justice: 
Justice, Ethics, and Social Responsibility, Tucson, Arizona, USA. 
 
 
2) The conceptual model was then published as a chapter in a book specialized in 
organizational justice. 
 
- Nadisic, T. (2008). The invisible hand of managers and the Robin Hood Effect: Antecedents 
and Consequences of Managers Using Invisible Remedies to Correct Workplace Injustice. In 
S. W. Gilliland, D. D. Steiner, & D. P. Skarlicki (Eds.), Innovations in Organizational 
Justice: Justice, Ethics and Responsibility. Greenwich: IAP. 
 
 
APPENDIX B.5.: CHAPTER 4 
 
1) The scenario study operationalizing the conceptual model was designed with the 
assistance of Marion Fortin, Assistant Professor at Durham University, UK, and under 
the guidance of Daniel Skarlicki, Professor, Edgar Kaiser Chair of Organizational 
Behavior at the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada. I presented it at 
the University of British Columbia as an invited speaker and in an international 
management conference. 
- Nadisic, T. (2008, May). Robin Hoodism and moral identity. Presented in the UBC Speaker 
series of the Sauder School of Business of the University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 
Canada. 
- Nadisic, T, Skarlicki, D. & Fortin, M. (2008, July). The moral hand of managers: situational 
and individual antecedents of managers’ use of invisible corrective justice strategies. 
Presented at the  European Group for Organisational Studies, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 
 
2) The scenario study was integrated as a fourth study in a four studies paper focused on 
the link between moral identity and reactions to injustice and is currently under review 
in an international journal specialized in organizational behavior.  
- Aquino, K., Skarlicki, D., Freeman, D., Nadisic, T. & Fortin M. (under review). The Lives of 
Others: How Moral Identity Influences Third-Parties’ Emotional, Cognitive, and Behavioral 
Reactions to Injustice. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. (Ranking: 2 
CNRS, α HEC, 1 ESSEC). 
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APPENDIX B.6.: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND SYNTHESIS IN FRENCH 
 
1) I presented a paper based on the general discussion and on the French document 
synthesizing the present dissertation as an invited speaker at the Paris 12 University. 
This paper will be submitted to a French journal in human resource management. 
- Nadisic (2008, June).  How and why do managers correct injustice at work ? Presented at IAE 
Gustave Eiffel, Université Paris 12 Créteil. 
- Nadisic, T, (to be submitted). L’effet Robin des Bois: Une stratégie managériale de correction 
des injustices au travail. Revue de Gestion des Ressources Humaines. (Ranking: 3 CNRS, 1 
ESSEC). 
 
APPENDIX B.7.: SYNTHESIS 
 
The different works included in the present dissertation have been: 
a. Presented at 2 Ph. D. workshops, 
b. Presented at 3 Universities as an invited speaker, 
c. Presented at 10 international conferences,  
d. Published as 1 Working Paper (as single author), 
e. Published as 1 bookchapter (as single author), 
f. Published in 1 journal (as single author), (Ranking: 4 CNRS, γ HEC, 2 
ESSEC),  
g. Under review in 1 journal (as fourth author), (Ranking: 2 CNRS, α HEC, 1 
ESSEC), 
h. To be submitted to 1 journal (as single author), (Ranking: 3 CNRS, 1 ESSEC), 
i. To be submitted to 1 journal (as first author), (Ranking: 2 CNRS, β HEC, 1 
ESSEC), 
j. To be submitted as a bookchapter (as single author), 
k. To be finished and sent to 1 journal (as first author), (Ranking: 2 CNRS, α 
HEC, 2 ESSEC). 
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APPENDIX C: MATERIALS USED FOR THE EXPERIMENT 
 
APPENDIX C.1.: SCALES USED BEFORE THE EXPERIMENT 
 
C.1.1. Scale for empathy (empathic concern) 
 
The following questions ask how you feel when you see another person in a difficult situation. 
 
         Strongly     Strongly 
         disagree       agree
  
1 When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel 
kind of protective towards them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 When I see someone being treated unfairly, I 
sometimes don’t feel very much pity for them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less 
fortunate than me. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 1 2 3 4 5 
5 Sometimes I feel very sorry for other people when they 
are having problems. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a 
great deal. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 I am often quite touched by things I see happen. 1 2 3 4 5 
  
Notice that items 2 and 6 are reverse-scored. 
The fair hand of managers 
 225  
C.1.2. Scale for assertiveness (initiating assertiveness and positive assertion) 
 
 
In a social situation, many people find it difficult to react in the way they really want 
to. For instance, they may find it hard to refuse a request, to ask for help, or to show approval 
or disapproval. 
Below you will find a list of some such situations, all of which involve social 
interactions. 
We should like you to work through all the questions. On each occasion, we should 
like you to record the first response that comes to mind. Please do not skip any questions, and 
complete the questionnaire as quickly as you can. 
We would like you to indicate in the columns preceding each of the situations (items) 
how nervous or tense you would feel if you behaved in the way described. It is possible to 
answer in any one of the following ways: 
 
1   2   3   4         5 
      not at all        somewhat           rather            very      extremely 
 
For instance, if you feel rather tense when you start a conversation with a stranger, indicate 
this by putting a mark in the third column in the following way: 
 
      1. Starting a conversation with a stranger. 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
    
 QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
     
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
  
     1. Starting a conversation with a stranger. 
     2. Telling a group of people about something you have experienced. 
     3. Offering an opinion that differs from that of the person you are 
talking to. 
     4. Acknowledging a compliment about your personal appearance. 
     5. Telling someone that you like him/her. 
     6. Telling someone that you are fond of him/her. 
     7. Acknowledging a compliment on something you have done. 
     8. Starting a conversation with a man/woman you find attractive. 
     9. Saying that you enjoy the experience of being told that you are 
liked. 
     10. Putting forward your opinion during a conversation with strangers. 
     11. Joining in the conversation of a group of people. 
     12. Maintaining your own opinion against a person who has a very 
pronounced opinion. 
     13. Saying that you enjoy people telling you that they are very fond of 
you. 
     14. Giving your opinion to a person in authority.    
     15. Telling someone that you are very pleased with something you 
have done. 
     16. Explaining your philosophy of life. 
     17. Going up to someone in order to make their acquaintance. 
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C.1.3. Scale for identification with the organization 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
The following questions ask about your opinions regarding HEC.   
 
 
 
 
Rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements. 
 
 
I talk about HEC as a good university to be in. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The values of HEC are similar to mine. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I am proud to tell people I am a member of HEC. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would recommend HEC to a friend. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
When someone praises HEC I feel proud. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Being a student in HEC is a large part of who I am. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
APPENDIX C.2.: TABLE OF THE CASES FOR THE EXPERIMENT 
 
 
 
Three cases were submitted to 118 MBA students. Case A was given to 1/3 of the students, 
Case B to 1/3 and Case C to 1/3.   
 
So that they did not see that all of them have received the same cases, two different files were 
given to them. 1/2 had to work on file 1 and 1/2 on file 2. 
 
 
 
 
Case A :  
Just 
Case B:  
Unjust by mistake 
Case C:  
Unjust on purpose 
File 1 
Offer 
AEA23 
 
 
 
 
Ass 
numbers: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Color: 
Case 1:  
Offer AEA23 
 
- Alexandre Masala (115) 
is chosen 
- Marthe Boisvert (119) 
is not chosen 
 
1 to 20 and   
201,00 
213,00 
219,00 
225,00 
231,00 
307,00 
Pink 
Case 2:  
Offer AEA23 
 
- Alexandre Masala (115) 
is not chosen 
- Marthe Boisvert (119) 
is chosen 
 
21 to 40 and 
  205,00 
  211,00 
  217,00 
  229,00 
  232,00 
 
Yellow 
Case 3:  
Offer AEA23 
 
- Alexandre Masala (115) 
is not chosen 
- Marthe Boisvert (119) is 
chosen 
 
41 to 60 and  
  203,00 
  209,00 
  221,00 
  227,00 
 
 
Red 
File 2 
Offer 
PPU11 
 
 
 
 
Ass 
numbers: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Color: 
Case 4:  
Offer PPU11 
 
- Claire Coueffe   (377) is 
chosen 
- Yannick Ternal (221) is 
not chosen 
 
61 to 80 and 
  204,00 
  216,00 
  228,00 
  311,00 
 
 
 
Green 
Case 5:  
Offer PPU11 
 
- Claire Coueffe   (377) is 
not chosen 
- Yannick Ternal (221) is 
chosen 
 
81 to 100 and 
  202,00 
  208,00 
  220,00 
  226,00 
  302,00 
  308,00 
 
Blue 
Case 6:  
Offer PPU11 
 
- Claire Coueffe   (377) is 
not chosen 
- Yannick Ternal (221) is 
chosen 
 
101 to 120 and 
  121,00 
  206,00 
  212,00 
  218,00 
  224,00 
  233,00 
  306,00 
Orange 
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APPENDIX C.3.: FILES GIVEN TO THE CANDIDATES AT FOR THE 
EXPERIMENT  
 
C.3.1. Confidentiality agreement 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
For Managerial Communication Study 
 
In order to participate in this study, you will be shown confidential information that will allow 
you to complete your task: writing two letters to applicants for internship positions. The 
confidential information includes: requirements of specific internship positions, personal 
details regarding applicants for internship positions, and, in some cases, details regarding 
administrative and other internal processes at HEC Paris.  
 
It is essential that details regarding the above remain confidential. HEC Paris takes the 
privacy of our students and employees very seriously. The trust that our students and 
employees place in us would be seriously violated if you were to share, with anyone, any 
personal information regarding other students, or information regarding HEC employees or 
internal processes. 
 
Of course, we also guarantee the confidentiality of your own responses. The results of the 
study will only be seen and analysed by the principal investigator, Dr. Angelo Fanelli, Dr. 
David Patient, and as part of the doctoral dissertation research of Thierry Nadisic.  
 
Thank you for helping to maintain these high standards of confidentiality. Please complete the 
form below BEFORE OPENING the folder with the materials. 
 
 
 
 
I, ____________________, AGREE THAT  
 
I WILL KEEP CONFIDENTIAL ANY PERSONAL INFORMATION REGARDING STUDENT 
APPLICANTS FOR INTERNSHIP POSITIONS WHICH COMES TO ME AS A RESULT OF 
PARTICIPATING IN THIS RESEARCH.  
 
I WILL NOT DISCUSS WITH ANYONE THE NAMES, PERSONAL DETAILS, OR ANY OTHER 
ATTRIBUTES OF CANDIDATES APPLYING FOR INTERNSHIP POSITIONS AT HEC, NOR WILL I, 
IN ANY WAY, DIVULGE DETAILS OF INTERNAL PROCEDURES REGARDING THE INTERNSHIP 
PROGRAM, OR ANY OTHER PROGRAM, AT HEC. 
 
______________________________  __________________________ 
Name (printed)     Signature 
 
______________________________ 
Date 
 
 
The fair hand of managers  
 230  
C.3.2. Letter from the Professor teaching the OB class 
 
Paris, June 7 
 
Subject: Your participation in managerial communication study. 
 
Dear Ting-Yu HUANG, 
 
As your professor of Organizational Behavior, I’m asking you to participate in a study on 
managerial communication and leadership styles. Your participation in this exercise is 
completely voluntary and is equivalent to 4% extra credit towards the final grade. You are 
also free to withdraw from participating in this exercise at any time. Your participation in the 
study is appreciated as it brings several benefits:  
- It helps us generate scientific results to use in class in order to illustrate the topics of 
management styles and management communication; 
- We’ll be able to give you individual and confidential feedback about your managerial 
and communication style; 
- It is part of a real task contributing to HEC’s Master Internship Program; 
- Finally, this study will also provide important research insights into managerial 
communication.  
 
This project is conducted by Thierry Nadisic, Professor in Management at Paris 13 University 
and PhD student at HEC, together with the collaboration of Angelo Fanelli, Professor at HEC, 
and Professor David Patient from the Faculdade de Ciências Economicas e Empresariais, 
Universidade Catolica Portuguesa, Lisbon, Portugal. Professors Nadisic and Fanelli will be both 
present at the debriefing session we’ll have on June 26th. 
 
Please notice that all the results will be completely anonymous and your name will never be 
quoted in any document. 
 
In order for the results of this study to be meaningful, it is important for participants to engage 
in a real task and to take it seriously. In your case, this will involve writing two letters, which 
can convey either good news of bad news. It is very important that you write the letters by 
hand and as naturally and spontaneously as possible. 
 
Your task will consist of acting as a temporary assistant recruiter for a new Master Internship 
Program (see the enclosed letter by Hervé Crès) launched by HEC in 2006. You will be 
asked to write two letters to two students who have applied for internships, and to tell them if 
their application was successful or not. It is possible that a few of you will work on the same 
files, in which case only one of the letters written will selected to be sent. By participating in 
this experiment, you accept that your letter may be sent to the receiver applicant (of course, 
your name will not be quoted). More information will be given to you in a letter from Valérie 
Leroy, the manager of the program, and in a letter from Prof. Thierry Nadisic.   
 
Thank you for your participation in this study. 
 
 
Kathryn Clutz 
MBA HEC 
kathryn_clutz@yahoo.fr 
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C.3.3. Letter from the responsible of the Master Internship Program  
 
Paris, June, Friday 8th 
 
Subject: Details regarding your recruitment assistant job 
 
 
Dear HEC MBA Student, 
 
First, I would like to warmly thank you for participating today in the role of a temporary recruitment 
assistant at HEC. A recruitment assistant plays an important role. We have now one part-time 
recruitment assistant who manages all the operations relating to training, securing internships for 
Master students from HEC and from 3 other partner schools and universities, the relations with firms, 
and the relations with the candidates. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient manpower to send 
personalized letters to all the candidates. Thus, we used to send form letters to them. However, we 
would prefer to send more personalized letters, especially to rejected candidates that are not successful 
in getting internships and who are already likely to be disappointed. So your Professor, Kathryn 
Clutz and one Professor of one of our partner universities, Thierry Nadisic, from Paris 13 University, 
suggested that we contact you to see if you can help us prepare personalized letters for the candidates, 
and that this work might also be useful in the course that you’re currently taking.  
 
Here is some more detailed information about our operations. HEC and the other partner universities 
and business schools receive details from organizations regarding available internships for Master 
students. We have built a student résumé database in partnership with these other business schools, 
engineer schools and universities (which are for the moment: ESSEC, Ecole Centrale, and CELSA-
Paris 4 University). All the students who are in the database have gone through a selection interview to 
evaluate the seriousness of their candidacy and, often, the elements in their curriculum have been 
checked. Each university or school belonging to the partnership electronically posts the internship 
announcements received from firms. Students who are in the database can then see the available 
internships on line and apply to them by e-mailing or by sending us a motivation letter (we already 
have their résumé in the data base).  
 
For each available internship, there are generally several student applications. After analysing the 
candidacy letters, the résumé, and the interviews we previously had with the students, we choose the 
most qualified candidate for each internship, and contact all of the applicants (successful and 
unsuccessful) in writing. This process ensures that the internship generally goes very well, though if a 
student is having major difficulties in an internship, another student can be found to replace him or 
her.  
 
This is where you come into action. We are going to provide you with files of two candidates: one 
who was accepted and one who was rejected for an internship. As a recruitment assistant, you have to 
write to the candidates a letter to inform them that they have been chosen or that they have not been 
chosen for the job they applied for. 
 
I would like to ask you to try to adapt the letters you write to each particular situation. First, finding an 
internship is very important for students. Second, it is really crucial for the firms to recruit students 
suitable for the job. For HEC, it is critical that we have a high quality process to ensure that both 
students and firms continue using our services. Thank you in advance for the professionalism you are 
going to show as a recruitment assistant. 
 
 
Valérie Leroy 
HEC, Responsible for the Master Internship Program 
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C.3.4. Letter from the Director of the business school 
 
 
Paris, October 10, 2006  
 
Letter to the Professors of HEC 
 
Subject : Creation of the “Master internship program” at HEC 
 
 
 
Dear faculty Member, 
 
I have the pleasure to announce the creation of an important new project in HEC: the 
“Master internship program”. Our general aim consists in contacting firms to inform 
them about our different specializations in business administration and management 
and also to tell them how they can hire HEC students for internships. At least for the 
first two years, the program is implemented only for the “Grande Ecole”.  
 
The first project that we are going to implement in the second semester of 2006 
consists in the creation of a database to link high quality Master students with 
internship positions at firms. This project is implemented in collaboration with Ecole 
Centrale, ESSEC and CELSA-Paris IV University. The students of these schools and 
universities are eligible to participate in the project. 
 
We commit to: 
1- Provide firms with candidates for internships, which are of the highest quality 
and whose qualifications are well suited to the internship offered 
2- Implement procedures to recruit students, check the quality of students, and 
ensure the suitability of students for particular internship positions (through 
interviewing applicants and verifying the information that is in their résumés) 
3- To use our recruitment procedures equally on behalf of all candidates, 
regardless of their business school or university 
4- To offer to students from the participating schools internships that are well 
suited to their qualifications and interests  
 
We hope that in this way HEC will become even a closer partner of the firms, and be 
seen as answering an important need. Thank you for informing both your students 
and firms you are in contact of our high quality internship program.  
 
 
Hervé Crès 
Directeur délégué 
HEC 
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C.3.5. Letter describing the task 
 
C.3.5.1. Case 1.A. 
Thierry Nadisic 
To the recruitment assistant 
 
Jouy en Josas, June 14 
 
 
 
 
Note to  
 
You will write letters to two candidates, one who was successful and one who was 
unsuccessful in obtaining an internship. You will have at your disposal a job description with 
the tasks that are asked for in this internship and the required qualifications. 
 
 
The candidate    Alexandre Masala      reference 115      has been chosen as being the  
 
most suitable for offer         AEA23     by the HEC recruitment assistant for the Master  
 
Internship Program.  
 
 
Marthe Boisvert             reference 119       who was the only other candidate who has  
 
applied for the same offer was not chosen. 
 
 
Please write to the candidate    Alexandre Masala      reference 115     a personalized   
 
acceptance letter and to   Marthe Boisvert             reference 119     a personalized rejection  
 
letter. You will find the cover letters and résumés for both candidates in the enclosed file. 
 
 
Please sign your letter as follows: For Mathilda August, recruitment assistant number           ”        
 
After you have written your two letters, please put each of them in an envelope and write on 
the top of each envelope the number of the offer, the number of the candidate and your 
assistant number. 
 
Then, when you have finished this, please complete the 3 short questionnaires that you 
will find at the bottom of this file. 
 
Thanks for your participation. 
 
Thierry Nadisic 
Paris 13 University, HEC PhD Program 
Ass 201 
Ass 201 
Rodrigue CHASTENET-DE-GERY 
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C.3.5.2. Case 1.B. 
 
Thierry Nadisic 
To the recruitment assistant 
 
Jouy en Josas, June 14 
 
 
 
Note  to  
 
You will write letters to two candidates, one who was successful and one who was 
unsuccessful in obtaining an internship. You will have at your disposal a job description with 
the tasks that are asked for in this internship and the required qualifications. You will also 
find the cover letters and résumés for both candidates in the enclosed file. 
 
 
The candidate Alexandre Masala (reference 115) was first chosen as being the most 
suitable candidate for Offer AEA23.  
 
Unfortunately, a mistake was made by an employee at HEC who accidentally sent 
the wrong file (the one from Marthe Boisvert (reference 119)) to the recruiting firm. 
Unfortunately, because of HEC’s mistake, the firm has already contacted the 
candidate, met her, and decided to hire her.  
 
It would be very difficult to change the situation now. So please write a personalized 
acceptance letter to Marthe Boisvert (reference 119) and a personalized rejection 
letter to Alexandre Masala (reference 115).  
 
Valérie Leroy 
Responsible for the Master Internship Program 
HEC 
 
 
 
Please sign your letter as follows: For Mathilda August, recruitment assistant number           ”        
 
After you have written your two letters, please put each of them in an envelope and write on 
the top of each envelope the number of the offer, the number of the candidate and your 
assistant number. 
 
Then, when you have finished this, please complete the 3 short questionnaires that you 
will find at the bottom of this file. 
 
Thanks for your participation. 
 
Thierry Nadisic 
Paris 13 University,  
HEC PhD Program 
Ass 211 
Ass 211 
Julien HAYE 
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C.3.5.3. Case 1.C. 
 
Thierry Nadisic 
To the recruitment assistant 
 
Jouy en Josas, June 14 
 
 
 
Note to 
 
You will write letters to two candidates, one who was successful and one who was 
unsuccessful in obtaining an internship. You will have at your disposal a job description with 
the tasks that are asked for in this internship and the required qualifications. You will also 
find the cover letters and résumés for both candidates in the enclosed file. 
 
 
The candidate Marthe Boisvert (reference 119) was chosen for the Offer AEA23 by 
our HEC recruitment manager for the Master Internship Program.  She knows the 
candidate personally and believes that Marthe is the best person for the job, 
regardless of who else applies. 
 
Alexandre Masala (reference 115) who also applied for the same 
internship was not chosen. It would be difficult for HEC to change it now. 
 
So please write a personalized acceptance letter to Marthe Boisvert (reference 119) 
and a personalized rejection letter to Alexandre Masala (reference 115). 
 
Valérie Leroy 
Responsible for the Master Internship Program 
HEC 
 
 
 
Please sign your letter as follows: For Mathilda August, recruitment assistant number           ”        
 
After you have written your two letters, please put each of them in an envelope and write on 
the top of each envelope the number of the offer, the number of the candidate and your 
assistant number. 
 
Then, when you have finished this, please complete the 3 short questionnaires that you 
will find at the bottom of this file. 
 
Thanks for your participation. 
 
 
Thierry Nadisic 
Paris 13 University 
HEC PhD Program 
 
Ass 203 
Ass 203 
Rahul CHOPRA 
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C.3.5.4. Case 2.A. 
Thierry Nadisic 
To the recruitment assistant 
 
Jouy en Josas, June 14 
 
 
 
 
Note to  
 
You will write letters to two candidates, one who was successful and one who was 
unsuccessful in obtaining an internship. You will have at your disposal a job description with 
the tasks that are asked for in this internship and the required qualifications. 
 
 
The candidate    Claire Coueffe           reference 377      has been chosen as being the  
 
most suitable for offer         PPU11    by the HEC recruitment assistant for the Master  
 
Internship Program.  
 
 
 Yannick Ternal              reference 221      who was the only other candidate who has  
 
applied for the same offer was not chosen. 
 
 
Please write to the candidate    Claire Coueffe           reference 377      a personalized   
 
acceptance letter and to   Yannick Ternal              reference 221      a personalized  
 
rejection letter. You will find the cover letters and résumés for both candidates in the enclosed 
file. 
 
 
Please sign your letter as follows: For Mathilda August, recruitment assistant number           ”        
 
After you have written your two letters, please put each of them in an envelope and write on 
the top of each envelope the number of the offer, the number of the candidate and your 
assistant number. 
 
Then, when you have finished this, please complete the 3 short questionnaires that you 
will find at the bottom of this file. 
 
Thanks for your participation. 
 
Thierry Nadisic 
Paris 13 University 
HEC PhD Program 
Ass 210 
Ass 210 
Boyan GRIFFEN 
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C.3.5.5. Case 2.B. 
 
Thierry Nadisic 
To the recruitment assistant 
 
Jouy en Josas, June 14 
 
 
 
Note to  
 
You will write letters to two candidates, one who was successful and one who was 
unsuccessful in obtaining an internship. You will have at your disposal a job description with 
the tasks that are asked for in this internship and the required qualifications. You will also 
find the cover letters and résumés for both candidates in the enclosed file. 
 
 
The candidate Claire Coueffe (reference 377) was first chosen as being the most 
suitable candidate for Offer PPU11.  
 
Unfortunately, a mistake was made by an employee at HEC who accidentally sent 
the wrong file (the one from Yannick Ternal (reference 221)) to the recruiting firm. 
Unfortunately, because of HEC’s mistake, the firm has already contacted the 
candidate, met her, and decided to hire her.  
 
It would be very difficult to change the situation now. So please write a personalized 
acceptance letter to Yannick Ternal (reference 221) and a personalized rejection 
letter to Claire Coueffe (reference 377).  
 
Valérie Leroy 
Responsible for the Master Internship Program 
HEC 
 
 
 
Please sign your letter as follows: For Mathilda August, recruitment assistant number           ”        
 
After you have written your two letters, please put each of them in an envelope and write on 
the top of each envelope the number of the offer, the number of the candidate and your 
assistant number. 
 
Then, when you have finished this, please complete the 3 short questionnaires that you 
will find at the bottom of this file. 
 
Thanks for your participation. 
 
 
Thierry Nadisic 
Paris 13 University 
HEC PhD Program 
Ass 214 
Ass 214 
Yuqing JIE 
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C.3.5.6. Case 2.C. 
 
Thierry Nadisic 
To the recruitment assistant 
 
Jouy en Josas, June 14 
 
 
 
Note to 
 
You will write letters to two candidates, one who was successful and one who was 
unsuccessful in obtaining an internship. You will have at your disposal a job description with 
the tasks that are asked for in this internship and the required qualifications. You will also 
find the cover letters and résumés for both candidates in the enclosed file. 
 
 
The candidate Yannick Ternal (reference 221) was chosen for the Offer PPU11 by 
our HEC recruitment manager for the Master Internship Program.  She knows the 
candidate personally and believes that Yannick is the best person for the job, 
regardless of who else applies. 
 
Claire Coueffe  (reference 377) who also applied for the same internship was not 
chosen. It would be difficult for HEC to change it now. 
 
So please write  a personalized acceptance letter to Yannick Ternal (reference 221) 
and a personalized rejection letter to Claire Coueffe  (reference 377). 
 
Valérie Leroy 
Responsible for the Master Internship Program 
HEC 
 
 
 
Please sign your letter as follows: For Mathilda August, recruitment assistant number           ”        
 
After you have written your two letters, please put each of them in an envelope and write on 
the top of each envelope the number of the offer, the number of the candidate and your 
assistant number. 
 
Then, when you have finished this, please complete the 3 short questionnaires that you 
will find at the bottom of this file. 
 
Thanks for your participation. 
 
 
Thierry Nadisic 
Paris 13 University 
HEC PhD Program 
 
Ass 206 
Ass 206 
Vincent FABRE 
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C.3.6. Scenarios  
 
C.3.6.1. Scenario 1 
 
A perfect internship for travel freaks (Bangalore, India) 
 
Offer AEA23 
 
Location: India | Bangalore 
 
 
 
We at Hitiki are travel freaks. Hitiki means community in a Polynesian language. The aim of 
Hitiki is to create an online multilingual travel guide, using some new and advanced Internet 
technologies. Hitiki is preparing for market launch in September 2007. As an open travel 
project the venture has only a partly commercial background. 
 
In India Hitiki is supported by the major Indian portal Greynium.com, an Internet and IT 
company with about 120 employees. 
 
To support our team we are looking for web savvy trainees to: 
- develop travel related content, especially writing of informative and entertaining articles 
- support Hitiki users and understand their needs, 
- look at what our competitors are doing, i.e., market research 
- implement marketing strategies 
 
In addition to a dedicated and independent workflow we expect: 
- passion for the Net and ideally some online project experience (e.g. your own blog), 
- excellent skills in English and preferably one more European language. 
- enthusiasm for writing and travel, preferably experience in tourism  
- creativity, dedication to the project. 
 
At Hitiki you will have the opportunity to: 
- get to know how an Internet company works, 
- work independently, 
- obtain  experience in an open minded international team (see http://blog.hitiki.com), and 
- live in Bangalore, the “funkiest town and Silicon Valley of India” 
  
Company name:  Hitiki 
Branch:   Internet, online travel guide 
Location:   Bangalore, 4th Floor, Shanthishree Complex, # 17/1, Rupena Agrahara, 
   Hosur Road, Bangalore – 560 068, India 
Start:    ASAP - Duration: min. 6 months - Salary: depends on qualifications 
 
 
Please send your application to: 
HEC Grande Ecole – Master Internship Program 
 
August@hec.fr 
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Mathilda 
 
De :   “Marthe Boisvert” <marthebv@orange.fr> 
À :   “Mathilda August” <august@hec.fr> 
Envoyé :  lundi 28 mai 2007 23:12 
Objet :  Dear Sir, dear madam 
 
 
 
Paris, May 28  
 
 
Application letter 
Reference of the offer: AEA23 
 
 
Dear Sir, dear madam, 
 
I’ve the pleasure to apply for the offer you published on the Internet concerning a position in 
Hitiki. 
 
Indeed, I have the experience of working in an international environment and I really like it. 
I’ve worked in Geneve. Plus, I’m able to make a website using Flash. Thus, I could help the 
firm to develop its website. Besides, I’m passionate about the arts, which I think makes me 
quite creative when I’m in a situation which needs me to act accordingly. Finally, I’m 
specialized in communication and Marketing, and would have pleasure to use these skills for 
Hitiki. 
 
Hoping that you will have a close look at my candidacy,  
 
Warm regards 
 
 
Marthe Boisvert 
Résumé reference 119 
16 bis, rue des Rossays 
91600 Savigny sur Orge  
France 
Phone:  06 18 58 04 66 
E-mail:  Marthebv@orange.fr; boivertm@hec.fr  
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Reference : 119 
 
Marthe Boivert   
 
Student in HEC (3 years completed in a French 
University) 
16 bis, rue des Rossays 
91600 Savigny sur 
Orge  
France 
 
Phone:  06 18 58 04 66 
E-mail :  
Marthebv@orange.fr 
 
I'm currently looking for an internship 
job in the following domain :  
 
  
Sales/Marketing 
Advertising/Public Relations 
 
 
Objectives : 
 
I completed my degree in Information/communication studies. Currently in a 
Master of Marketing program, and I would like to use my skills for a position 
such as Marketing Assistant 
 
 
   Education   
 
Since 
September 2006 
HEC Grande Ecole 
direct admission in the 2nd year of the program (equivalent of 
the first year of a 2 years Master) 
Specialization : Marketing  
September 2002 
June 2006 
University of Savoie 
Bachelor of Science in economics and management and Deug 
in information-communication. 
Specialization : Information-communication  
September 2000 
June 2003 
College of Glieres 
Obtained the Baccalaureat Litteraire with major in Visual 
arts. 
Specialization : Literature and Art  
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September 1997 
June 2000 
College Michel Servet 
Gradated from the College. 
 
   Experience   
 
February 2005 
April 2005 
GRAPHELF 
Title : Graphics Designer 
Task :  Assistant Graphics Designer, responsible for projects 
(calling cards, posters, booklets) and design of Web sites. 
Participation in the publication of the magazine "Akkro" of 
Mars 
Results :  Improvement of graphics knowledge and HTML 
language. 
January 2004 
April 2004 
Tribune de Genève 
Title :  Marketing Assistant 
Task :  Marketing Assistant, public relations, flyers, 
participation in the Motor-show of Geneva. 
Results :  Understanding of international marketing and of 
event organizing and marketing. 
 
   IT knowledge   
 
 
Software :  
Flash MX, Photoshop 7, QuarkExpress, Illustrator, Dreamweaver, Adobe First 
Pro.   
 
More information :  
Created Web site using flash. 
 
 
   Languages   
 
 
English 
Spoken   Advanced 
Written   Intermediate 
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French 
Spoken   Native speaker 
Written   Native speaker 
 
Spanish 
Spoken   School level 
Written   School level 
 
   Hobbies   
 
Art and Music 
I am passionate about the arts, including ballet (danced for 14 years) and hip 
hop (4 years).  
 
I enjoy painting, the drawing and graphics. 
Good knowledge of the arts.  
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Mathilda 
 
De :   “Alexandre Masala” <masala.alex@free.fr> 
À :   “Mathilda August” <august@hec.fr> 
Envoyé :  mardi 29 mai 2007 21:21 
Objet :  Reference of the offer: AEA23 
 
 
 
Offer reference: AEA23 
 
 
 
Dear Ms. August,  
 
I am contacting you in response to the job posting for an internship in Hitiki, listed with 
the “Master internship program” postings.  
 
After I graduate, I plan to live abroad. East-Asia and India, in particular, are places 
where I’ve already gone as a tourist, and would be happy to work for the first years of 
my career. I have international work experience in the USA, where I used to be a 
salesman in a National Park, in Great Britain, where I worked as an international sales 
assistant, in Spain, where I was in charge of marketing research in an organization and 
I’ve lived in Mexico. 
 
These experiences also allowed me to develop relevant competencies in the management 
of online projects. For example, in London I was in charge of updating parts of the 
company Intranet. Further, I learned the ropes of the tourism business while working for 
a travel agency in Spain. I used both experiences to improve my skills in marketing and 
sales.  
 
I have a strong sense of personal initiative. I’ve been President of a student association, 
and I wanted to specialize in project management. I would also say that I give 
importance to interpersonal communication, that I have a dynamic approach to working 
on creative projects, and that I work well in a team environment.  
 
I look forward to the opportunity to show you how my skills and experience make me a 
suitable candidate for this internship.  
 
 
Yours faithfully  
 
Alexandre Masala 
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Reference: 115 
Alexandre Masala  
 
University (5 years completed) 
119 bd Jean Jaurès 
92110 Clichy 
Phone:  06 16 07 79 53  
E-mail :  masala.alex@free.fr  
 
I'm currently looking for a   Full Time 
internship in the following domain :  
Tourism 
Sales/Marketing 
Project Management 
 
Objectives : 
 
Young graduate seeking an internship which will allow me to put into practice 
the knowledge and the experience gained during various training courses, 
vocational training, and work experience. 
 
   Education   
 
September 2003 
December 2006 
ESSEC 
Grande Ecole – Business School 
Specialization : Project Management & Multimedia  
One year studying in ESADE Business School (Barcelona, Spain) 
September 2000 
July 2003 
Lycée du Parc de Vilgénis 
One year in Preparatory Class and 2 year in BTS Accounting 
and Management. 
Diploma of High-level technician  
Specialization : Accountancy and Management  
September 1998 
July 2000 
Ecole des Pupilles de l'Air 
Military College of the French Air Force.  
Diploma: Bac Tertiary Sciences and Technologies, with  
majors in Accountanting and Management (First Class 
Honours)  
Specialization : Bac STT option Accounting and Management  
September 1994 
July 1996 
Lycée Franco-Mexicain 
Franco-Mexican college of Mexico City  
 
   Experience   
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March 2006 
August 2006 
Internode  
Title :  International Sales Assistant in London (Great-Britain) 
Task :  Management of commercial B2B proposals (Web Portals, 
wap, sms, mms...).  
In charge of technology survey and updates to parts of the company 
Intranet.  
Prepare and deliver sales presentations. 
April 2005 
August 2006 
Havas Voyages  
Title :  Marketing research in tourism area in Barcelona (Spain) 
Task :  In charge of customers surveys and research on competitors. 
Presentation of the results to the board of directors. 
June 2004 
June 2005 
ESPEC  
Title :  President 
Task :  Organization of conferences and events concerning stock 
exchange, financial markets, and economics, in partnership with 
the bank "Société Générale," for the students of the campus. 
Creation of the Web site of the association. 
Resources :  Help from other members of the association and the 
support of the ESSEC business School and of other associations of 
the school.  
Results :  Implementation of a one-month-long stock market 
investment game based and leading our missions to the SIFE 
contest, which proceeded this year into the Senate.  
January 2002 
December 2002 
French Federation of Fencing 
Title :  Volunteer 
Task :  Participation in the organization of international fencing 
competitions  
June 2002 
July 2002 
France Telecom Research & Development 
Title : Administrator of contracts and patent licences  
Task :  Management and audit of contracts within the intellectual 
property department 
July 2001 
August 2001 
Everglades National Park 
Title :  Salesperson 
Task :  Salesperson in the Everglades National park (Florida, 
US) 
July 2000 
August 2000 
France Telecom OCISI 
Title :  Data Manager 
Task :  Data manager for programming department and for 
corporate Intranet service. 
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   IT knowledge   
 
Software :  
Microsoft Office Suite 2003 (Word, Excel, Access, Project, Power Point, Visio...,  
Dreamweaver MX, Flash MX,  
Magix Video Deluxe,  
Hypercam2...  
 
   Languages   
 
English 
Spoken   Fluent 
Written   Fluent 
 
Spanish 
Spoken   Fluent 
Written   Fluent 
 
French 
Spoken   Native speaker 
Written   Native speaker 
 
   Hobbies   
 
Sports 
Fencing (for 13 years), Swimming (for 3 years), Skiing, Tennis (for 1 year), Soccer...  
Leisure 
Traveling abroad: Europe, South America (Argentina, Brasil, Peru) and Asia (Tibet, Japan, 
India), new technologies, cinema 
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C.3.6.2. Scenario 2 
  
 
Be part of the most exciting internet web 2.0 start up! 
 
Offer PPU 11 
 
 
Location: PARIS 75003 and Philadelphia 
 
 
 
Who we are: the most innovative social shopping site ever started!  
 
Who you are : a curious, autonomous, dynamic student in marketing looking for a trainee 
position within your school curriculum (stage conventionné); you must have a very good 
knowledge of US internet environment (blogs, trends etc) as well as being aware of what's 
hype, fun, trendy in consuming products.  
 
What you will have to do: US market research, moderate the site, contact the bloggers, the 
press, the merchants, the partners.  
 
What we will offer: the excitement of a start up, a learning experience and the real possibility 
of a full time job after the internship is over.  
 
The minimum duration of the internship is 3 months, starting in July and can be extended, 
depending on your school's requirements.  
 
 
Please send your application by e-mail to: 
HEC Grande Ecole – Master Internship Program 
 
August@hec.fr 
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Mathilda 
 
De :   “Yannick Ternal” <ternaly@hec.fr> 
À :   “Mathilda August” <august@hec.fr> 
Envoyé :  jeudi 31 mai 2007 11:12 
Objet :  Internship HEC 
 
 
 
Paris, May 31st  
 
 
Application letter 
Reference of the offer: PPU11 
 
 
Dear Mathilda, 
 
I’m happy to apply for the offer concerning a position in Paris and Philadelphia. 
 
Indeed, I have the experience of working in communication., I’m also specialized in British 
literature and civilization. Finally, I would be very excited by working abroad. 
 
 
Kindest regards 
 
 
Yannick Ternal 
Résumé reference 221 
Résidence Joseph Francesci 
39, rue des Ecoles 
94000 France  
France 
Phone:  06 64 41 17 42 
E-mail: ternaly@hec.fr or yan.ternal@free.fr  
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Reference 221 
Yannick Ternal 
 
Master (5 years completed) 
Graduate  
Résidence Joseph Franceschi  
39, rue des Ecoles  
94000 CRETEIL  
France 
 
Phone :  06 64 41 17 42  
E-mail :  yan.ternal@free.fr 
 
I'm currently looking for an internship or 
job in the following domain :  
 
Arts/Culture/Fashion 
Sales/Marketing 
Advertising/Public Relations 
 
 
Objectives : 
 
Available soon, I would like to work as a communication manager, ideally in an international 
environment, with the help of my adaptability, writing skills and sociability.  
 
 
   Education   
 
November 2005 
September 2006 
HEC 
Master 2  
Specialization : CEMS MIM  
November 2004 
September 2005 
HEC 
Master 1  
Specialization : CEMS MIM 
November 2003 
July 2004 
ISERP 
Certificate in Public Relations 
Specialization : Corporate and Political Communication  
November 2000 
July 2003 
University of Marne la Vallée 
3 years completed 
English grammar, phonetics, linguistics, literature, civilization,... 
Specialization : British literature and civilization  
September 1999 
June 2000 
F.Cabrini High School 
French Literary Baccalauréat 
Option: Italian 
Specialization : Literature and Languages  
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Specialization : Literature and Languages  
 
   Experience   
 
November 2004 
September 2006 
LE PETIT FUTE  
Title : Communication Assistant 
Task :  Internship 
Organization of events 
Report writing  
Translations 
Resources :  Intranet Website 
Office software 
Corporate applications 
May 2006 
June 2006 
Vauto events  
Title : Production Assistant 
Task :  Follow-up of the exhibitors and visitors in the framework of events 
organized by 2 famous atuomobile groups. 
June 2004 
September 2004 
Chelles City Hall 
Title : Communication Assistant 
Task :  Internship 
Updating of the municipal communication mediums 
Writing of press extract and press kit 
October 2002 
July 2003 
Carrefour 
Title : Cashier 
Task :  Welcoming and informing the customers 
Managing the payment 
July 2000 
July 2002 
Brice, Crédit Agricole, EDF, Disneyland Paris, 
Prodène Klint... 
Title : Temp 
Task :  Several temporary jobs in various domains: sales, administration, 
industry, reception, administration  
 
   IT knowledge   
 
 
Software :  
Use daily: 
Word 
Excel 
Works 
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Works 
Powerpoint 
Internet Explorer 
 
Beginner: 
Dreamweaver 
Quark X-press 
 
 
   Languages   
 
 
English 
Spoken   Fluent 
Written   Fluent 
 
German 
Spoken   Intermediate 
Written   Intermediate 
 
Italian 
Spoken   Intermediate 
Written   Intermediate 
 
   Hobbies   
 
Cooking 
Reading 
Classic and contemporary literature 
Essays 
Newspaper and magazines  
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Mathilda 
 
De :   “Claire Coueffe” <chiara2@tiscali.fr> 
À :   “Mathilda August” <mathilda.august@hec.fr> 
Envoyé :  mercredi 30 mai 2007 13:26 
Objet :  my candidacy for the PPU 11 offer 
 
 
Paris, May 30  
 
Subject: Candidacy for the PPU11 offer 
 
 
 
Dear Madam, 
 
I’m writing to you in order to present my candidacy for the PPU 11 offer. I am extremely 
interested in this offer, and am confident that my education, interests, and relevant experience 
make me a strong candidate.  
 
Your offer provides addresses my own desire to work in marketing, my passion for fashion 
and design, my desire to return to the United Sates to work, and my knowledge and 
enthusiasm for the Internet. 
 
As far as my competencies are concerned, I have relevant experience working in the fields of 
marketing and communication. For example, I have already worked in the fashion, art and 
music industries, and also have worked as a webmaster. I am an enthusiastic and effective 
writer, as shown by the more than 120 people who visit my blog (worldview.com) each day. I 
am looking for an opportunity to work in a startup with products targeting the American 
market, with which I am pretty familiar. 
 
I look forward to discussing further with you how my international and web experience, my 
dynamic personality, my enthusiasm for technology and working for a startup, and my range 
of professional experience, could help me contribute to your firm. 
 
 
Sincerely 
 
 
Claire Coueffé 
 
34, rue Guillaume Tell  
75017 Paris, France 
 
Tel : +33 (0)6 08 32 24 55 
E-mail: Chiara2@tiscali.fr 
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Reference 377 
 
Claire Coueffé 
 
University (4 years completed) 
  
34, rue Guillaume Tell 
75017 Paris  
France 
 
Phone:  +33 (0)6 08 32 24 55 
E-mail :  Chiara2@tiscali.fr 
 
I'm currently looking for a full time internship 
job in the following domain:  
 
  
International marketing and communication 
 
 
 
Objectives : 
 
I would like to work in an Internet environment and to participate in the 
marketing of innovative products. 
 
 
   Education   
 
Since 
September 2006 
Sorbonne, Université de Paris IV, CELSA 
(Ecoles des hautes études en sciences de l’information et de 
la communication/ School of higher studies in the information 
and communication sciences) 
2nd year of Master  in Communication  
August 
Dec 2005 
Baruch College, New York 
Fall semester of the Master of Corporate Communications (12 
credits) 
September 2005 
June 2006 
Sorbonne, Université de Paris IV, CELSA 
1st year of Master  in Communication  
thesis:  Olfactive marketing 
September 2002 
June 2005 
Sorbonne, Université de Paris IV, CELSA 
Bachelor in Literature and Language applied to Culture and 
Communication 
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   Experience   
 
May 2006 
July 2006 
Saatchi & Saatchi Business Communications, Neuilly 
April 2005 
July 2005 
Hypoflash, New York 
Internet Website specialized in music derived products for 
April 2004 
July 2004 
InClub, Florence (Italy),  
Art consultant and promoter for Italian engravings 
May 2003 
July 2003 Secret-Service-Style, trends office, Paris 
Assisted the manager in fashion research. Organized and 
Sept. 2002 
 
Galerie Maeght (contemporary art gallery) 
Assisted the gallery staff 
Sept. 2002 
April 2004 
Sybill Agence, Neuilly  
Hostess for commercial events and exhibitions 
 
   IT knowledge   
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   Languages   
 
 
English 
Bilingual 
 
French 
Mother tongue 
 
Spanish 
Solid working knowledge 
 
Italian 
Solid marking knowledge 
 
   Hobbies   
 
Swimming, running, drawing, reading, fashion, photography 
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C.3.7. Manipulation checks (example for scenario 1) 
 
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 1 
 
 
 
Your name:     Sairaman KALPATHI 
 
Your assistant number:   
 
 
  
Rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements using 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 
(1 = to a small extent to 5 = to a large extent) 
 
 
OFFER NUMBER __________ AEA23_________ 
 
1. After looking at the job posting and the candidates' materials, to what 
 extent do you feel that the candidate number ___ Masala 115________   
 was well suited for the job? 
 
2. After looking at the job posting and the candidates' materials, to what  
extent do you feel that the candidate number ____ Boisvert 119_______ 
was well suited for the job?  
 
 
 
Ass 215 
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C.3.8. Justice scales 
 
 
Example for scenario 1 
 
- Questionnaire 2a 
 
- Questionnaire 2b 
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Questionnaire 2a 
 
 
Rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements using 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 
(1 = to a small extent to 5 = to a large extent) 
 
 
The following items refer to the decision, which consisted of recruiting or not recruiting the candidate 
for this internship job. To what extent: 
 
1. Is the decision consistent with the candidate’s qualifications?…………………….……... 
 
2. Does the decision reflect the candidate’s experience?…….……………..……………… 
 
3. Is the decision justified given the suitability of the candidates  for the internship?…… 
 
4. Does the decision reflect the quality of the candidates?......…….……………………….…….. 
 
 
The following items refer to the procedures, which have been used by HEC to make the decision 
whether to recruit or not recruit the candidate for this internship job. To what extent: 
 
5. Have those procedures allowed the candidate to show his (her) value?……………….…….. 
 
6. Have those procedures allowed the candidate to influence the decision?.………..………. 
 
7. Have those procedures been applied consistently?…………………….…………….….... 
 
8. Have those procedures been free of bias?…….…………………………….……….…….. 
 
9. Have those procedures been based on accurate information?………………………….….. 
 
10. Is the candidate able to appeal the decision arrived at by those procedures?.........…..…… 
 
11. Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral standards?...............……………………. 
 
 
The following items refer to yourself and to your letter. To what extent: 
 
12. Have you treated the candidate in a polite manner?…….……………………………….…….. 
 
13. Have you treated the candidate with dignity?……………………………………………….. 
 
14. Have you treated the candidate with respect?…….…………………………………………. 
 
15. Have you refrained from improper remarks or comments?…………………………………… 
 
16. Have you been candid in your communication with the candidate?………………….………… 
 
17. Have you explained the procedures thoroughly?.................................................…………. 
 
18. Have you given reasonable explanations regarding the procedures?................................… 
 
19. Have you communicated details in a timely manner?…..…………………………..…….. 
 
20. Have you tailored your communications to the candidate’s specific needs?..................…. 
Candidate name 
 
Candidate reference 
Masala
115 
Your assistant number 
 
Job reference 
Ass 221 
AEA23 
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Questionnaire 2b 
 
 
Rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements using 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 
(1 = to a small extent to 5 = to a large extent) 
 
 
The following items refer to the decision, which consisted of recruiting or not recruiting the candidate 
for this internship job. To what extent: 
 
1. Is the decision consistent with the candidate’s qualifications?…………………….……... 
 
2. Does the decision reflect the candidate’s experience?…….……………..……………… 
 
3. Is the decision justified given the suitability of the candidates  for the internship?…… 
 
4. Does the decision reflect the quality of the candidates?......…….……………………….…….. 
 
 
The following items refer to the procedures, which have been used by HEC to make the decision 
whether to recruit or not recruit the candidate for this internship job. To what extent: 
 
5. Have those procedures allowed the candidate to show his (her) value?……………….…….. 
 
6. Have those procedures allowed the candidate to influence the decision?.………..………. 
 
7. Have those procedures been applied consistently?…………………….…………….….... 
 
8. Have those procedures been free of bias?…….…………………………….……….…….. 
 
9. Have those procedures been based on accurate information?………………………….….. 
 
10. Is the candidate able to appeal the decision arrived at by those procedures?.........…..…… 
 
11. Have those procedures upheld ethical and moral standards?...............……………………. 
 
 
The following items refer to yourself and to your letter. To what extent: 
 
12. Have you treated the candidate in a polite manner?…….……………………………………….…….. 
 
13. Have you treated the candidate with dignity?……………………………………………….. 
 
14. Have you treated the candidate with respect?…….…………………………………………. 
 
15. Have you refrained from improper remarks or comments?…………………………………… 
 
16. Have you been candid in your communication with the candidate?………………….………… 
 
17. Have you explained the procedures thoroughly?.................................................…………. 
 
18. Have you given reasonable explanations regarding the procedures?................................… 
 
19. Have you communicated details in a timely manner?…..…………………………..…….. 
 
20. Have you tailored your communications to the candidate’s specific needs?..................…. 
Candidate name 
 
Candidate reference 
Boisvert 
119 
Your assistant number 
 
Job reference 
Ass 221 
AEA23 
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APPENDIX C.4.: THE CODING SCHEME USED TO CODE THE LETTERS 
 
 
Rating Scales: 
 
Advises to the coder 
 
 
You’re going to read some rejection letters that were sent to candidates who applied and were 
not selected for an internship. These letters were sent by the recruitment assistant of the 
Master Internship Program, an organization to which the school of the candidates belongs and 
which links students who are looking firms to host them for an internship and firms who are 
willing to propose an internship to students. Your job consists of judging these letters on the 
criteria of explanations and interpersonal sensitivity. 
 
Below are the criteria to consider and look out for when rating the different aspects of 
interpersonal and information fairness. There will be, and is supposed to be, substantial 
overlap between the different items in each scale, though each item is also supposed to focus 
your attention on specific behaviors. Having said that, some letter writers will do a great job 
on some parts of explanations or interpersonal sensitivity, and a lousy job on others. 
 
Don’t attach TOO much importance to the suggestions for 1-5 ratings, or to the specific 
criteria or examples under each item. That is, you should also rate based on your FEELINGS. 
How did you feel during and after the reading of the letter (especially for the first 2 items). 
Did you FEEL the candidate was being treated politely and courteously? Did you FEEL the 
candidate was respected as a worthwhile person? Did the person who wrote the letter SEEM 
concerned about the recipient? Did the explanation SEEM reasonable and satisfy you? Did the 
explanation FEEL sincere?  
 
(1) Politeness and courtesy 
 
1- The sender is not polite. 
- Doesn’t use any form of address (such as “sincerely” or “regards”) 
 
2- The sender does not make any special attempt at politeness. 
- Uses a normal form of address (“sincerely”, “regards”) 
 
3- The sender is normally polite.   
- Thanks the candidate for having applied 
- Uses a more sophisticated form of address ( “sincerely yours”, “yours truly”) 
 
4- The sender puts emphasis on politeness. 
- Whishes future success at the end of the letter 
 
5- The overall tone and message is very polite and courteous 
- The sender uses kind words at the start or the end of the letter (“we are pleased…”) 
- For example thanks for the candidate’s understanding for the difficult choice the 
recruiter had to make 
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(2) Respect and dignity 
 
1- The sender is disrespectful and does not appreciate the value of the person 
- Doesn’t use the candidate’s name or surname (doesn’t write “Dear X” or “Dear M. 
Y”) 
- Doesn’t end the letter by giving his or her title and number (“for Mathilda August, 
Recruitment Assistant number Z”) 
 
2- The sender does not make any special attempt at showing respect and dignity. 
- Uses the candidate’s name or surname (“Dear X” or “Dear M. Y”) 
- Ends the letter by giving his or her title and number (“for Mathilda August, 
Recruitment Assistant number X”) 
 
3- The sender is normally respectful 
- As above, plus uses some formal conventions at the beginning of the letter (“address”, 
“date”, “subject”…) 
- Recognizes the unfavorable situation by using “unfortunately” or “we do not have 
good news” 
- Says the decision is not an indication of the candidate’s potential 
 
4- The sender puts emphasis on respect and dignity 
- Acknowledges the hardship by expressing regret (“I’m sorry to announce you”, “I 
regret to inform you”…) 
- Praises the candidate by recognizing his-her strengths 
 
5- The overall tone of the message is very respectful 
- Encourages to remain motivated and to keep trying (“ we advise you to keep track on 
your goals and don't loose your focus on your interest area”). 
- Offers to answer to any further questions at the end of the letter 
- For example signs with his (her) real name 
 
(3) Thorough and reasonable explanations 
  
1- No attempt to explain the rationale for the decision. 
- Only states that the candidate has not been chosen, without any justification (for 
instance: “Unfortunately, we can not offer you the position at this time” or “ your 
application for this internship was unsuccessful”) 
 
2- Only gives a partial and vague explanation for the decision. 
- Refers to the number of applicants (For instance: “an increase in the number of 
applications with very good profiles made it difficult to extend an offer to you”) 
- Or refers to “limited vacancies” 
- Tells the candidate can write if he-she wants to have a feedback 
 
3- Short justification of the decision or some details about the decision process. 
- Only explains that the candidacy doesn’t match (for instance: “we were unable to find 
a match between the competencies required for the position and your profile”) 
- Or gives details about the decision process (for example: after “careful consideration 
of you application package” or “the selection process is a rigorous process”) 
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- Or talks about an “external event” that made not possible to hire the candidate 
without giving any other detail 
 
4- Precisely states the reasons why the decision was made. 
- Tells what did not match (For example: “we were looking for someone with a bit more 
experience and solid command of the English language”) 
- Or clearly says that a mistake has been made in the decision process 
 
5- Comprehensive and detailed explanation for the reasons of the decision.  
- Precisely analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the candidacy in comparison to the 
job requirements and concludes on what is not adequate (for instance: “Even if your 
profile shows a set of good achievements, it does not meet all requirements of the 
position, in terms of studies, working experiences and exposure to foreign 
environments. On the other side we think that this position is not fitting your 
objectives and you may probably find other opportunity which are more close to your 
long term targets.”)  
- Or explains the kind of mistake that has been made in the decision process (for 
example: “Unfortunately, due to a clerical mistake we sent another candidate's 
resumé to the hiring firm who has been selected as well”).  
- Or explains there has been a bias in the decision process and that the person who was 
hired had some connections in the selection team 
 
(4) Tailoring communication 
 
Here is some information about the profiles of the candidates to whom the rejection letters are 
addressed. The only thing you do not know at this step is how many other candidates applied 
to the same offer and what’s the profile of the one who was hired. 
 
- Alexandre Masala has a very strong curriculum and his competencies are very well 
adapted to the job offered (experience in online projects and in tourism and an 
excellent level in English). Plus, his cover letter shows his very strong motivation.  
- Marthe Boisvert has a good curriculum but she doesn’t master at a high level some of 
the competencies that are necessary for the job she is applying to (some experience in 
online projects, no experience in tourism, an intermediate level in English). Her cover 
letter doesn’t show a very strong motivation. 
- Claire Coueffé has a very strong curriculum and her competencies are very well 
adapted to the job offered (very good knowledge of US Internet environment, 
experience in trendy consumer products). Plus, her cover letter shows her very strong 
motivation. 
- Yannick Ternal has a good curriculum but he doesn’t master at a high level some of 
the competencies that are necessary for the job he is applying to (low knowledge of 
the US Internet environment, small experience in communication). His cover letter 
doesn’t show a very strong motivation. 
 
1- Did not adapt communication to recipient. 
- Standard letter, with no reference to the candidate’s curriculum and cover letter 
 
2- Only slightly adapted communication to recipient. 
- Minor reference to the candidate’s profile (for example: “your credentials are 
impressive” or “your profile does not exactly suit our need for that position”). 
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3- The sender tries to personalize his-her comments 
- Some reference to the candidate’s information (for instance, “We were looking for a 
very specific profile which necessitated previous experience in one US internet 
environment, and which you lacked”). 
 
4- Extensive reference to the candidate’s information 
- Lists and recognizes the strengths and weaknesses of the candidate regarding the 
requirements of the job and discusses them. 
 
5. As above, plus adapted discussion and advises about what skills to improve or 
the kinds of ads to reapply to  
- For instance: “If you wish to enter that business sector we would suggest you to travel 
to the US or seek exposure to the US in other ways and to take up courses in IT. You 
could for example open and maintain your own web blog”.) 
 
 
The fair hand of managers  
 265 
 
APPENDIX D: MATERIALS USED FOR THE QUALITATIVE STUDY 
 
 
APPENDIX D.1.: THE INTERVIEW GUIDE 
 
• Attributes noted: 
- Sex 
- Managerial position (manager or deputy manager) 
- Level (department or service) 
- Activity (production or administrative) 
 
 
1. Describe an event that your subordinates have experienced and that 
you’ve found unjust 
(note: Be sure to understand 
1. the type of injustice that was at stake 
2. the type of antecedent event that was concerned 
3. the type of justice rule violated 
4. the source of the injustice) 
 
2. Describe what you did in reaction to this injustice 
 
 
3. What was your motivation to do what you did ? 
 
 
4. Describe the consequences of your reaction 
 
a. Did your behavior help to fix the injustice ? 
 
b. How did your subordinates behave after you had reacted to the 
injustice ? 
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APPENDIX D.2.: THE N’VIVO®  CODING SCHEME 
 
D.2.1. The node structure 
 
 
 The way these nodes are structured: 
a. Mirrors the way the interviews were conducted 
b. Allows to identify corrective justice actions from managers  
c. Allows to identify the antecedents and consequences of managerial corrective 
actions to injustices 
 
 
1. The injustice: The injustice experienced by the employees and its characteristics 
 
1.1. The type of injustice 
 
Distributive injustice 
1.1.1. The antecedent event 
1. Tasks 
2. Bonus and pay increase 
3. Cooperation 
4. Time off and duration of work 
5. Salary 
6. Working means 
7. Fringe benefits 
8. Promotions 
9. Offices 
10. Sanctions 
1.1.2. The justice rule that was violated 
11. Equity 
12. Equality 
13. Need 
14. Other 
Interpersonal injustice 
Procedural injustice 
Informational injustice 
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1.2. The source of injustice 
 
Manager 
Firm or upper management 
Coworkers 
 
 
2. The (corrective) reactions to the injustice: Main reactions, often corrective justice 
actions, from managers 
 
Used informational justice 
Tried to fix the problem, at the origin of the injustice 
Engaged in invisible remedies 
Kinds of invisible remedies 
• Allocated free days off or was more flexible in the allocation of time off 
• Allocated more bonuses 
• Recruited more temporary workers 
• Allocated a higher salary increase 
• Allocated little gifts 
• Allocated more training 
• Helped subordinates be promoted 
• Improved the subordinates’ status 
• Gave personal help to the subordinates to handle their jobs 
• Applied a formal allocation rule with flexibility for fringe benefits 
• Improved working conditions  
Appealed to a better future 
Refused to react to the injustice 
Used procedural justice 
Asked for help to correct the injustice 
Used authority to ask perpetrators to respect the rules 
Used interpersonal justice 
Managed the way people react to injustice 
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Improved working conditions  
Criticized the decision by upper management 
 
 
3. Managers’ motivations : Main motivations 
 
Because it was the right thing to do 
Relational motives 
Work performance instrumental motives 
To avoid problems 
To help the subordinate 
Thought there was no injustice 
To make the subordinate accept the decision 
To appear as being just 
 
 
4. The reactions to the (corrective) reactions: Employees’ attitudinal and behavioral 
reactions to the managerial (corrective) attempts (from the managers’ point of view). 
 
Positive attitudes and behaviors from employees 
4.1. Types of positive attitudes and behaviors 
• Psychological comfort 
• Less injustice and frustration felt 
• Maintained quality of work and performance 
• Satisfaction 
• Decision acceptance 
• Maintained a good social climate 
• More motivation 
• People stopped complaining 
•  Maintained a good relationship between the subordinate and the manager 
• Positive effects only in the short run 
• Motivated people to report problems to their managers 
• Subordinates thanked the manager 
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Negative attitudes and behaviors from employees 
No impact 
Injustice was fixed 
Ambiguous consequences 
Employees learned to react differently to the injustice 
In long run, the injustice disappeared by itself 
 
 
D.2.2. The casebook of attributes 
 
1. Managers’ hierarchical position 
 
Department head 
Deputy department head 
Team manager 
Deputy team manager 
 
2. Managers’ activity 
 
Productive function 
Administrative function 
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APPENDIX E: MATERIALS USED FOR THE SCENARIO STUDY 
 
APPENDIX E.1.: SCALE FOR MORAL IDENTITY (INTERNALIZATION) 
 
 
Listed alphabetically below are some characteristics that might describe a person: 
 
1. Caring 6. Hardworking 
2. Compassionate 7. Helpful 
3. Fair 8. Honest 
4. Friendly 9. Kind 
5. Generous  
 
The person with these characteristics could be you or could be someone else.  For a moment, visualize 
in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics.  Imagine how that person would think, 
feel, and act.  When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following 10 
questions (by circling the number) using the scale provided below. 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Mostly 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Mostly 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. It would make me feel good to be a 
person who has these 
characteristics. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Being someone who has these 
characteristics is an important part 
of who I am. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I would be ashamed to be a person 
who has these characteristics. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Having these characteristics is not 
really important to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I strongly desire to have these 
characteristics.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Notice that items 3 and 4 are reverse-scored. 
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APPENDIX E.2.: SCENARIOS FOR THE SCENARIO STUDY 
 
 
Three scenarios were used for this study (scenarios 1, 2 and 3).  There were 2 (Interpersonal 
injustice / Interpersonal justice) x 2 (Distributive injustice / Distributive justice) = 4 
conditions. 
 
 
E.2.1. Scenario 1: The project launch 
 
Introduction 
You are the manager of an engineering team in TECHNOSURE, a medium-sized firm that 
provides tailor-made IT solutions to a range of companies.  Marc, who is one of your 
subordinates, has been working over the last twelve months preparing a new project. Marc 
would love to launch this project now.  
 
Interpersonal injustice 
The President called Marc into his office and personally told Marc that he was not chosen to 
launch the project. When he met with the President, the President told him rather harshly that 
he would give him only a few minutes. The President was verging on being rude and 
discourteous. 
 
Interpersonal justice 
The President called Marc into his office and personally told Marc that he was not chosen to 
launch the project. When he met with the President, the President told him that he was happy 
to give Marc all the feedback he needed. The President said he was really sorry that he could 
not give Marc this opportunity now, and that the company appreciated his contribution. 
 
Distributive injustice 
Marc believes, however, that the person chosen to launch the project is considerably less 
qualified and experienced than Marc and has poorer results than Marc.  
  
Distributive justice 
Marc believes, however, that the person chosen to launch the project is considerably more 
qualified and experienced than Marc and has somewhat better results than Marc. 
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E.2.2. Scenario 2: Promotion to Team Leader 
 
Introduction 
You are the manager of an engineering team in TECHNOSURE, a medium-sized firm that 
provides tailor-made IT solutions for a wide range of companies. TECHNOSURE has been 
expanding rapidly, and as a new project arises, a new Team Lead position becomes available.  
The position is desirable – it is deemed a promotion and comes with a salary increase. Several 
applications for the new Team Lead position have been received. One of your subordinates, 
Marc, has applied for the position; he really would love to get the Team Lead job. 
 
Interpersonal injustice 
The President called Marc into his office and personally told Marc that he was not given the 
promotion. When he met with the President, the President told him rather harshly that he 
would give him only a few minutes. The President was verging on being rude and 
discourteous. 
 
Interpersonal justice 
The President called Marc into his office and personally told Marc that he was not given the 
promotion. When he met with the President, the President told him that he was happy to give 
Marc all the feedback he needed. The President said he was really sorry that he could not give 
Marc this opportunity now, and that the company appreciated his contribution. 
 
Distributive injustice 
Marc believes, however, that the person who received the promotion is considerably less 
qualified and experienced than Marc, and has poorer results than Marc. 
 
Distributive justice 
Marc believes, however, that the person who received the promotion is considerably more 
qualified and experienced than Marc and has somewhat better results than Marc. 
 
 
The fair hand of managers  
 273 
 
E.2.3. Scenario 3: The bonus 
 
Introduction 
You are the manager of an engineering team in TECHNOSURE, a medium-sized firm that 
provides tailor-made IT solutions to a range of companies.  Every year, TECHNOSURE’s 
president makes decisions regarding employee bonuses. Marc, who is one of your 
subordinates, is expecting a large bonus. 
 
Interpersonal injustice 
The President called Marc into his office and personally told Marc that he did not receive a 
bonus. When he met with the President, the President told him rather harshly that he would 
give him only a few minutes. The President was verging on being rude and discourteous. 
 
Interpersonal justice 
The President called Marc into his office and personally told Marc that he did not receive a 
bonus. When he met with the President, the President told him that he was happy to give Marc 
all the feedback he needed. The President said he was really sorry that he could not give Marc 
a bonus now, and that the company appreciated his contribution. 
 
Distributive injustice 
Marc believes, however, that his contribution during the former year was considerably more 
than others in the company who received bonuses.  
 
Distributive justice 
Marc believes, however, that his contribution during the former year could be less than others 
in the company who received bonuses.  
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APPENDIX E.3.: MANIPULATION CHECKS AND JUSTICE SCALES 
 
E.3.1. Manipulation checks 
 
Please respond to the following items using the scales below: 
 
Strongly   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Strongly  
Disagree         Agree 
 
1. The President treated Marc with sensitivity and respect ______ 
2. How did Marc’s contribution, qualifications and experience compare to his coworker(s) in 
the scenario (check one):  
- Marc had done more and was more qualified ______ 
- Marc was at least equal to his coworkers ______ 
- Marc was less qualified than his coworker(s) ______ 
 
 
E.3.2. Justice scales 
 
Please respond to the following items using the scales below: 
 
Very Unfair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Very Fair 
 
1. As Marc’s manager, how would you rate the interpersonal treatment provided by the 
President? ______ 
2. Even though the decision was unfavorable for Marc, given Marc’s experience, 
qualifications and results, I thought the decision was: ______ 
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APPENDIX E.4.: THE INVISIBLE REMEDIES SCALE (from item 7 to item 11) 
 
Imagine you are Marc’s manager. Marc has told you his story and he is not satisfied with 
what happened. On the scale below, please indicate how likely you would respond in the 
following manner: 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
Very Unlikely       Very Likely 
 
1. Appeal to the employee’s sense that the future will be better _____ 
2. “Go upstairs” (talk to President) to get help to rectify the situation _____ 
3. Ask the employee to remain confident in the future _____ 
4. Verify whether the decision was made unfairly _____ 
5. Communicate the employee’s concerns to upper management _____ 
6. Try to give the employee more detailed information about the situation _____ 
7. Provide some alternative informal form of compensation _____ 
8. Give the employee a small bonus from my own budget _____ 
9. Think of some fringe benefits to make up for the employee’s loss _____ 
10.  Give the employee some unofficial time off _____ 
11. Try to somehow improve the working conditions for the employee _____ 
12. Try to ensure the employee has a voice in these kinds of future decisions _____ 
13. Tell the employee something to get him to accept the decision _____ 
14. Listen to the employee and show empathy _____ 
15. Reassure the employee of the firm’s good intentions _____ 
16. Recognize and acknowledge the employee’s perspective _____ 
17. Allow the employee to take some company resources home  _____ 
18. Explain that I do not agree with the decision but that the decision needs implementing in 
any case _____ 
19. Show my agreement with the employee concerning the problem _____ 
20. Reassure the employee regarding his value and competence to try to boost his self-esteem 
_____ 
21. Direct him to go to upper management to rectify the problem _____ 
22. Try to justify the situation to the employee _____ 
23. Try to persuade the employee that the situation has advantages for him _____ 
24. Try to give the employee another view of the situation _____ 
25. Confront the transgressor who made the decision _____ 
26. Give less tasks to do to Marc to alleviate his workload _____  
27. Make extra efforts to be a friend to the employee _____ 
28. Tell the subordinate that you blame upper management _____ 
29. Give the employee some time to digest the problem _____ 
30. Deny that the decision was unfair to the employee _____ 
31. Ask your other subordinates to empathize with this employee _____ 
32. Tell the subordinate to stop complaining _____ 
33. Encourage the employee to get over it _____ 
34. Tell the employee that he has no choice in the matter _____ 
35. Advise the employee to appeal the decision and that you will support him _____ 
36. Place at least partial blame on the employee _____ 
37. Ask the employee to remain focused on his current job _____ 
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ABSTRACT: THE FAIR HAND OF MANAGERS: MANAGERS’ VISIBLE AND INVISIBLE CORRECTIVE 
JUSTICE STRATEGIES AND THEIR ANTECEDENTS 
 
Traditional organizational justice research has documented the impact (in)justice perceptions have on a host of 
employees’ attitudes and behaviors. The present dissertation studied the forms and antecedents of the managers’ corrective 
justice behaviors in four complementary ways.  
In the first chapter, I investigated the antecedents of managers’ tendency not to use interactional justice behavior to 
correct for unjust formal procedures and unfair reward allocations – a phenomenon referred to as the “Churchill effect”. An 
experiment (n=118) showed that the more unjust the managers found a situation, the less likely were they to correct it using 
informational justice. Moreover, the less assertive the managers, the less likely were they to correct the injustice using 
interpersonal justice. In addition, managers’ identification with the organization related negatively to their interpersonal and 
informational injustice behaviors and moderated the relationship between managers’ procedural justice judgments and their 
informational justice behaviors. The results also showed that managers can use other corrective justice strategies in addition 
to interpersonal and informational justice. 
In chapter two, other corrective justice strategies were identified. An exploratory study (n=35) was conducted and 
revealed a strategy to correct injustice at work that has received little research attention: a manager allocating extra benefits, 
belonging to the company, and not for their formal or intended use, to restore justice “under the radar”. I labelled this strategy 
an invisible remedies strategy and I named Robin Hoodism the managers’ use of it. In this second study the forms and 
antecedents of this strategy were compared to those of other managerial corrective justice strategies.  
 In a third chapter, the organizational justice and sociological literatures relating to organizational theft were linked 
in order to develop a conceptual model of Robin Hoodism. Research propositions were offered concerning the forms 
invisible remedies might take in the workplace and the conditions under which managers are most likely to use them.  
In the fourth and last chapter, preliminary empirical support was found for aspects of the proposed model, including 
the importance of distributive and interpersonal injustice and of managers’ moral identity as predictors of the managers’ 
allocation of invisible remedies. Specifically, a scenario study (n=187), showed that a three way interaction between 
distributive justice, interpersonal justice and managers moral identity predicted managers’ Robin Hoodism. 
 
KEYWORDS: Organizational justice, managers’ corrective justice strategies, assertiveness, empathy, identification, 
invisible remedies, Robin Hoodism. moral identity. 
 
 
RESUME : LA MAIN JUSTE DES MANAGEURS: LES STRATEGIES VISIBLES ET INVISIBLES DE JUSTICE 
CORRECTIVE DES MANAGEURS ET LEURS ANTECEDENTS 
 
La recherche traditionnelle en justice organisationnelle a montré l’impact que les sentiments de justice et d’injustice 
ont sur un grand nombre d’attitudes et de comportements des salariés. La présente thèse a étudié les formes et les antécédents 
des comportements de justice corrective des manageurs de quatre façons complémentaires.  
 Dans le premier chapitre ont été explorés les antécédents de la tendance des manageurs à ne pas se comporter de 
façon interactionnellement juste pour corriger des procédures formelles injustes et des allocations de récompenses injustes – 
un phénomène connu sous le nom de « effet Churchill ». Une expérience (n=118) a montré que plus les manageurs ont trouvé 
la situation injuste, moins ils ont eu tendance à la corriger en utilisant la justice informationnelle.  De plus moins les 
manageurs étaient assertifs, moins ils ont été enclins à corriger l’injustice en utilisant la justice interpersonnelle. Par ailleurs 
l’identification des manageurs à l’organisation était négativement reliée à leurs comportements d’injustice interpersonnelle et 
informationnelle et modérait la relation entre leurs sentiments de justice procédurale et leurs comportements de justice 
informationnelle. Les résultats ont aussi montré que les manageurs pouvaient utiliser d’autres stratégies de justice corrective 
en plus de la justice interpersonnelle et informationnelle. 
Dans le second chapitre, d’autres stratégies de justice corrective ont été identifiées. Une étude exploratoire (n=35) 
a été menée qui a révélé une stratégie de correction de l’injustice au travail ayant fait l’objet de peu de recherches : le 
manageur réalisant des allocations complémentaires de bénéfices appartenant à l’entreprise, pour des utilisations autres que 
formellement prévues, pour rétablir la justice « sous le manteau ». Cette stratégie a été nommée la stratégie des remèdes 
invisibles et il a été fait référence à son utilisation par les manageurs sous le terme de stratégie Robin des Bois. Cette seconde 
étude a comparé les formes et les antécédents de cette stratégie à ceux des autres stratégies managériales de justice corrective.  
Dans le troisième chapitre la littérature de la justice organisationnelle et celle de la sociologie du vol 
organisationnel ont été reliées de façon à développer un modèle conceptuel de la stratégie Robin des Bois. Des propositions 
de recherche ont été faites concernant les formes que les remèdes invisibles pouvaient prendre au travail et les conditions qui 
rendaient plus probable leur utilisation par les manageurs.  
Dans le quatrième et dernier chapitre, certains aspects du modèle proposé ont reçu une confirmation empirique 
préliminaire, en l’occurrence l’importance de l’injustice distributive, de l’injustice interpersonnelle et de l’identité morale des 
manageurs comme prédicteurs de l’allocation de remèdes invisibles par les manageurs. De façon spécifique, une étude par 
scénario (n=187) a montré qu’une triple interaction entre justice distributive, justice interpersonnelle et identité morale 
prédisait la stratégie Robin des Bois. 
 
MOTS CLES : Justice organisationnelle, stratégies de justice corrective des manageurs, assertivité, empathie, identification, 
remèdes invisibles, stratégie Robin des Bois, identité morale. 
